Developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on young children's event memory and false reports

The present study investigated developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on children's memory and suggestibility. Three- and 5-year-olds were singly or repeatedly interviewed about a play event by a highly biased or control interviewer. Children interviewed once by the biased interviewer after a long delay made the most errors. Children interviewed repeatedly, regardless of interviewer bias, were more accurate and less likely to falsely claim that they played with a man. In free recall, among children questioned once after a long delay by the biased interviewer, 5-year-olds were more likely than were 3-year-olds to claim falsely that they played with a man. However, in response to direct questions, 3-year-olds were more easily manipulated into implying that they played with him. Findings suggest that interviewer bias is particularly problematic when children's memory has weakened. In contrast, repeated interviews that occur a short time after a to-be-remembered event do not necessarily increase children's errors, even when interviews include misleading questions and interviewer bias. Implications for developmental differences in memory and suggestibility are discussed.     

Knowing that I didn't know: preschoolers' understanding of their own false belief is a predictor of assents to fictitious events

The present study examines the relation between children's theory of mind abilities and their tendency to assent to fictitious events when questioned repeatedly across interviews. Children between the ages of 3 and 6 years were interviewed individually either four or seven times about a fictitious and a real staged event, and in addition given a false belief test as well as a fantasy‐reality distinction test. Children's performance on the false belief task addressing the understanding of their own false belief was a better predictor for assents to false events than was understanding the false belief of another person, age, number of interviews and performance on a fantasy‐reality distinction task. Children's memory for a staged event showed that repeated questions across interviews was related to a decrease in correct assents to having experienced a staged event, an increase in wrong yes‐responses about touch and erroneously mentioning names of children who had not been present during the staged event. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's false memory and true disclosure in the face of repeated questions

The current study was designed to investigate children's memory and suggestibility for events differing in valence (positive or negative) and veracity (true or false). A total of 82 3- and 5-year-olds were asked repeated questions about true and false events, either in a grouped order (i.e., all questions about a certain event asked consecutively) or in a nongrouped order (i.e., questions about a certain event were interspersed with questions about other events). Interviewer gender was also varied. Individual differences, including attachment style, inhibition, and behavioral adjustment, were examined as potential predictors of memory and suggestibility. Results revealed significant age, valence, and veracity effects on children's memory reports. Path analysis demonstrated that individual differences in behavioral problems and inhibitory ability predicted children's provision of inaccurate information. Implications for psychological theory and legal application are discussed.     

Five-year-old children's difficulty with false belief when the sought entity is a person

A total of 153 children (excluding those who erred on control questions), mainly 5 and 7 years of age, participated in two experiments that involved tests of false belief. In the task, the sought entity was first at Location 1 and then, unknown to the searching protagonist, it moved to Location 2. In Experiment 1, performance was well below ceiling in 5-year-olds when the sought entity was a person, and this contrasted with a task in which the sought entity was a physical object. Performance was especially inaccurate when the sought person moved of his or her own volition rather than when the sought person was requested to move by a third party. Interestingly, 5-year-olds were more likely to nominate Location 1 when asked where the searching protagonist would look first than when asked what he or she would do next. In Experiment 2, however, 5-year-olds also tended to nominate Location 1 following a question that included the word "first" even in a test of true belief--a patently incorrect response. Altogether, the results suggest that 5-year-old children have considerable difficulty with a test of false belief when the sought entity is a person acting under his or her own volition. This suggests that 5-year-olds' handle on states of belief is surprisingly fragile in this kind of task.     

Rumor mongering and remembering: how rumors originating in children's inferences can affect memory

This study examined how rumors originating in 3- to 6-year-olds' causal inferences can affect their own and their peers' memories for a personally experienced event. This was accomplished by exposing some members of classrooms to contextual clues that were designed to induce inferences about the causes of two unresolved components of the event. After a 1-week delay, a substantial number of children who were exposed to the clues misremembered their inferences as actual experiences. Causal inferential memory errors were most pronounced among 5- and 6-year-olds. Also, many of the children whose classmates were exposed to the clues mistakenly incorporated their classmates' causal inferences into their own accounts, with 3- and 4-year-olds being most likely to make this error.     

Event plausibility does not determine children's false memories

In this paper we ask how the plausibility of an event affects the likelihood that children will develop a false memory for it. Over three interviews 6-year-olds and 10-year-olds were shown two true photos and two false photos—a plausible and less plausible event—and reported what they could remember about those events. Children also rated their confidence that the events happened, and how much they could remember about the events. By the final interview, within each age group, there were no differences in children's confidence ratings for the two false events. In addition, within each age group, the rate of false memories was the same for each event; across age groups, younger children developed more false memories than older children.     

