Children's numerical skill and judgments of confidence in estimation

This study investigated how children's fluent use of a basic numerical skill is related to their perceptions of confidence on a task of quantitative estimation. One hundred four 10th graders (age 15.7 years) were categorized according to level of numerical fluency as assessed by timed tasks of counting in various nonunity increments. They then made estimates of large numbers of dots and rated how confident they were on each trial. The estimation task varied according to two within-subject factors of task difficulty. It was found that counting skill was related not only to accuracy in estimating, but also to the appropriateness of the children's confidence in their responses. Skillful children made judgments that corresponded with actual task difficulty. A derived calibration score corroborated ANOVA findings of the interaction of skill level and task difficulty on confidence ratings. It also revealed that while girls were less confident than boys, they were actually more realistic in their judgments. Findings are discussed in terms of (a) the effect of stimulus knowledge on awareness of task difficulty and (b) sex differences in achievement-related expectancies.     

Forecasting outcomes of the World Cup 2006 in football: Performance and confidence of bettors and laypeople

ObjectivesMotivated by a paucity of research on sports forecasting, this paper examines how well individuals with varying degrees of relevant knowledge predict football (soccer) and how much confidence they have in their predictions.Design and procedureThree groups of participants (110 art students, 81 sports students, and 85 bettors) representing three levels of knowledge (poor, moderate, and expert) performed five forecasting tasks with relation to the outcome of the first round of the World Cup 2006. The tasks were assumed to reflect different degrees of complexity. About half of the participants obtained relevant information (world rankings). The participants stated their confidence in connection to conducting those tasks.ResultsWhereas the groups had roughly similar levels of performance in three tasks (i.e., predicting the teams qualifying for the second round as well as two types of match statistics), the knowledgeable and expert participants were better at predicting scores and percentage of ball possession in the matches than the naïve participants. Relatively few participants performed better than the simple rule that followed world rankings. Regardless of task complexity, the knowledgeable and expert participants were found to be significantly more confident about their forecasts than the naïve participants. Access to information had limited influence on forecasting performance and confidence.ConclusionThe present study shows that the forecasting performance of football experts and laypeople varies dependent on task. For easy tasks, they tend to predict equally well, partly because laypeople might use well-adapted heuristics. Once the prediction tasks become more difficult, the experts may take advantage of their domain-specific skills and produce forecasts that excel those of the laypeople.     

Influences of metamemory on performance predictions for text

When predicting future performance on tests over text material, do individuals estimate retention in addition to assessing comprehension? In Experiment 1, participants either rated their comprehension or predicted performance for each text, with lower ratings indicating lower confidence either in comprehension or in eventual performance. Judgement magnitude was significantly lower for performance predictions than for comprehension ratings, suggesting that predictions were based partly on retention estimates. In Experiment 2, predictions varied with anticipated test delay (15 min or 2 weeks) whereas comprehension ratings did not, providing further evidence that individuals estimate retention when predicting performance. Analyses of individual differences suggest that both good and poor performers incorporate retention estimates when predicting performance, but better performers do so in a more discriminative manner. Implications for theory of metacognitive judgements are discussed.     

An ingroup advantage for confidence in emotion recognition judgments: the moderating effect of familiarity with the expressions of outgroup members

The confidence we have in our assessment of an interaction partner's emotional state can have important consequences for the quality of the interaction. Two studies assessed the hypothesis that immigrants are more confident in their judgment of others' emotional facial expressions if the expresser is a member of their cultural ingroup rather than a member of the host community or another cultural group. In addition, the effects of the perceived familiarity with the type of expression, the length of residence in the host country, the quality of cross-cultural contact, the level of acculturation, and the intensity of the facial expressions were assessed. Overall, the results revealed an ingroup advantage effect for confidence ratings as well as support for the notion that individuals are more confident when judging expressions that they consider as more frequently displayed in everyday life. Furthermore, individuals were more confident when judging happiness expressions as well as more intense expressions in general.     

单维测验合成信度元分析

元分析是根据现有研究对感兴趣的主题得出比较准确和有代表性结论的一种重要方法,在心理、教育、管理、医学等社会科学研究中得到广泛应用。信度是衡量测验质量的重要指标,用合成信度能比较准确的估计测验信度。未见有文献提供合成信度元分析方法。本研究在比较对参数进行元分析的三种模型优劣的基础上,在变化系数模型下推出合成信度元分析点估计及区间估计的方法;以区间覆盖率为衡量指标,模拟研究表明本研究提出的合成信度元分析区间估计的方法得当;举例说明如何对单维测验的合成信度进行元分析。     

A note comparing three measures of subjective probability,their validity and reliability

An attempt was made to compare three measures of subjective probability: estimates out of ten, confidence ratings and time to decide. The validity and reliability of these measures was also investigated. Estimates out of ten and confidence ratings were found to be closely similar measures, but the results from decision times were not so closely comparable. However, the results might be considered to offer sufficient support for the use of decision time when there are strong advantages for a scale which does not require Ss' active participation and deliberation.     

