Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief.     

McDowell and Idealism

John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common‐sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this intended coincidence. The upshot is a dilemma: McDowell can retain his conception of the subject, but lose the coincidence; or he can keep the coincidence, but abandon his conception of the subject.     

Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem

Philosophical Studies - The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have developed a number of...     

John McDowell

Books reviewed: Tim Thornton, John McDowell, Acumen: 2004, pp vi + 261, £40.00/£14.95
Reviewed by Stephen Mulhall, New College, Oxford
New College
Oxford OX1 3BN     

邪恶的两张面孔:根本的邪恶和平庸的邪恶——汉娜·阿伦特对极权主义制度下的邪恶现象的批判

汉娜.阿伦特对极权主义制度下的邪恶现象有两种表述方式,即“根本的邪恶”和“平庸的邪恶”。前者的根本特征表现为破坏了人类发展和和进步的概念,致力于把人变成多余的人的事业,以及消灭了人的法律人格、道德人格以及作为个体的人;后者的特征体现为无思想和肤浅性。阿伦特为思考极权主义专制制度下邪恶现象产生的根源以及个人应该担负何种道德责任提供了一种全新的视角,从而为建立一种以思想为核心的个人责任伦理提供了理论上的可能。     

Response to McDowell

The rationale for the common rejection of classical societal functionalism is that it entails treating a society as an intelligent purposer, capable of directing its own internal organization in furtherance of survival. But a more acceptable alternative account of the origins of a society's functional organization is conceivable: the individual unconsciously recognizes the needs of his group and directs his behaviour so that they are met. The plausibility of this explanation hangs on whether selection between groups occurs to any significant extent, however, and it is therefore on this question that the plausibility of classical societal functionalism itself depends.     

McDowell on Value and Knowledge

Books reviewed in this article:
John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality
John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality     

Intentionality and Content in McDowell

In its most general form, the issue of intentionality takes the following shape: How can something be about something else? In basic cases, this relation is one between a subjective occurrence and a state of affairs, allowing the problem of intentionality to be articulated in this manner: What makes it the case that a subjective occurrence has the capacity to be about something external to it? The views of John McDowell on intentionality form the focus of this article. They are examined through the notion of content and via the later Wittgenstein's standpoint on content and intentionality. The main objective is to reach a conspicuous perspective of McDowell's stance on intentionality in order to uncover its presuppositions. This leads to the identification of a pivotal point of tension in McDowell's philosophical commitments, in particular the extent to which he can legitimately claim to be a quietist.     

Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind

Abstract

McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is puzzling. I argue that a closer look at the prima facie puzzling asymmetry dissolves the apparent disagreement and reveals a deeper agreement concerning both the nature and the origin of the problems haunting the Cartesian picture in question. Both McDowell and Merleau-Ponty argue that on the picture of the relation of between mind and world in question, we lose our grip on the very idea of a perceptual appearance. Furthermore, the two authors regard a certain conception of nature as conceived in the image of science, as one of the crucial elements in making the picture of the mind in question look attractive.     

McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action

Within philosophy there is not yet an integrative account of unreflective skillful action. As a starting point, contributions would be required from philosophers from both the analytic and continental traditions. Starting from the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, shared Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian common ground is identified. McDowell and Dreyfus agree about the importance of embodied skills, situation-specific discernment and responsiveness to relevant affordances. This sheds light on the embodied and situated nature of adequate unreflective action and provides a starting point for the development of an account that does justice to insights from both philosophical traditions.