Hindsight bias in political elections

Two studies on political hindsight bias were conducted on the occasions of the German parliament election in 1998 and the Nordrhein-Westfalen state parliament election in 2000. In both studies, participants predicted the percentage of votes for several political parties and recalled these predictions after the election. The observed hindsight effects were stronger than those found in any prior study on political elections (using percentage of votes as the dependent variable). We argue that the length of the retention interval between original judgement and recollection is mainly responsible for this difference. In our second study, we investigated possible artifacts in political hindsight biases using a control-group design where half of the participants recalled their predictions shortly before or after the election. Hindsight bias was preserved, reinforcing the results of earlier studies with non-control-group designs. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the hindsight experience (in political judgement and in general) actually consists of three different, partly independent components.     

Hindsight bias in political elections

Two studies on political hindsight bias were conducted on the occasions of the German parliament election in 1998 and the Nordrhein-Westfalen state parliament election in 2000. In both studies, participants predicted the percentage of votes for several political parties and recalled these predictions after the election. The observed hindsight effects were stronger than those found in any prior study on political elections (using percentage of votes as the dependent variable). We argue that the length of the retention interval between original judgement and recollection is mainly responsible for this difference. In our second study, we investigated possible artifacts in political hindsight biases using a control-group design where half of the participants recalled their predictions shortly before or after the election. Hindsight bias was preserved, reinforcing the results of earlier studies with non-control-group designs. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the hindsight experience (in political judgement and in general) actually consists of three different, partly independent components.     

模拟法官决策中心理控制源对后见偏差的影响

考察模拟法官决策中心理控制源对后见偏差的影响。实验采用2（心理控制源：外控型、内控型）×3（有无策略：后见组、分散注意组、指导组）两因素被试间实验设计。采用自编两个案例及问卷测查模拟法官决策中后见效应的差异。实验结果发现,不同心理控制源是导致模拟法官决策中后见偏差存在差异的影响因素。同时,两种策略都能够有效减少模拟法官决策中的后见偏差。     

Reversibility of the Hindsight Bias: Manipulation of Experimental Demands

A hindsight bias is found when ratings made after outcome feedback differ from ratings made before feedback. Cognitive processes, motivational factors, and demand characteristics have all been identified as possible mediators of the effect. In the first of two experiments, providing subjects with a forewarning with or without a passage that was predicted to have caused it to be ineffective in previous research failed to reduce the bias. Subsequent instructions to produce the bias inflated the effect, whereas instructions to not produce the bias did not alter ratings. In the second experiment, experimental demands were altered by forewarning subjects about a "never-knew-that" effect. The results from Experiment 2 replicated the failure of the forewarning instructions. However, the hindsight bias was removed by instructions to produce a "never-knew-that" effect. The implications of these two experiments for research into the hindsight bias were discussed.     

“I Knew It All Along” Under All Conditions? or Possibly “I Could Not Have Expected It to Happen” Under Some Conditions?: Comments on Mark and Mellor (1994)

Research conducted by Mazursky and Ofir (1990) suggests that the reaction to a surprising event may take the form of ‘I could not have expected it to happen’ rather than ‘I knew it all along,’ as implied by the hindsight bias. Mazursky and Ofir (1990) postulated that people may acknowledge their surprise at highly unexpected outcomes. When asked to provide retrospective judgments, they would tend to provide judgments that are not in accordance with the hindsight bias. Instead, their judgments represent either the elimination of the bias or even its reversal. The present paper responds to Mark and Mellor's (1994) comments and also addresses general questions regarding the hindsight bias and its reversal. The alternative hypotheses and interpretations offered by them are discussed in detail, shown to be invalid, and ruled out. The robustness of hindsight bias is affirmed but it is strongly recommended that the reversal hypothesis offered by Mazursky and Ofir (1990) be accommodated.     

We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups

Two studies investigated the occurrence of hindsight distortion in groups as compared to individuals. Competing predictions were derived from four theoretical positions: Memory impairment, response bias, self-presentation, and group polarization. In Experiment 1, small groups vs individuals made hypothetical predictions with or without outcome information. Both individuals and groups were found to distort their predictions in the direction of the alleged outcome. Experiment 2 employed a memory design in which individuals vs groups made a series of predictions for which they subsequently received outcome information which was either above or below their prediction or for which they received no outcome information. Subjects had to recall their initial prediction. Results indicated that (a) hindsight bias was slightly attenuated in groups compared to individuals, (b) groups were more likely to recall their original predictions correctly than individuals, (c) this recall advantage of groups disappeared when time taken to make the initial prediction was held constant, and (d) outcome information affected hindsight bias but not hit rates. Results were interpreted as supporting the response bias perspective.     

