Borrowing Personal Memories

The present investigation documents memory borrowing in college‐age students, defined as the telling of others' autobiographical stories as if they are one's own. In both pilot and online surveys, most undergraduates admit to borrowing personal stories from others or using details from others' experiences to embellish their own retellings. These behaviors appear primarily motivated by a desire to permanently incorporate others' experiences into one's own autobiographical record (appropriation), but other reasons include to temporarily create a more coherent or engaging conversational exchange (social connection), simplify conveying somebody else's interesting experience (convenience), or make oneself look good (status enhancement). A substantial percentage of respondents expressed uncertainty as to whether an autobiographical experience actually belonged to them or to someone else, and most respondents have confronted somebody over ownership of a particular story. Documenting memory borrowing is important as the behavior has potential consequences for the creation of false memories. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sound of Social Cognition: Toddlers’ Understanding of How Sound Influences Others

Understanding others' perceptions is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Children's construal of visual perception is well investigated, but there is little work on children's understanding of others' auditory perception. The current study assesses toddlers' recognition that producing different sounds can affect others differentially—auditory perspective taking. Two- and 3-year-olds were familiarized with two objects, one loud and one quiet. The adult then introduced a doll, and children were randomly assigned to one of two goals: either to wake the doll or to let her sleep. Children's object choice and the sound intensity they produced significantly varied in the predicted direction as a function of the goal task. These findings reveal young children's understanding of the effects of sound on other people's behavior and psychological states.     

Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowledgement

Six‐year‐old children negatively evaluate plagiarizers just as adults do (Olson & Shaw, 2011), but why do they dislike plagiarizers? Children may think plagiarism is wrong because plagiarizing negatively impacts other people's reputations. We investigated this possibility by having 6‐ to 9‐year‐old children evaluate people who shared their own or other people's ideas (stories). In Experiment 1, we found that children consider it acceptable to retell someone else's story if the source is given credit for their story (improving the source's reputation), but not if the reteller claims credit for the story (steals credit away from someone else). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that children do not consider it bad to lie by giving someone else credit for one's own good story (improving someone else's reputation), but do consider it bad to give someone else credit for one's own bad story (improving one's own reputation at the expense of someone else's). Experiment 4 demonstrated that children think it is equally bad to take credit for someone else's idea for oneself as it is to take someone else's idea and give credit to someone else, suggesting that children dislike when others take credit away from someone else, regardless of whether or not it improves the plagiarizer's reputation. Our results suggest that children dislike plagiarism because it negatively affects others' reputations by taking credit away from them.     

Rational Hypocrisy: A Bayesian Analysis Based on Informal Argumentation and Slippery Slopes

Moral hypocrisy is typically viewed as an ethical accusation: Someone is applying different moral standards to essentially identical cases, dishonestly claiming that one action is acceptable while otherwise equivalent actions are not. We suggest that in some instances the apparent logical inconsistency stems from different evaluations of a weak argument, rather than dishonesty per se. Extending Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford's (2006) analysis of slippery slope arguments, we develop a Bayesian framework in which accusations of hypocrisy depend on inferences of shared category membership between proposed actions and previous standards, based on prior probabilities that inform the strength of competing hypotheses. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that inferences of hypocrisy increase as perceptions of the likelihood of shared category membership between precedent cases and current cases increase, that these inferences follow established principles of category induction, and that the presence of self‐serving motives increases inferences of hypocrisy independent of changes in the actions themselves. Taken together, these results demonstrate that Bayesian analyses of weak arguments may have implications for assessing moral reasoning.     

