共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Jim Stone 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):153-160
Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating
due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example
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Jim StoneEmail: |
2.
Structural equations and causation 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
N. Hall 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):109-136
Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural
equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure
to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem,
and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.
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N. HallEmail: |
3.
Brian P. McLaughlin 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):149-172
Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes
within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing
the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties
that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including analytical
filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude
by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental
properties.
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Brian P. McLaughlinEmail: |
4.
Roberto Poli 《Axiomathes》2007,17(1):1-18
The thesis is defended that the theories of causation, time and space, and levels of reality are mutually interrelated in
such a way that the difficulties internal to theories of causation and to theories of space and time can be understood better,
and perhaps dealt with, in the categorial context furnished by the theory of the levels of reality. The structural condition
for this development to be possible is that the first two theories be opportunely generalized.
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Roberto PoliEmail: |
5.
Graham Macdonald 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):239-253
This paper argues that the non-reductive monist need not be concerned about the ‘problem’ of mental causation; one can accept
both the irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties and the causal closure of the physical. More precisely,
it is argued that instances of mental properties can be causally efficacious, and that there is no special barrier to seeing
mental properties whose instances are causally efficacious as being causally relevant to the effects they help to bring about.
It is then shown that the causal relevance of mental properties is consistent with there being no downward causation, so the
dilemma of ‘epiphenomenalism or reduction’ can be avoided. Non-reductive monism lives on as a viable position in the philosophy
of mind.
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Graham MacdonaldEmail: |
6.
Sven Walter 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):273-285
Epistemological approaches to mental causation argue that the notorious problem of mental causation as captured in the question
“How can irreducible, physically realized, and potentially relational mental properties be causally efficacious in the production
of physical effects?” has a very simple solution: One merely has to abandon any metaphysical considerations in favor of epistemological considerations and accept that our explanatory practice is a much better guide to causal relevance than the metaphysical
reasoning carried out from the philosophical armchair. I argue that epistemological approaches to mental causation do not
enjoy any genuine advantage over theories which treat the problem of mental causation as a genuinely metaphysical problem.
相似文献
Sven WalterEmail: |
7.
Christopher Hitchcock 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):391-401
Hall [(2007), Philosophical Studies, 132, 109–136] offers a critique of structural equations accounts of actual causation, and then offers a new theory of his own.
In this paper, I respond to Hall’s critique, and present some counterexamples to his new theory. These counterexamples are
then diagnosed.
相似文献
Christopher HitchcockEmail: |
8.
Christian Sachse 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):201-205
In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally
assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to
physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons
and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical
properties because there are different ontological levels. In this commentary, I shall reconsider the essential issues of
this compatibilism (1), focus on a problem for Horgan’s conception of agent causation that arises from the causal argument
for ontological reductionism (2), and propose to embed Horgan’s conception of agency within a reductionist approach in order
to vindicate the indispensable character of agency (3).
相似文献
Christian SachseEmail: |
9.
Frank Hofmann 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):173-182
Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly,
the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties
are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem.
A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality
as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises,
since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers
and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious
problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal
powers and causation.
相似文献
Frank HofmannEmail: |
10.
The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue
that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other,
by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this
non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness
with the neurophysiology of the brain and body.
相似文献
Itay Shani (Corresponding author)Email: |
11.
Hans-Ulrich Hoche 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):389-409
From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which
an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach
in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and
his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical
causation.
相似文献
Hans-Ulrich HocheEmail: |
12.
Robert Northcott 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):111-123
I argue that causation is a contrastive relation: c-rather-than-C* causes e-rather-than-E*, where C* and E* are contrast classes associated respectively with actual events c and e. I explain why this is an improvement on the traditional binary view, and develop a detailed definition. It turns out that
causation is only well defined in ‘uniform’ cases, where either all or none of the members of C* are related appropriately
to members of E*.
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Robert NorthcottEmail: |
13.
Nathan Stemmer 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(2):315-327
Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s
theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according
to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role
in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues
such as mental causation, the nature of qualia, supervenience of the mental, or multiple realizability, presume the existence
of, or at least attribute a positive role to, mental entities. The probable correctness of Quine’s theory therefore suggests
that all these publications are worthless and reading them is a waste of time just as reading studies about how crystal spheres
can move planets is considered nowadays a waste of time.
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Nathan StemmerEmail: |
14.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):105-107
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying
himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands
the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
相似文献
Dan Cavedon-TaylorEmail: |
15.
“Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception
of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.
相似文献
Michel BitbolEmail: |
16.
Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Sophie C. Gibb 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(2):205-221
Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism
faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning
the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation
of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are
both metaphysically implausible. This is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced
with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism.
相似文献
Sophie C. GibbEmail: |
17.
Jordi Fernandez 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):333-356
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether
memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest
that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the
past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view,
when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that
caused the very memory experience that she is having.
相似文献
Jordi FernandezEmail: |
18.
19.
Derk Pereboom 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):21-33
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest
a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether
he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the
role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument
is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility
is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
相似文献
Derk PereboomEmail: |
20.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):273-295