Integrating temporal biases: the interplay of focal thoughts and accessibility experiences

We provide an integrative account of temporal biases (confidence changes, planning fallacy, impact bias, and hindsight bias). Students listed either 3 or 12 thoughts about success or failure before an upcoming real-life exam or immediately after learning their grades. Previous explanations had focused on how thought content alone (what comes to mind) influences temporal biases. We found, however, an interaction between thought content and accessibility experiences (how easily or difficultly thoughts come to mind). Thinking about 3 ways to succeed (success was easy to bring to mind) was equivalent to thinking about 12 ways to fail (failure was difficult to bring to mind), and conversely, thinking about 3 ways to fail was equivalent to thinking about 12 ways to succeed. In no case was thought content alone sufficient to predict the biases. These results have implications for debiasing strategies and other judgments over time.     

Surprise, defence, or making sense: what removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite-that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.     

Surprise,defence, or making sense: What removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite--that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.     

Hindsight bias demonstrated in the prediction of a sporting event

The authors examined hindsight bias in the context of a sporting event (Super Bowl XXXIII) with individuals who had previous knowledge of the hindsight bias-42 students who were currently enrolled in psychology classes that had previously covered hindsight bias. To control for extraneous variables, the authors analyzed how often the participants watched football, their gender, and whom they predicted to win; they found no differences between how often the participants watched football and whom they predicted to win. The hindsight bias existed for the prediction of the outcome for the Super Bowl, and the participants with previous knowledge were not immune to its effect. Results are discussed in relation to attribution theory, the reconstructionist view, and response bias view.     

Hindsight Bias Demonstrated in the Prediction of a Sporting Event

Abstract

The authors examined hindsight bias in the context of a sporting event (Super Bowl XXXIII) with individuals who had previous knowledge of the hindsight bias–42 students who were currently enrolled in psychology classes that had previously covered hindsight bias. To control for extraneous variables, the authors analyzed how often the participants watched football, their gender, and whom they predicted to win; they found no differences between how often the participants watched football and whom they predicted to win. The hindsight bias existed for the prediction of the outcome for the Super Bowl, and the participants with previous knowledge were not immune to its effect. Results are discussed in relation to attribution theory, the reconstructionist view, and response bias view.     

Hindsight bias: a by-product of knowledge updating?

With the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, people's recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judgments were. It has been suggested that this hindsight bias may be due to a reconstruction process of the prior judgment. A model of such a process is proposed that assumes that knowledge is updated after feedback and that reconstruction is based on the updated knowledge. Consistent with the model's predictions, the results of 2 studies show that knowledge after feedback is systematically shifted toward feedback, and that assisting retrieval of the knowledge prior to feedback reduces hindsight bias. In addition, the model accounts for about 75% of cases in which either hindsight bias or reversed hindsight bias occurred. The authors conclude that hindsight bias can be understood as a by-product of an adaptive process, namely the updating of knowledge after feedback.     

Age Differences in Processes Underlying Hindsight Bias: A Life-Span Study

Hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of a fact or event after learning the actual fact. Recent research has suggested that age-related differences in hindsight bias may be based on age-related differences in inhibitory control. We tested whether this explanation held for 3 cognitive processes assumed to underlie hindsight bias: recollection bias, reconstruction bias, and the tendency to adopt newly acquired knowledge as old. We performed a typical hindsight-bias study with 9-year-olds, 12-year-olds, young adults, and older adults. Participants first gave numerical judgments to difficult almanac questions. They later received the correct judgments for some of the questions while trying to recall their own earlier judgments. To experimentally test the impact of inhibitory control, the correct judgment was presented either in a weak or in a strong manner that was difficult to ignore. Hindsight bias was larger in the strong condition than in the weak condition and followed a U-shaped life-span pattern with young adults showing the least hindsight bias in line with an inhibitory-control explanation. Yet, the mixture of underlying processes differed considerably between age groups, so inhibitory control did not suffice as a sole explanation of age differences.     