They heard a cry: psychosocial resources moderate perception of others' distress

Two studies tested whether psychosocial resources affect perception of another's distress. Participants' had their resources depleted, left unchanged, or boosted by elaborately recalling either someone who had betrayed them, a neutral person, or a close and trusted other, respectively. Participants then listened to disturbing baby cries, and rated how much distress the cries conveyed. As predicted, participants who recalled a betrayal subsequently heard the cries as conveying more distress than did other participants (Study 1). However, recalling a betrayal did not amplify cry ratings if, prior to cry rating, betrayal‐related thoughts and feelings were disclosed (Study 2). The moderating effect of disclosure on cry ratings indicates that boosting resources (disclosure) can counteract the effects of resource depletion (betrayal). Results in both studies remained significant even after controlling for mood. This research is the first to show that social contexts, and emotional disclosure, each affects perception of others' distress. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Observed actions affect body-specific associations between space and valence

Right-handers tend to associate “good” with the right side of space and “bad” with the left. This implicit association appears to arise from the way people perform actions, more or less fluently, with their right and left hands. Here we tested whether observing manual actions performed with greater or lesser fluency can affect observers' space–valence associations. In two experiments, we assigned one participant (the actor) to perform a bimanual fine motor task while another participant (the observer) watched. Actors were assigned to wear a ski glove on either the right or left hand, which made performing the actions on this side of space disfluent. In Experiment 1, observers stood behind the actors, sharing their spatial perspective. After motor training, both actors and observers tended to associate “good” with the side of the actors' free hand and “bad” with the side of the gloved hand. To determine whether observers' space–valence associations were computed from their own perspectives or the actors', in Experiment 2 we asked the observer to stand face-to-face with the actor, reversing their spatial perspectives. After motor training, both actors and observers associated “good” with the side of space where disfluent actions had occurred from their own egocentric spatial perspectives; if “good” was associated with the actor's right-hand side it was likely to be associated with the observer's left-hand side. Results show that vicarious experiences of motor fluency can shape valence judgments, and that observers spontaneously encode the locations of fluent and disfluent actions in egocentric spatial coordinates.     

A Longitudinal Application of the Theory of Reasoned Action to Women's Career Behavior1

Based on the theory of reasoned action (TRA; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), we hypothesized that young women's career intentions would be predicted by their gender-role attitudes and perceptions of their boyfriends' and parents' career-related preferences for them. Career intention was expected to predict future career behavior. The model was tested using longitudinal data from 105 women studied in 1973 and followed up 14 years later in 1987. Data were analyzed using structural equation modeling. Results supported the TRA: women's gender-role attitudes and their perceptions of important others' preferences predicted their career intentions, which predicted career behavior 14 years later. Implications for the study of women's careers and the longitudinal application of the TRA are discussed.     

Psychological Distance and the Discrepancy Between Recommendations and Actions

Action hypocrisy is the tendency to recommend behavior for others that one would personally be unwilling to undertake. Six studies examine the relationship between action hypocrisy and psychological distance. Studies 1a and 1b and 2 demonstrate action hypocrisy in three populations and in 2 different contexts. Studies 3 to 5 support a psychological distance explanation for action hypocrisy: people are more likely to choose action for themselves in the future versus the present (Study 3), for someone at a distant location versus a nearby location (Study 4), and for someone who appears to be distant versus close in a photograph (Study 5).     

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.     

The desirability of beliefs: preschoolers' appreciation of fact beliefs and subsequent emotions

In this study, we investigated the extent to which preschool children's own knowledge about reality biases their understanding that others' beliefs about reality govern others' emotions and not reality itself. Therefore, an increasing tension was created between the beliefs of the protagonist and the participant, by providing varying degrees of evidence about the validity of the protagonist's belief. Children of between 4 and 5 years of age were asked to predict the protagonist's emotion, given the protagonist's desire and the protagonist's belief. The results show that, to a certain extent, preschool children take others' beliefs into account when predicting others' emotions. When the outcome is clear, children probably feel tied to reality, and in the case of false beliefs, their knowledge about reality biases their emotion predictions, as was also evident in ‘false belief’ research (Wimmer H, Perner I. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition 13: 103–128). However, when it is uncertain what the actual outcome will be, then it is not the likelihood of others' beliefs but the desirability of the outcome that biases children's predictions of others' emotions. In other words, when the actual outcome is yet unclear, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds show a tendency for wishful thinking in their predictions of others' emotions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do examples of failure effectively prepare students for learning from subsequent instruction?

