A model of plausibility

Plausibility has been implicated as playing a critical role in many cognitive phenomena from comprehension to problem solving. Yet, across cognitive science, plausibility is usually treated as an operationalized variable or metric rather than being explained or studied in itself. This article describes a new cognitive model of plausibility, the Plausibility Analysis Model (PAM), which is aimed at modeling human plausibility judgment. This model uses commonsense knowledge of concept-coherence to determine the degree of plausibility of a target scenario. In essence, a highly plausible scenario is one that fits prior knowledge well: with many different sources of corroboration, without complexity of explanation, and with minimal conjecture. A detailed simulation of empirical plausibility findings is reported, which shows a close correspondence between the model and human judgments. In addition, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates that PAM is robust in its operations.     

Changing beliefs about implausible autobiographical events: a little plausibility goes a long way

Three experiments investigated the malleability of perceived plausibility and the subjective likelihood of occurrence of plausible and implausible events among participants who had no recollection of experiencing them. In Experiment 1, a plausibility-enhancing manipulation (reading accounts of the occurrence of events) combined with a personalized suggestion increased the perceived plausibility of the implausible event, as well as participants' ratings of the likelihood that they had experienced it. Plausibility and likelihood ratings were uncorrelated. Subsequent studies showed that the plausibility manipulation alone was sufficient to increase likelihood ratings but only if the accounts that participants read were set in a contemporary context. These data suggest that false autobiographical beliefs can be induced in clinical and forensic contexts even for initially implausible events.     

Acquiring complex partial orderings in comparison with acquiring similar-sized linear orderings

The acquisition of a 14-term partial ordering was compared with the acquisition of a 14-term linear ordering. Learning the partial ordering was found to be more difficult because of two factors: (1) Subjects do not appear to have in their knowledge systems a prototype or rule for representing a long list of comparative relations as a partial ordering structure, and (2) the partial ordering must be presented so that some of the adjacently presented premises do not contain a common element. When these two factors were controlled, the partial ordering was as easy to learn as the linear ordering. It was also found that subjects learning the partial ordering showed no evidence of a serial position learning curve, whereas subjects learning the linear ordering showed some tendency to produce a serial position learning curve.     

Rosser orderings and free variables

It is shown that for arithmetical interpretations that may include free variables it is not the Guaspari-Solovay system R that is arithmetically complete, but their system R ^–. This result is then applied to obtain the nonvalidity of some rules under arithmetical interpretations including free variables, and to show that some principles concerning Rosser orderings with free variables cannot be decided, even if one restricts oneself to usual proof predicates.     

More and more and more about more

Three experiments explored the development of three linguistic aspects of more in children's speech. Subjects were 56 children between the ages of 2;6 and 6;0. Experiment 1 addressed the nature of the early semantic content of more. Experiment 2 examined the child's differentiation of mass more from count more. Experiment 3 explored the child's use of more as a comparative marker on adjectives. The results suggest, first, that the child initially stores the meaning of more with a prototype, rather than with some more systematic, featural representation. In addition, children's linguistic understanding of the dual use of more as a quantifier of mass amounts and count amounts does not appear to develop until long after they have been using more appropriately in unambiguous contexts. Finally, children learn to use more as a marker on comparatives only after they have acquired -er as a comparative marker, and some time after they have been using more successfully in nonadjectival constructions.     

More about linda or conjunctions in context

Abstract

Tversky and Kahneman (1982; 1983) reported that subjects rated the con junction of two events as more likely than one of the component events. This “conjunction effect” is an error in terms of formal probability, where the probability of more happening is always smaller than the probability of less. They explained this effect in terms of a “representativeness” heuristic. This paper focuses on the context of the problem and the suggestions implied by the questions in the task. The three studies reported here provide evidence that context effects and implicit suggestions alter subjects' judgements. Tvenky and Kahneman's models take no account of such factors. Two studies show that when implicit suggestions are reduced, subjects are much less prone to the conjunction “effect”. Subjects take being asked the question “Is person X a Y?”, as providing evidence that X may be Y.     

Positional discriminability in linear orderings

Subjects were taught two eight-term linear orders of the form “A taller than B taller than C ….,” They were then asked to choose the “taller” term in all possible pairwise combinations within each series, and reaction time was measured for each pair. In addition, subjects performed a further task in which they judged whether or not two terms were adjacent in the ordering. In subsequent sessions, subjects were told that the “shortest” term on one list was taller than the “tallest” term on the other, so that the two lists were merged into a single 16-term series. They were then required to choose the “taller” term for both within-groups and between-groups pairs. Subjects did not appear to use the initial groupings in performing this task, even when given training on differential categorical codes (“tall” vs. “short”) for the two sublists. Rather, subjects in all tasks appeared to represent the items as ordered positions along an internal array, so that comparison times depended largely on the differential discriminability of the item positions. In each task decisions were made more quickly if the terms being compared were near the ends of the ordering, rather than near the middle.     

On the plausibility of Superman's x-ray vision

Requirements that a vision system must meet to make Superman 's x-ray vision possible are stated, and two solutions are proposed. In one, emitted x-rays carry the information to Superman 's eyes; in the other, emitted rays make objects transparent to a second type of ray. Further subjects lending themselves to this type of research are superhearing , the biomechanics of leaping tall buildings, or being faster than a bullet.     

On L-decomposability of random orderings

In the setting of random orderings, we study conditional independence properties related to L-decomposability. We show that if a random ordering satisfies L-decomposability for any labelling of the ranks, then it is quasi-independent, provided the number of alternatives is at least 4, and each ordering has a positive probability.     

The availability explanation of excessive plausibility assessments

The assessment of hypotheses in hypothesis generation involves a comparison between those hypotheses that have been generated (specified) and those that are not generated (unspecified). Experiment 1 was an investigation of an “availability explanation” for subjects' overconfidence in the probability of specified hypotheses. The conjecture is that subjects have difficulty retrieving unspecified hypotheses from memory. Therefore, the underpopulated set of unspecified hypotheses is assessed as less probable then it actually is and the specified set is assessed as more probable. Two manipulations to increase the availability of unspecified hypotheses were investigated. One involved explicitly requesting subjects to populate the unspecified set; the other was a computer presentation of candidate unspecified hypotheses. Results of experiment 1 were that assessment overconfidence for both experimental groups was reduced. The results support the conjecture that the availability heuristic is at least partially responsible for subjects' overconfidence. The main result of experiment 2 was that the overconfidence bias persisted with different assessment methods for both subject-generated and experimenter-supplied hypotheses.