Jumping to conclusions and the continuum of delusional beliefs

The present study examined the jumping to conclusions reasoning bias across the continuum of delusional ideation by investigating individuals with active delusions, delusion prone individuals, and non-delusion prone individuals. Neutral and highly self-referent probabilistic reasoning tasks were employed. Results indicated that individuals with delusions gathered significantly less information than delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on both the neutral and self-referent tasks, (p<.001). Individuals with delusions made less accurate decisions than the delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on both tasks (p<.001), yet were more confident about their decisions than were delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on the self-referent task (p=.002). Those with delusions and those who were delusion prone reported higher confidence in their performance on the self-referent task than they did the neutral task (p=.02), indicating that high self-reference impacted information processing for individuals in both of these groups. The results are discussed in relation to previous research in the area of probabilistic reasoning and delusions.     

The link between judgments of comparative risk and own risk: further evidence

Individuals typically believe that they are less likely than the average person to experience negative events, a phenomenon termed "unrealistic optimism". The direct method of assessing unrealistic optimism employs a question of the form, "Compared with the average person, what is the chance that X will occur to you?". However, it has been proposed that responses to such a question (direct-estimates) are based essentially just on estimates that X will occur to the self (self-estimates). If this is so, any factors that affect one of these estimates should also affect the other. This prediction was tested in two experiments. In each, direct- and self-estimates for an unfamiliar health threat - homocysteine-related heart problems - were recorded. It was found that both types of estimate were affected in the same way by varying the stated probability of having unsafe levels of homocysteine (Study 1, N=149) and varying the stated probability that unsafe levels of homocysteine will lead to heart problems (Study 2, N=111). The results are consistent with the proposal that direct-estimates are constructed just from self-estimates.     

Lax monitoring versus logical intuition: The determinants of confidence in conjunction fallacy

The general assumption that people fail to notice discrepancy between their answer and the normative answer in the conjunction fallacy task has been challenged by the theory of Logical Intuition. This theory suggests that people can detect the conflict between the heuristic and normative answers even if they do not always manage to inhibit their intuitive choice. This theory gained support from the finding that people report lower levels of confidence in their choice after they commit the conjunction fallacy compared to when their answer is not in conflict with logic. In four experiments we asked the participants to give probability estimations to the options of the conflict and no-conflict versions of the tasks in the original set-up of the experiment or in a three-option design. We found that participants perceive probabilities for the options of the conflict version less similar than for the no-conflict version. As people are less confident when choosing between more similar options, this similarity difference is proposed to serve as a mediator in the task in a way that the conflict and no-conflict conditions have their effects on confidence ratings through manipulating the similarity of the answer options.     

Confidence in Dyadic Decision Making: The Role of Individual Differences

Groups typically express more confidence than individuals, yet how individual‐level confidence combines during collaborative decision tasks is not well understood. We prescreened 686 community members using a novel confidence measure (a true/false trivia test) intentionally designed to be difficult (accuracy rates were not significantly better than chance) and randomly assigned 72 individuals to collaborate on a matched version of the same test in dyads composed of two low‐confidence individuals, two high‐confidence individuals, or one of each (“mixed”). Consistent with past research, we found that the confidence expressed by dyads was higher than the confidence expressed by individuals; importantly, however, this pattern varied markedly by dyad type, with low‐confidence dyads showing the largest increase, mixed dyads showing a moderate increase, and high‐confidence dyads showing no increase—despite the fact that all dyads showed similarly low accuracy (about 55%). These results highlight the conditions under which groups express greater confidence than individuals and offer insights for the composition of collaborative decision‐making teams. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The voice of confidence: Paralinguistic cues and audience evaluation

A standard speaker read linguistically confident and doubtful texts in a confident or doubtful voice. A computer-based acoustic analysis of the four tapes showed that paralinguistic confidence was expressed by increased loudness of voice, rapid rate of speech, and infrequent, short pauses. Under some conditions, higher pitch levels and greater pitch and energy fluctuations in the voice were related to paralinguistic confidence. In a 2 × 2 design, observers perceived and used these cues to attribute confidence and related personality traits to the speaker. Both text and voice cues are related to confidence ratings; in addition, the two types of cue are related to differing personality attributes.     

The coincidence effect in similarity and choice

Medin, Goldstone, and Markman (1995) recently described a series of parallel effects in similarity and choice. They suggested that similarity and choice are related in a nontrivial way such that choice may entail a similarity judgment to an explicit or constructed ideal. In this paper, the correspondences between similarity and choice were investigated with respect to a phenomenon in similarity known as thecoincidence effect. In coincidence (pronounced “coincide-ence”), two items that match on one dimension but have a large difference on another dimension receive a higher similarity rating than do two items that have only modest differences on both dimensions. We conducted five experiments in order to examine commonalities between similarity and choice processes with respect to coincidence. Four types of tasks were given: similarity ratings, desirability ratings, forced choice similarities (which of two items is most similar to a target), and forced choice preferences (which of two items one would prefer, given a target). We found a main effect for ratings as opposed to forced choices, with ratings showing greater coincidence effects than did choices. Similarity measures tended to produce more coincidence than did preference measures. The overall pattern of results suggests the presence of dimensional weighting processes sensitive to task characteristics and operating somewhat differently for similarity and decision making.     

Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness

Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors benefit from displaying confidence, confident but inaccurate advisors receive low credibility ratings. However, Study 2 shows that when feedback on advisor accuracy is unavailable or costly, confident advisors hold sway regardless of accuracy. People also made less effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors; interest in buying advisor performance data decreased as the advisor’s confidence went up. These results add to our understanding of how advisor confidence, accuracy, and calibration influence others.     

Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty

In 3 studies, participants viewed sequences of multiattribute objects (e.g., colored shapes) appearing with varying frequencies and judged the likelihood of the attributes of those objects. Judged probabilities reflected a compromise between (a) the frequency with which each attribute appeared and (b) the ignorance prior probability cued by the number of distinct values that the focal attribute could take on. Thus, judged probabilities were partition dependent, varying with the number of events into which the state space was subjectively divided. This bias was diminished among participants more confident in what they learned, was strong and insensitive to level of confidence when ignorance priors were especially salient, and required ignorance priors to be salient only when probabilities were elicited (not during encoding).     

Confidence and Eyewitness Identifications: The Cross‐Race Effect,Decision Time and Accuracy

Participants encountered same‐race and cross‐race faces at encoding, completed a series of line‐up identification tests and provided confidence ratings by using one of nine different confidence scales. Confidence was less well calibrated with identification accuracy when participants selected a cross‐race than a same‐race face because of overconfidence. By contrast, there was no cross‐race effect on confidence–accuracy calibration when participants responded ‘not present’. Whereas confidence was a very strong predictor of accuracy for fast identifications of a line‐up face, this was much less the case for slower decisions. Highly confident identifications showed a dramatic drop in accuracy from faster decisions to slower decisions, whereas there was little change in accuracy between faster and slower decisions for moderately confident or weakly confident identifications. Finally, we observed little influence of the format of the nine different confidence scales: numerical and verbal scales produced comparable calibration scores, as did scales with few or many points. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Separating the confident from the correct: Leveraging member knowledge in groups to improve decision making and performance

Groups often struggle to distinguish expert members from others who stand out for various reasons but may not be particularly knowledgeable (Littlepage & Mueller, 1997). We examined an intervention designed to improve group decision making and performance through instructing group members to search for information they already possessed that was relevant to a problem. Participants estimated values and expressed their confidence in their estimates individually and then a second time either individually or in a group. This was done with or without the intervention. Results indicated that: (1) groups were more confident than, and out-performed, individuals, (2) group decision making was best captured by models predicting more influence for more accurate members when the intervention was used and more influence for more confident members in its absence, and (3) groups that received the intervention out-performed groups that did not.     

The persistence of the fluency–confidence association in problem solving

Confidence in answers is known to be sensitive to the fluency with which answers come to mind. One aspect of fluency is response latency. Latency is often a valid cue for accuracy, showing an inverse relationship with both accuracy rates and confidence. The present study examined the independent latency–confidence association in problem-solving tasks. The tasks were ecologically valid situations in which latency showed no validity, moderate validity, and high validity as a predictor of accuracy. In Experiment 1, misleading problems, which often elicit initial wrong solutions, were answered in open-ended and multiple-choice test formats. Under the open-ended test format, latency was absolutely not valid in predicting accuracy: Quickly and slowly provided solutions had a similar chance of being correct. Under the multiple-choice test format, latency predicted accuracy better. In Experiment 2, nonmisleading problems were used; here, latency was highly valid in predicting accuracy. A breakdown into correct and incorrect solutions allowed examination of the independent latency–confidence relationship when latency necessarily had no validity in predicting accuracy. In all conditions, regardless of latency’s validity in predicting accuracy, confidence was persistently sensitive to latency: The participants were more confident in solutions provided quickly than in those that involved lengthy thinking. The study suggests that the reliability of the latency–confidence association in problem solving depends on the strength of the inverse relationship between latency and accuracy in the particular task.     

Demonstrating and eliminating the aggregation effect in physical skill tasks

Confidence judgments can be elicited in multiple ways. One of these procedures is to provide confidence judgments regarding each of a number of cases (individual judgments). A second procedure is to provide confidence judgments about a set of items (an aggregate judgment). Much research has demonstrated an aggregation effect—that individual judgments are more confident than aggregate judgments—within the cognitive knowledge domain. However, this effect has not previously been investigated with physical performance skill tasks. In three experiments, participants gave individual and aggregate judgments regarding the number of successful tosses they would make in either a ring toss, ping‐pong toss, or basketball toss task. In keeping with the aggregation effect, individual judgments were more confident than were aggregate judgments of success. Additionally, we eliminated the aggregation effect in Experiments 2 and 3 by employing a case‐specific base rate manipulation. Consistent with previous research with cognitive tasks, these results suggest that individual confidence judgments for physical skill tasks are determined primarily by characteristics associated with the individual case to be judged, whereas aggregate confidence judgments are determined by a more general evaluation of one's ability in the domain. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.