Event plausibility does not determine children's false memories

In this paper we ask how the plausibility of an event affects the likelihood that children will develop a false memory for it. Over three interviews 6-year-olds and 10-year-olds were shown two true photos and two false photos-a plausible and less plausible event-and reported what they could remember about those events. Children also rated their confidence that the events happened, and how much they could remember about the events. By the final interview, within each age group, there were no differences in children's confidence ratings for the two false events. In addition, within each age group, the rate of false memories was the same for each event; across age groups, younger children developed more false memories than older children.     

A comparison of preschoolers' recall of experienced versus non‐experienced events across multiple interviews

Preschool children's recall of both experienced and non‐experienced activities was examined across three interviews. One hundred and six children aged 4 to 5 years (58 males, 48 females) from both low and high socioeconomic status areas participated in an event called the Deakin Activities, which consisted of two experienced activities. One or two days later, the children were asked to recall what happened in the two activities and an activity they had not experienced which was suggested to have occurred along with the experienced activities. Next, children were given false suggestions about one of the experienced (true‐biased) activities and the non‐experienced (false) activity. For the remaining experienced (true‐unbiased) activity, no questions were asked. Three and eight days after the activities were presented, children were again required to recall all three activities in their own words while a variety of suggestive techniques were used as encouragers. The results revealed that irrespective of the SES group, assent rates across the true and false activities became more similar after the first interview. Furthermore, children's narratives about the false activity became more similar in detail, structure and quality to their narratives about the true activities across interviews. However, the rate of fantastic/improbable details was higher for the false activity compared to the true activities, children reported more interviewer suggestions about the false activity than the true‐biased activity, and there were fewer confabulation errors reported about the false activity compared to the true activities. The implications of the results are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rule selection versus rule execution in preschoolers: an error-detection approach.

In 2 experiments, an error-detection approach was used to determine whether 3-year-olds' perseverative errors on the postswitch phase of the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) are due to lack of response control or representational inflexibility. In Experiment 1, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds watched a puppet sort perseveratively on the postswitch phase and evaluated its responses. Most 4- and 5-year-olds detected the puppet's perseverative errors, whereas most 3-year-olds failed to do so despite detecting errors on a simpler card sort. Experiment 2 revealed that 3-year-olds who failed to correctly evaluate the puppet's behavior tended to fail their own DCCS. Results imply that perseveration on the DCCS cannot be attributed to difficulty inhibiting prepotent motor responses. Instead, changes in rule use between 3 and 5 years of age are interpreted in terms of the development of representational flexibility.     

Suggestibility, social support, and memory for a novel experience in young children

This study examined 5- and 6-year-olds' suggestibility and interviewer demeanor as joint predictors of their memory for a novel experience. Session 1 consisted of children taking part in a novel laboratory event. Session 2 took place after approximately a 1-week delay and consisted of children completing both a memory test concerning what happened during the prior event and the Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (VSSC). During the second session, the interviewer behaved either supportively or nonsupportively. Greater acquiescence on the VSSC was associated with fewer correct responses to misleading questions about the laboratory event in the supportive and nonsupportive conditions and with more errors in response to specific questions in the nonsupportive condition. Results indicate that individual differences in children's suggestibility are related to the accuracy of their memory for separate events, although some of these relations may vary depending on the context in which children are interviewed.     

Children's natural conversations following exposure to a rumor: Linkages to later false reports

Previous research has shown that children naturally propagate overheard false rumors and that the circulation of such information can induce children and their peers to wrongly recall actually experiencing rumored-but-nonexperienced events. The current study extends this work by recording 3- to 6-year-olds' naturally occurring conversations following exposure to an erroneous rumor. Results indicate that, compared with children who overhear rumors spread by adults, those who pick up rumors from peers during natural interactions engage in deeper and more inventive rumor mongering. Moreover, the degree and originality of rumor propagation was linked with various qualities of children's subsequent recollections at both 1-week and 4-week delayed interviews. Furthermore, compared with 3- and 4-year-olds, 5- and 6-year-olds naturally transmitted more novel and coherent embellishments of the rumor to their peers, and more of their false narrative reports during the interviews overlapped with their own and their peers' utterances transmitted soon after the rumor was planted.     

Theory of mind, inhibitory control, and preschool-age children's suggestibility in different interviewing contexts

The current study examined the relations among 3- to 5-year-olds' theory of mind, inhibitory control, and three measures of suggestibility: yielding to suggestive questions (yield), shifting answers in response to negative feedback (shift), and accuracy in response to misleading questions during a pressured interview about a live event. Theory of mind aided in the prediction of suggestibility about the live event, and inhibitory control was a moderator variable affecting the consistency of children's sensitivity to social pressure across situations. The findings indicate that theory of mind and inhibitory control predict children's suggestibility about a live event above and beyond yield, shift, and age and that the construct validity of shift may improve as children's inhibitory control develops.     

