The Epistemic Value of Emotions in Politics

In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards to the political part, I argue that the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge about political facts, is indeed politically valuable. To develop my argument, I show first that an evaluative kind of knowledge is relevant for reaching a sophisticated level of political cognition, and second that emotions contribute distinctively to this kind of knowledge. I conclude that, when emotional experiences towards political events are coupled with an adequate factual knowledge about those events, they can ground a distinctive evaluative knowledge about those events, and such knowledge is relevant both from an epistemic and a political perspective.     

Working Passions: Emotions and Creative Engagement with Value

It is now a commonplace that emotions are not mere sensations but, rather, conceptually contentful states. In trying to expand on this insight, however, most theoretical approaches to emotions neglect central intuitions about what emotions are like. We therefore need a methodological shift in our thinking about emotions away from the standard accounts' attempts to reduce them to other mental states and toward an exploration of the distinctive work emotions do. I show that emotions' distinctive function is to engage us with both objective and personal values. Attention to emotions' work reveals that it is precisely their “unruliness” that allows them to play meaningful roles in our lives.     

Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge

According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to be favoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour. All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge: there are circumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due to the personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing on the value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to the partiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and consider Ewing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirely satisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing could have offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer.

Quantifying the Value of Emotions Using a Willingness to Pay Approach

People generally seek out positive moods and avoid negative moods; however, it is unclear which motivation is more pronounced. Two studies addressed this issue by developing a value-based ranking of emotions based on the willingness to pay (WTP) approach. The approach utilizes money’s cardinal properties and assumes opportunity costs as with everyday purchases. In Study 1 British participants indicated they would be willing to pay more to experience positive than to avoid negative emotions. In Study 2 this positivity bias was replicated with another sample of British participants. However, Hong Kong Chinese participants did not show such a preference, and were willing to pay significantly less to experience positive emotions but more to avoid negative emotions when compared with British participants. Experiencing Love was given the highest WTP judgment in all samples. Thus, some emotions are universally valued, whereas preferences for others differ across cultural groups, perhaps shaped by norms. Implications concerning valuations of psychological states for policy purposes are discussed.     

The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value

Philosophia - The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts,...     

自我意识情绪：人类高级情绪

自我意识情绪是个体在具有一定自我评价的基础上,通过自我反思而产生的情绪。自我意识情绪与基本情绪既有区别又有联系。自我表征、自我觉察、自我评价过程的卷入是自我意识情绪产生的重要条件。对个体行为进行自我调节、服务于人际交流、人际互惠和个体心理内部需要是自我意识情绪具有的主要功能。自我意识情绪是随着认知的发展而逐渐形成和发展的,并会受到文化的影响。自我报告、非言语行为编码技术、言语报告和行为编码、神经成像技术是自我意识情绪的主要研究方法。自我意识情绪的普遍性和特殊性需要进一步跨文化研究的验证     

Emotions and Human Flourishing

Individual differences in emotional reactivity or affective style can be decomposed into more elementary constituents. Several separable of affective style are identified such as the threshold for reactivity, peak amplitude of response, the rise time to peak and the recovery time. latter two characteristics constitute components of affective chronometry The circuitry that underlies two fundamental forms of motivation and and withdrawal-related processes-is described. Data on differences in functional activity in certain components of these are next reviewed, with an emphasis on the nomological network of surrounding individual differences in asymmetric prefrontal The relevance of such differences for understanding the nature affective dysfunction in affective disorders is then considered. The ends by considering what the prefrontal cortex “does” in certain of affective style and highlights some of the important questions for future research.     

自我意识情绪:聚焦于自我的道德情绪研究

自我意识情绪是人们在社会交往中根据一定的价值标准评价自我或被他人评价时产生的情绪,也是个体根据道德自我认同标准,比较不同情境下的行为或行为倾向时产生的道德情绪。自我意识情绪以自我认知为基础,具有独特性。其中,内疚、羞耻、尴尬以及自豪和道德行为之间存在着千丝万缕的联系,并且有反馈、激发动机以及协调人际行为等道德功能。因此极有必要开展自我意识情绪的本土化研究,为建设和谐社会提供理论支持和实验根据。     

Explaining Emotions

Emotions and cognition are inextricably intertwined. Feelings influence thoughts and actions, which in turn can give rise to new emotional reactions. We claim that people infer emotional states in others using commonsense psychological theories of the interactions among emotions, cognition, and action. We present a situation calculus theory of emotion elicitation representing knowledge underlying commonsense causal reasoning involving emotions, and show how the theory can be used to construct explanations for emotional states. The method for constructing explanations is based on the notion of abduction. This method has been implemented in a computer program called AbMaL. The results of computational experiments using AbMaL to construct explanations of examples based on cases taken from a diary study of emotions indicate that the abductive approach to explanatory reasoning about emotions offers significant advantages. We found that the majority of the diary study examples cannot be explained using deduction alone, but they can be explained by making abjuctive inferences. These inferences provide useful information relevant to emotional states.     

Moral Emotions

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multi‐dimensional and relative to human realities. The “axiological” position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony.     

Emotions as wishes and beliefs

Emotions can be assessed by means of different diagnostic methods, for example, by self-report instruments, ratings of facial expressions, or by projective techniques. This study presents an alternative approach: a computerized investigation of verbally expressed emotions by means of the Affective Dictionary Ulm (ADU; Dahl, H?lzer, & Berry, 1992), which was applied to responses in the Holtzman Inkblot Technique (HIT; Holtzman, 1988; Holtzman, Thorpe, Swartz, & Herron, 1961). A normal group (n = 30), patients with neurotic disorders (n = 30), borderline patients (n = 30), acute schizophrenics (n = 25), and chronic schizophrenics (n = 25) were compared in regard to verbally expressed emotions. According to the results, patients with neurotic disorders did not differ from the normal group in regard to verbally expressed emotions. Borderline patients expressed fear and emotions in general significantly more frequently than all other diagnostic groups. Furthermore, borderline patients differed in regard to specific emotions from patients with neurotic disorders, acute schizophrenics, and chronic schizophrenics. Acute schizophrenics did not differ from the normal group in regard to the expression of emotions, whereas chronic schizophrenics expressed anger, fear, anxiety, and emotions in general significantly less frequently than normals. By a discriminant analysis using verbally expressed emotions as predictors of the diagnosis, hit rates between 87% and 100% could be achieved. Furthermore, hypotheses about correlations between emotions on the one hand and internalized primitive object relations and bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking were tested empirically. Significant correlations could be demonstrated. These results support the validity of assessing emotions through a lexical content analysis of the HIT by use of the ADU.