Moral hypocrisy: appearing moral to oneself without being so.

How can people appear moral to themselves when they fail to act morally? Two self-deception strategies were considered: (a) misperceive one's behavior as moral and (b) avoid comparing one's behavior with moral standards. In Studies 1 and 2 the authors documented the importance of the 2nd strategy but not the 1st. Among participants who flipped a coin to assign themselves and another participant "fairly" to tasks, even a clearly labeled coin that prevented misperception did not produce a fair result (Study 1). Inducing behavior-standard comparison through self-awareness did (Study 2). Study 3 qualified the self-awareness effect: When moral standards were not salient before acting, self-awareness no longer increased alignment of behavior with standards. Instead, it increased alignment of standards with behavior and produced less moral action. Overall, results showed 3 different faces of moral hypocrisy.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.     

Psychological Distance and the Discrepancy Between Recommendations and Actions

Action hypocrisy is the tendency to recommend behavior for others that one would personally be unwilling to undertake. Six studies examine the relationship between action hypocrisy and psychological distance. Studies 1a and 1b and 2 demonstrate action hypocrisy in three populations and in 2 different contexts. Studies 3 to 5 support a psychological distance explanation for action hypocrisy: people are more likely to choose action for themselves in the future versus the present (Study 3), for someone at a distant location versus a nearby location (Study 4), and for someone who appears to be distant versus close in a photograph (Study 5).     

Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy

In the current article the authors examined the impact of specific emotions on moral hypocrisy, the tendency among people to judge others more severely than they judge themselves. In two studies, they found that (a) anger increased moral hypocrisy, (b) guilt eliminated moral hypocrisy, and (c) envy reversed moral hypocrisy. In particular, these findings were observed in two domains. In Study 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas describing unethical behavior and rated how acceptable it would be if others engaged in the unethical behavior, or alternatively, if they themselves engaged in the unethical behavior. In Study 2, participants were asked how much they would like to donate to research on cancer, or alternatively, how much they think others should donate. The results demonstrate that specific emotions influence moral decision making, even when real money is at stake, and that emotions of the same valence have opposing effects on moral judgment.     

"... As you would have them do unto you": Does imagining yourself in the other's place stimulate moral action?

Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fairness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.     

Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.     

When Values and Behavior Conflict: Moral Pluralism and Intrapersonal Moral Hypocrisy

The authors review the various ways moral hypocrisy has been defined and operationalized by social psychologists, concentrating on three general types: moral duplicity, moral double standards, and moral weakness. While most approaches have treated moral hypocrisy as an interpersonal phenomenon, requiring public claims, preaching (versus practicing), or judgments of others (versus oneself), this paper also considers intrapersonal moral hypocrisy – that is, conflicts between values and behavior that may exist even in the absence of public pronouncements or judgments. Current attempts to understand and combat intrapersonal moral hypocrisy are aided by moral pluralism, the idea that there are many different moral values, which may come into conflict both between and within individuals. Examples are given to illustrate how taking into account individual differences in values can help to reduce moral hypocrisy. The authors close by considering the possibility that in a pluralistic world, reducing intrapersonal moral hypocrisy might not always be a normatively desired end goal.     

Do negative implicit associations indicate negative attitudes? Social explanations moderate whether ostensible “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based

The present work challenges the idea that implicit evaluative associations with outgroups necessarily provide information about negative or prejudiced attitudes. We argue that the manner in which one explains outgroup status and action shapes whether one's implicit “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based. Four studies are consistent with this possibility. Study 1 suggests that whereas implicit “negative” associations are predictive of negative explicit attitudes among those who reject external explanations for African American status and action, such implicit “negativity” predicts positive explicit attitudes among those who endorse external explanations. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that the provision of external explanations results in the formation of implicit “negative” associations that are predictive of compassionate responding. Study 3 provides more direct support for the idea that implicit “negative” associations are empathy-based among external explainers by showing that such “negative” associations are positively correlated with a measure of dispositional empathy-proneness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that IAT “negativity” is associated with automatic activation of empathy-related associations among those who strongly endorse external explanations. Discussion centers on the importance of considering factors—such as social explanations—that may moderate whether implicit “negativity” is prejudice-based or empathy-based.     