Children's memory distortions following social contact with a co-witness: Disentangling social and cognitive mechanisms

This study examined whether recalling an event with a co-witness influences children's recall. Individual 3-5-year-olds (n = 48) watched a film with a co-witness. Unbeknown to participants, the co-witness was watching an alternative version of the film. Afterwards both the co-witness and the participant answered questions about the film together (public recall), and the degree to which children conformed to the co-witness's alternative version of events was measured. Subsequently participants were questioned again individually (private recall). Children also completed false belief and inhibitory control tasks. By separating errors made in public and private, the results indicated that both social conformity (32% of errors) and memory distortion (68% of errors) played a role in co-witness influence. Inhibitory control predicted the likelihood of retracting errors in private, but only for children who failed (r=.66) rather than passed false belief tasks (r=-.10). The results suggest that children with a theory of mind conform in the company of the co-witness to avoid social embarrassment, while those a poor theory of mind conform on the basis of an inability to inhibit the co-witness's response. The findings contribute to our understanding of the motivations responsible for co-witness conformity across early childhood.     

Are eyes windows to a deceiver's soul? Children's use of another's eye gaze cues in a deceptive situation

Three experiments examined 3- to 5-year-olds' use of eye gaze cues to infer truth in a deceptive situation. Children watched a video of an actor who hid a toy in 1 of 3 cups. In Experiments 1 and 2, the actor claimed ignorance about the toy's location but looked toward 1 of the cups, without (Experiment 1) and with (Experiment 2) head movement. In Experiment 3, the actor provided contradictory verbal and eye gaze clues about the location of the toy. Four- and 5-year-olds correctly used the actor's gaze cues to locate the toy, whereas 3-year-olds failed to do so. Results suggest that by 4 years of age, children begin to understand that eye gaze cues displayed by a deceiver can be informative about the true state of affairs.     

The development of the memorability-based strategy: insight from a training study

We investigated whether the memorability-based strategy, a process supporting the rejection of nonexperienced event occurrence, could be promoted through training. The performance of children who received memorability-based training was compared with that of (a) children who received source-monitoring training and (b) children who did not receive any specific training but were instructed to be as accurate as possible. Participants (142 6- to 10-year-olds) enacted common and bizarre actions. Eighteen days later, participants received misinformation about the first session. Five days after being misinformed, children were questioned about the first session. Compared with children in the no training condition, those in both training conditions reported significantly more true events, but only older children who received the memorability-based training were more likely to reject bizarre suggested events. Age interacted with action type when metacognitive assessments about false event rejection were examined, consistent with the idea that the use of the memorability-based strategy develops late during the elementary school years.     

Young children can tell strategic lies after committing a transgression

This study investigated whether young children make strategic decisions about whether to lie to conceal a transgression based on the lie recipient's knowledge. In Experiment 1, 168 3- to 5-year-olds were asked not to peek at the toy in the experimenter's absence, and the majority of children peeked. Children were questioned about their transgression in either the presence or absence of an eyewitness of their transgression. Whereas 4- and 5-year-olds were able to adjust their decisions of whether to lie based on the presence or absence of the eyewitness, 3-year-olds did not. Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated whether the lie recipient appeared to have learned information about children's peeking from an eyewitness or was merely bluffing. Results revealed that when the lie recipient appeared to be genuinely knowledgeable about their transgression, even 3-year-olds were significantly less likely to lie compared with when the lie recipient appeared to be bluffing. Thus, preschool children are able to make strategic decisions about whether to lie or tell the truth based on whether the lie recipient is genuinely knowledgeable about the true state of affairs.     

When Baby Maisy came to school: Mothers' interview styles and preschoolers' event memories

Fifteen 4–5-year-old children experienced a surprise event in their classroom — the visit of their former teacher and her new baby. The same day, children were interviewed about the event by their mothers, who had not been present and were naive to details. Mothers questioned their children in whatever way they wished. Three weeks later, children were interviewed by a researcher who had not been present during the original event and who had no information about the content of the parent–child interviews. Results showed that mothers' conversational style predicted the amount of information children provided during the mother–child interview, which in turn predicted how much accurate information children remembered during the researcher–child interview. The findings suggest that parent–child memory talk affects children's long-term memory reports, even when parents do not share in the event and have no knowledge of its details.     

Children's suggestibility for an instance of a repeated event versus a unique event: the effect of degree of association between variable details

Are children who experience an event repeatedly more suggestible about an instance of the event than children who experience it once? Researchers have answered this question both in the affirmative and in the negative. In this study, we hypothesized that the degree of association between details that changed across instantiations of the event would help to explain the discrepancy. Preschoolers (4- and 5-year-olds) and first graders (6- and 7-year-olds) participated in either a single play session or four repeated play sessions, each of which contained 16 critical details. Across play sessions in the repeat-event condition, half of the critical details were associated and half were not associated. During a biasing interview 2 weeks later, children were misinformed about half of the critical details. The next day, children answered free and cued recall questions about the target play session. Among older children, repeat-event participants were more suggestible than single-event participants, especially for high-association details. Among younger children, repeat-event participants were more suggestible than single-event participants for low-association details. Consistent with some current theories of children's memory, older children were more suggestible than younger children.