Is social projection based on simulation or theory? Why new methods are needed for differentiating

The literature on social cognition reports many instances of a phenomenon titled ‘social projection’ or ‘egocentric bias’. These terms indicate egocentric predictions, i.e., an over-reliance on the self when predicting the cognition, emotion, or behavior of other people. The classic method to diagnose egocentric prediction is to establish high correlations between our own and other people's cognition, emotion, or behavior. We argue that this method is incorrect because there is a different way to come to a correlation between own and predicted states, namely, through the use of theoretical knowledge. Thus, the use of correlational measures is not sufficient to identify the source of social predictions. Based on the distinction between simulation theory and theory theory, we propose the following alternative methods for inferring prediction strategies: independent vs. juxtaposed predictions, the use of ‘hot’ mental processes, and the use of participants’ self-reports.     

Surprise influences hindsight–foresight differences in temporal judgments of animated automobile accidents

The hindsight bias occurs when people view an outcome as more foreseeable than it actually was. The role of an outcome’s initial surprise in the hindsight bias was examined using animations of automobile accidents. Twenty-six participants rated the initial surprise of accidents’ occurring in eight animations. An additional 84 participants viewed these animations in one of two conditions: Half stopped the animations when they were certain an accident would occur (i.e., in foresight), and the other half watched the entire animations first and then stopped the animations when they thought that a naïve viewer would be certain that an accident would occur (i.e., in hindsight). When the accidents were low in initial surprise, there were no foresight–hindsight differences; when initial surprise was medium, there was a hindsight bias; and when initial surprise was high, there was a reversed hindsight bias. The results are consistent with a sense-making model of hindsight bias.     

Hindsight Bias,Visual Aids,and Legal Decision Making: Timing is Everything

Once individuals learn the outcomes of events, they tend to overestimate the ability with which they could have predicted the event (hindsight bias). We discuss the relation between processing fluency and hindsight bias in the context of visual animations designed to clarify complex events. Visual reconstructions, by increasing clarity while masking gaps or uncertainty in the underlying data, have been shown to increase hindsight bias in legal settings. More generally, any computer‐generated visual may not only clarify data sets, but breed overconfidence. Further, by taking a broader view of judgments shift over time, a clearer portrait of hindsight bias may be achieved.     

Attribute models and the effect of frequency and imagery values on word recognition

Recent explanations of the word frequency effect in recognition studies (Gregg 1976; Glanzer and Bowles 1976) state that this effect occurs because words of high and low frequency differ in encoding variability and number of associative relations. These models suggest that the different recognition scores of high and low frequency words are the result of both more hits and less false positives on words that have a low frequency of occurence. As Morris (1978) showed, these models can also be applied on the effect of word imagery values on recognition performance.In the first experiment to be reported here the differential effects of words of high and low frequency and imagery values on hit and false positive rates were examined. The predicted results concerning high and low imagery values were indeed found, but the predictions with respect to high and low frequency words were not completely substantiated. However, it was shown that this deviation can be explained by a response bias effect.In a second experiment an assumption concerning the underlying distributions of high and low imagery ‘old’ and ‘new’ items was tested. In accord with the expectation it was found that the distributions of ‘old’ high and low imagery words did not differ, but that there was a clear difference in the distributions of ‘new’ high and low imagery words.     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

A retrieval-based approach to eliminating hindsight bias

Individuals exhibit hindsight bias when they are unable to recall their original responses to novel questions after correct answers are provided to them. Prior studies have eliminated hindsight bias by modifying the conditions under which original judgments or correct answers are encoded. Here, we explored whether hindsight bias can be eliminated by manipulating the conditions that hold at retrieval. Our retrieval-based approach predicts that if the conditions at retrieval enable sufficient discrimination of memory representations of original judgments from memory representations of correct answers, then hindsight bias will be reduced or eliminated. Experiment 1 used the standard memory design to replicate the hindsight bias effect in middle-school students. Experiments 2 and 3 modified the retrieval phase of this design, instructing participants beforehand that they would be recalling both their original judgments and the correct answers. As predicted, this enabled participants to form compound retrieval cues that discriminated original judgment traces from correct answer traces, and eliminated hindsight bias. Experiment 4 found that when participants were not instructed beforehand that they would be making both recalls, they did not form discriminating retrieval cues, and hindsight bias returned. These experiments delineate the retrieval conditions that produce—and fail to produce—hindsight bias.     

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age

Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function.