Rule‐breaking in an anonymous situation: When people decide to deviate from existing rules

The present study examined how soon people would make a decision to break existing rules in an anonymous situation, with particular attention paid to the degree of anonymity. A total of 100 participants were randomly assigned to either a self‐reward condition or an other‐reward condition, in both of which they were asked to flip a coin twice in each of the four coin‐flip trials to win the assigned reward. As predicted, the results showed that only participants in the self‐reward condition broke the assignment rules for obtaining the reward, and they only did so in the very last coin‐flip trial. In sum, the present findings suggest that people do not break existing rules for material gain as soon as they become anonymized, but some may do so at the very last moment.     

Creating bizarre false memories through imagination

The present study explored memory for familiar or usual actions (e.g., flip the coin) and bizarre or unusual actions (e.g., sit on the dice). In Session 1, action statements were presented to 210 participants, who had to either perform or imagine those actions. In Session 2, 24 h later, participants imagined performing various actions, some presented in the first session and others totally new. Finally, in Session 3, 2 weeks later, participants were tested on their memory for the original actions. We found that as the number of imaginings increased in Session 2, so did the proportion of did responses to actions that were only imagined or not even presented. This pattern was present for both bizarre and familiar actions. These results demonstrate that bizarre actions may lose the item distinctiveness that is used to make accurate memory decisions after repeated imagination.     

Abstraction increases hypocrisy

Four studies show that an abstract view on moral issues increases moral hypocrisy. In Experiment 1, participants who were directly instructed to take a more abstract view on a moral issue judged the immoral behavior of others more severely than their own immoral behavior, but participants with a concrete view did not. Experiments 2 and 3 induced an abstract view in an indirect manner, by manipulating temporal distance toward the dilemma. In Experiment 4 abstractness was manipulated completely independent from the moral dilemma, by inducing an abstract or a concrete mindset. In all four studies, abstractness consistently increased hypocrisy. The last study also shows that the effect of abstractness on hypocrisy is mediated by the degree of moral flexibility. Together, these studies show that hypocrisy is directly determined by the focus that people have when making a moral judgment.     

宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

Do Applicants Fake Their Personality Questionnaire Responses and How Successful are Their Attempts? A Case of Military Pilot Cadet Selection

This paper presents the results of three interrelated studies investigating the occurrence of response distortion on personality questionnaires within selection and the success of applicants in faking situations. In Study 1, comparison of the Big Five personality scores obtained from applicants in a military pilot cadet selection procedure with participants responding honestly, faking good, and faking an ideal candidate revealed that applicants responded more desirable than participants responding honestly but less desirable than respondents under fake instructions. The occurrence of faking within the military pilot selection process was replicated in Study 2 using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire and another comparison group. Finally, in Study 3, comparison of personality profiles obtained in selection and ‘fake job’ situations with experts' estimates indicated that participants were partially successful in faking the desirable profile.     

Rumination, negative cognition, and their interactive effects on depressed mood

Response styles theory posits that rumination represents a trait vulnerability to depression. Recent evidence has suggested that rumination predicts changes in depression more strongly among individuals with high levels of negative cognition. Three studies evaluated this model of interactive vulnerabilities. Study 1 provided empirical support for the distinction between rumination and negative cognitive content. The next 2 studies investigated the interactive model in the laboratory. Study 2 randomly assigned participants to either ruminate or distract following a sad mood induction. This study found that rumination was more strongly associated with dysphoria among individuals who report high levels of negative cognition. Similarly, Study 3 found that rumination and negative cognition interact to predict changes in dysphoria across a no-task delay period following a sad mood induction. These studies provide support for an interactive model in which rumination amplifies the deleterious effects of negative cognition.     