Studies on the productive failure (PF) approach have demonstrated that attempting to solve a problem prepares students more effectively for later instruction compared to observing failed problem-solving attempts prior to instruction. However, the examples of failure used in these studies did not display the problem-solving-and-failing process, which may have limited the preparatory effects. In this quasi-experiment, we investigated whether observing someone else engaging in problem solving can prepare students for instruction, and whether examples that show the problem-solving-and -failing process are more effective than those that only show the outcome of this process. We also explored whether the perceived model–observer similarity had an impact on the effectiveness of observing examples of failure. The results showed that observing examples effectively prepares students for learning from instruction. However, observing the model's problem-solving-and-failing process did not prepare students more effectively than merely looking at the outcome. Studying examples were more effective if model–observer similarity was high.     

Attitudes and the attribution of mental disorder

Among the problems of understanding mental pathology through a labeling perspective is the need to understand more about the attributional process itself. It is postulated that characteristics of observers, in particular their attitudes, influence the attribution of mental disorder to individuals manifesting deviant behavior. Questionnaire items were factor analyzed to produce several dimensions of attitudes and types of deviance. Tests of seven sub‐hypotheses provide support for the major hypothesis that the probability mental disorder will be attributed by an observer to an actor is positively related to the degree an actor's behavior (implying beliefs or attitudes) differs from the beliefs and attitudes of the observer.     

Power and perceived influence: I caused your behavior,but I'm not responsible for it

There are numerous examples of powerful people denying responsibility for others' (mis)conduct in which they played—and acknowledge playing—a causal role. The current article seeks to explain this conundrum by examining the difference between, and powerful people's beliefs about, causality and responsibility. Research has shown power to have numerous psychological consequences. Some of these consequences, such as overconfidence, are likely to increase an individual's belief that he or she caused another person's behavior. However, others, such as decreased perspective‐taking, are likely to decrease an individual's belief that he or she was responsible for another person's behavior. In combination, these psychological consequences of power may lead powerful people to believe that they instigated another's behavior while simultaneously believing that the other person could have chosen to do otherwise. The dissociation between these two attributions may help to explain why people in positions of power often deny responsibility for others' behavior—unethical or otherwise—that they undeniably caused.     

Perceptions of Religious Hypocrisy: When Moral Claims Exceed Moral Action

In this study, we investigated perceptions of hypocrisy among Christian and non-Christian individuals. Specifically, participants (N = 121) were asked to evaluate people of different religious orientations in terms of perceptions of both claimed morality, actual behavior, and general hypocrisy. Across all designations, perceptions of moral hypocrisy were determined to be greater to the extent that moral claims exceeded actual behavior. Among non-Christian participants, perceptions of hypocrisy were highest with respect to “devout” and “evangelical” Christian targets. In contrast, among Christian participants, the highest ratings of hypocrisy were reserved for “casual” Christians (i.e., Christians who do not incorporate their faith into their daily life). Our findings have both theoretical implications regarding the nature of religious hypocrisy perceptions, as well as real-world implications for understanding inter-faith perceptions and interactions.     

Effect of Personal Injustice on Attributions for the Success of Others

The current research tested competing predictions on whether the experience of personal injustice would increase or decrease internal attributions of others' success. Compared with the control condition, Study 1 found that individuals gave less credit to another person for his promotion after they recalled their own unfair experience. Study 2 revealed that personal injustice led weak just-world believers, but not strong just-world believers, to perceive a lottery winner to be less deserving. Study 3 showed that these effects were mediated by resentment. The findings demonstrate that thinking about one's own injustice can lead to a more cynical outlook on others' positive outcomes.     

