What is wrong with incest?

Incest taboos should be seen as involving non‐sexual objections to sexual relations, that is, objections based on who people are in relation to each other, rather than their activities. What is at stake is brought out by considering certain objections to father‐daughter incest and certain features of taboos. The objections that matter do not depend on social ties and distinctions having a biological basis, but there is nonetheless a biological element in incest taboos. To see it, one must look to the nature of the Oedipus complex, and to the conditions for the development of the individual and of society. There may be prohibitions which are necessary (to morality, to society, to humanity) even though they may not be justifiable within a narrower conception (e.g. utilitarian) of morality and justification. And so taboos which are universal (occur, in one form or another, in every society), and absolute (allow no questioning), and impose strict liability (allow no excuse), may not be irrational: they may mark the boundaries that shape a way of life.     

What is wrong with imagery questionnaires?

Research evidence is reviewed which shows that the questionnaire method represents a deviant case in imagery research: Whereas experimental techniques consistently produce strong effects for the imagery variable in a large specter of cognitive tasks, research based on imagery questionnaires yields ambiguous and most frequently negative results. Existing explanations of the discrepant findings are critically examined and found to be inadequate. An alternative interpretation is offered, where it is hypothesized that the questionnaire approach to the study of imagery is infected by a serious methodological flaw, due to differences in subjective conceptions of the rating scale employed in imagery questionnaires. Experimental evidence is reported which supports this interpretation.     

What is wrong with Allais' Certainty Effect?

Several choice situations are constructed to explore whether the violation of expected utility theory in an Allais paradox choice situation can be attributed to what Tversky and Kahneman (1986) describe as the Allais certainty effect. Problems are developed where the Allais certainty effect would be expected to occur but results show it does not. Other problems demonstrate that the Allais ‘paradox’ is observed in the absence of the Allais certainty effect. The study concludes that, although expected utility theory is known to be wrong through the Allais paradox, the Allais certainty effect does not appear to be able to rescue it.     

What is Wrong with the Concept of Religious Experience?

After briefly mentioning the reason why the concept of religious experience has become a key to understanding Western and non-Western religious phenomena in current religious studies, this paper argues that the concept itself is insufficient to represent the religious phenomena of Islam, because to speak about 'an experience of God' in the context of Islam is misleading. This paper also argues that to consider mystical experience as well as the prophetic revelation that is wah?y within the boundaries of religious experience is confusing. Since the transmission process and contents of wah?y are extraordinary and miraculous, it should not be treated as an ordinary religious occurrence and therefore should not be considered as a personal religious experience.     

What is wrong with religious education? A response to Philip Barnes

This article reviews Philip Barnes’ account of problems with religious eEducation (RE), and explores the practical implications of his position. Acknowledging his compelling logic – that RE is premised on an acceptance of all religions as equally theologically true – this article argues for optimism: with controversy and ambiguity moving to centre stage, a re‐orientation of RE’s attainment targets could focus RE curricula and provide a measure of direction for future progress. Equally, a focus on developing individual values for life in a plural democracy – where personal destinies often conflict both culturally and existentially – would likewise give RE a more potent purpose and the foundations for a normative agenda. Inspired by J.S. Mill, this article concludes that such RE may have to move beyond the classroom to achieve its potential as a critical, inclusive, relevant and progressive subject with coherent social and educational aims.     

What is the Role of Culture in the Association of Relationships with Health?

There is now widespread recognition that relationships have important implications for health. To better understand this linkage, scholars have called for greater bridging between relationship science and the study of health. The goal of this paper is to raise awareness of another factor that needs to be incorporated into this area of study: culture. I recommend three steps that researchers can take to systematically incorporate culture into the study of relationships and health. First, I suggest four possible culture patterns to study: similarity, moderation, mediation, and novel constructs. Second, I suggest that theoretically meaningful cultural variation and multiple cultures be concurrently studied. The value of this strategy is highlighted via examples from three contexts that emphasize distinct approaches to self and emotion in relationships. Third, I suggest that key relationship processes in families and couples, two relationships with extensive implications for health, be studied. Selected studies of four relationship processes known to be relevant for health – expectations, formation and maintenance, emotions, and social support – are briefly reviewed to highlight the value of this focus. The theoretical and applied benefit of incorporating culture into the study of the association of relationships with health is discussed.     

What is the Problem of Non-Existence?

It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the problem of non-existence, despite what some philosophers say.     

What’s wrong with the evolutionary argument against naturalism?

Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism (the idea that God does not tinker with evolution) undermines its own rationality. Natural selection is concerned with survival and reproduction, and false beliefs conjoined with complementary motivational drives could serve the same aims as true beliefs. Thus, argues Plantinga, if we believe we evolved naturally, we should not think our beliefs are, on average, likely to be true, including our beliefs in evolution and naturalism. I argue herein that our cognitive faculties are less reliable than we often take them to be, that it is theism which has difficulty explaining the nature of our cognition, that much of our knowledge is not passed through biological evolution but learned and transferred through culture, and that the unreliability of our cognition helps explain the usefulness of science.     

What is the point of helping?

Philosophical Studies - In some cases, a group of people can bring about a morally bad outcome despite each person’s individual act making no difference with respect to bringing that outcome...     

What is the Point of Sufficiency?

Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal value. Neither, secondly, is it committed to the person‐affecting view, the view that says that nothing can be better (worse) if there is no one for whom it is better (worse). This, in itself, is of interest because some sufficientarians reject egalitarianism precisely for its alleged incompatibility with the person‐affecting view. Sufficientarians' disavowal of the person‐affecting view implies that their view, similarly to egalitarianism (and, perhaps less famously, prioritarianism), must be anchored in some impersonal value. But crucially, and this is the third step of the argument, there is no apparent value that can fit that role. We must conclude, then, that telic sufficientarianism is groundless.     

What is the Normativity of Meaning?

There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle a dispute among proponents of the claim that meaning is normative, it should be of interest to those who challenge it. After all, before one takes aim, one’s target needs to be in clear view.