By any means necessary: the effects of regulatory focus and moral conviction on hostile and benevolent forms of collective action

In two studies, we investigate the effect of individuals' promotion and prevention focus on engagement in collective action. We show that responding to group-based disadvantage out of a sense of moral conviction motivates prevention-oriented- but not promotion-oriented- individuals to engage in collective action. Furthermore, holding such strong moral convictions about the fair treatment of their group causes the prevention-oriented to disregard societal rules against hostile forms of collective action (i.e., forms of action that are aimed at harming the interests of those held responsible for the group's disadvantage). Study 1 showed that prevention-oriented individuals, but not promotion-oriented individuals, with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group are willing to support both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Study 2 replicated this effect and showed that for prevention-oriented individuals but not for promotion-oriented individuals, holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group overrides moral objections to hostile forms of collective action in the decision to support these forms of action.     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

Implicit and explicit attitude dissociation in spontaneous deceptive behavior

Society considers deception to be an improper act but at the same time, people deceive each other surprisingly often during interpersonal interactions. In our study, this hypocrisy was assumed to be derived from ambivalent attitudes stemming from different sources, which we divided into implicit and explicit. Using a simulated racing task in a virtual environment, we identified participants who chose to be deceptive. Twenty two of the 60 subjects spontaneously decided to cheat in order to gain monetary compensation, while the other 38 subjects chose to be honest. We compared these two groups’ implicit beliefs about deception using the Implicit Association Test (Deception-IAT), as well as their explicit attitudes about deception and their personalities using self-report questionnaires. There was no difference between the two groups in explicit attitude or personality; however, the group who cheated on the racing task showed their implicit preference for deception more than that of the group who acted honestly as measured by the Deception-IAT.     

The Regulatory Easy Street: Self-Regulation Below the Self-Control Threshold Does not Consume Regulatory Resources

We present and test a theory in which self-control is distinguished from broader acts of self-regulation when it is both effortful and conscious. In two studies, we examined whether acts of behavioral management that do not require effort are exempt from resource depletion. In Study 1, we found that a self-regulation task only reduced subsequent self-control for participants who had previously indicated that completing the task would require effort. In Study 2, we found that participants who completed a self-regulation task for two minutes did not evidence the subsequent impairment in self-control evident for participants who had completed the task for four or more minutes. Our results support the notion that self-regulation without effort falls below the self-control threshold and has different downstream consequences than self-control.     

Gender-related differences in moral judgments

The moral sense is among the most complex aspects of the human mind. Despite substantial evidence confirming gender-related neurobiological and behavioral differences, and psychological research suggesting gender specificities in moral development, whether these differences arise from cultural effects or are innate remains unclear. In this study, we investigated the role of gender, education (general education and health education) and religious belief (Catholic and non-Catholic) on moral choices by testing 50 men and 50 women with a moral judgment task. Whereas we found no differences between the two genders in utilitarian responses to non-moral dilemmas and to impersonal moral dilemmas, men gave significantly more utilitarian answers to personal moral (PM) dilemmas (i.e., those courses of action whose endorsement involves highly emotional decisions). Cultural factors such as education and religion had no effect on performance in the moral judgment task. These findings suggest that the cognitive–emotional processes involved in evaluating PM dilemmas differ in men and in women, possibly reflecting differences in the underlying neural mechanisms. Gender-related determinants of moral behavior may partly explain gender differences in real-life involving power management, economic decision-making, leadership and possibly also aggressive and criminal behaviors.     

The impact of moral theories on cheating

This research series began as a test of an emotion-attribution approach to moral behavior. However, in the early studies, college students who read about morality were subsequently more likely to cheat on a vocabulary test than were control subjects who read materials irrelevant to morality. We hypothesized that resentment toward the test constructors interacted with the moral schemas activated by the reading task. To reduce resentment, in Study III the vocabulary test was presented as the experimenter's doctoral research. As predicted, compared to controls, those subjects who read about morality cheated less. Study IV was a quasi-experiment that confirmed the hypothesized resentment differences between Study III and the earlier studies. In Study V, while two groups read about morality, one group read an internal emotion-attribution passage and the other read an external version; less cheating was observed in the internal condition than in the external or control conditions. The results indicate that even when moral schemas are elicited under conditions favoring moral behavior, those schemas will lead to reduced cheating most effectively under conditions in which subjects attribute their emotional arousal to their own behavior rather than to external causes. Issues of moral schema activation and emotion-attribution in moral behavior are discussed.