A New Scale for Scoring the Bernreuter Personality Inventory

Abstract

Two studies with American students demonstrated the utility of interpersonal theory in social psychological research. The hypothesis in Study 1, following Mead's (1934) interactionist viewpoint, was that others' perceptions of an individual relate to how that individual thinks these others view him and that these reflexive self-perceptions are subsequently linked with an individual's self-perceptions. This conceptualization corrected Shrauger and Schoeneman's (1979) erroneous parallelism between self-images and reflected perceptions and between self-images and others' actual perceptions. It extended previous works by using interpersonally based self- and other-acceptance measures, a “naturalistic” setting, and repeated measurements. Three of four regression analyses supported the hypothesis. Study 2 was conducted to investigate further significant differences found between the self-and other-acceptance measures. As predicted from Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal theory, individuals considered it more important to be viewed as accepting of others than of self, although their other-acceptance schemata was, in general, more poorly defined.     

Cognitive appraisals and emotional experience: Further evidence

Abstract

The present study uses methods derived from Smith and Ellsworth (1985) to investigate the degree to which emotions are associated with distinctive patterns of cognitive appraisal. Subjects described past situations in which they had unambiguously experienced each of eight emotions: guilt. embarrassment, shame. anxiety. anger, hope. joy, and pride. These situations were then rated on each of 10 appraisal scales: unpleasantness. unexpectedness of events from own and from others' perspective, inconsistency of own actions with own and others' behavioural standards, benefit to self and to others, own and others' responsibility for events. and degree to which events were beyond anyone's control. Analysis of these ratings revealed distinctive patterns of appraisal associated with the eight emotions. including discriminable patterns for guilt and shame—emotions that were not distinguished in terms of the appraisal dimensions recovered by Smith and Ellsworth. Thus the present study demonstrates that appraisal dimensions (such as unexpectedness, benefit, and inconsistency with behavioural standards) in addition than those used by Smith and Ellsworth have utility in distinguishing among emotions.     

Health Behavior Theories and Research: Implications for Suicidal Individuals’ Treatment Linkage and Adherence

Treatment linkage and adherence to psychotherapeutic interventions can be challenging with suicidal individuals. Health behavior theories, specifically the Health Belief Model, Stages of Change, and Theory of Planned Behavior, focus on individuals' beliefs, their readiness to change, their perceptions of illness severity and "threat," their perceptions of significant others' attitudes toward illness and treatment, and their behavioral intentions to change. These constructs have relevance both for understanding suicidal individuals' behaviors related to treatment utilization and for understanding cultural variations in these behaviors. Furthermore, these theories have implications for clinical practices aimed at facilitating improved treatment follow-through and adherence. After describing the theories and their constructs, clinical examples are provided to illustrate applications to practice with suicidal individuals.     

Living in Alternative and Inner Worlds: Early Signs of Acting Talent

In an exploratory, qualitative study, 11 professional actors were interviewed about their childhoods to investigate the early predictors of acting talent. To control for verbal talent, scientists-turned-lawyers were selected as a comparison group. Participants were asked about their families, schooling, and training, as well as about their early propensities for play and imagination, their orientation towards fiction, and their emotionality and attunement to others' mental states. Actors' childhood memories differed from those of the lawyers in the following respects. The actors recalled greater engagement in alternative worlds (imaginary and fictional worlds) and in inner worlds (emotional and other mental states). Not surprisingly, then, they were also more likely to recall feeling different from others and unable to engage fully in school. Unlike the lawyers, the actors recalled practicing for their adult roles as early as age 4—by inventing and directing plays in their backyards. Unlike lawyers, actors chose their careers despite parental discouragement: although their parents valued the arts, they discouraged the choice of acting as a career. Taken together, the results suggest that an early interest in alternative and inner worlds and an identification of oneself as different from others are predictive of early and steady involvement in theater—a choice of career in which one can live daily in another world of imagined lives and in the other world of others' mental lives.