沉没成本效应的产生根源与影响因素

沉没成本效应是指决策者的决策行为因受沉没成本影响而产生的一种非理性决策现象。针对这一决策偏差的产生根源,研究者从认知、动机和神经三个角度提出了解释。沉没成本效应的影响因素包括沉没成本特性、情境因素、个体差异和文化差异等。基于先前研究存在的问题和不足,沉没成本效应的未来研究应着眼于改进研究方法,探究产生根源,关注行为沉没成本和加强应用研究。     

行为决策中作为价值的时间:基于与金钱的比较

传统经济学家认为,时间就是金钱,而近年来的一些研究却发现了与之不同的结论。后续的研究者主要从损失和受益时的风险偏好和决策依据、沉没成本效应、心理账户和禀赋效应这四个方面对时间和金钱进行比较,但是这方面的研究还处于起步阶段,还有许多问题需要在以后的研究中深入探讨。未来的研究应对时间是否存在损失规避和敏感性递减、时间的沉没成本效应和时间的禀赋效应的形成机制等问题进行探讨。     

国外文章标记效应研究综述

该文系统地总结了西方文章阅读心理学关于文章标记效应的研究。该文认为 ,西方研究者由于对文章标记缺乏定性分析和恰当的分类 ,该领域的研究显得非常零散、缺乏系统 ,研究结论也有诸多矛盾之处 ,文章标记效应的加工机制问题也存在着严重分歧。在分析了现有研究不足的基础上 ,该文对文章标记进行了重新界定和分类 ,中肯地评价了文章标记对文章阅读理解与信息保持促进效应及其作用机制的研究。     

关于成本沉没效应的实验研究

运用IAT 技术,通过实验,证明“损失厌恶”具有内隐性,“损失厌恶”存在内隐偏差,并且二者具有很强的稳定性,即不受当前情绪及刺激材料性质等的影响,为进一步认识成本沉没效应等现象的本质特点提供了证据。     

评估零效应的三种统计方法CSSCI

在心理学研究中,研究者可能需要评估效应是否不存在,但常用的原假设显著性检验无法提供支持零效应的证据。因此,实践中研究者要么对p>0.05的情况进行回避,要么错误地认为p>0.05支持了原假设。近年来,等价检验、贝叶斯估计和贝叶斯因子逐渐被用于评估零效应。文章介绍了这三种方法的原理,并通过两个实例分析,展示三种方法的实际应用。这三种评估零效应的方法能够帮助心理学研究者在实际研究中进行合理的统计推断和研究决策。     

定量数据分析效应值:意义、计算与解释

由于零假设显著性检验存在的问题,近年来国外许多研究者、期刊编辑和研究学会建议或要求定量研究结果报告效应值作为对显著性检验结果的补充,然而国内心理学、教育学等社会科学领域还很少有学者对效应值进行专门研究。文章将讨论显著性检验存在的问题,效应值的定义及其重要性,效应值的分类、效应值的计算方法和效应值的解释标准。     

潘菽心理学思想的当代启示

潘菽对心理学的研究对象、心理学的学科性质、心理学的研究方法、心理学的理论研究与应用研究的关系等问题进行了系统、深刻的分析,为人们正确地进行心理学研究提供了重要的理论启示;他对心理学未来发展的预测,揭示了心理学与社会发展之间的关系,对心理学研究者也是一种莫大的鼓励。文章对这些问题进行了较为详细的分析。     

心理学研究与公共政策的制定

公共政策的心理学研究是近年西方应用心理学的一个重要发展方向。文章对心理学参与公共政策研究的源起,美国心理学公共政策研究的主要方向进行了分析,并对公共政策的心理学研究在中国的发展前景作了简要的展望。     

情境交互作用理论体系：辩证心理学与交互行为心理学

摘要 辩证心理学和交互行为心理学是近年对心理学理论建设和方法论改革影响较大的心理学取向,它们可以共同归纳到心理学的情境交互作用理论体系之下。情境交互作用理论体系打破了传统心理学只关注意识、行为和心理机制的单一维度,认为心理学应该关注机体与情境交互作用中的意义。文章对辩证心理学和交互行为心理学的主要观点和主要假设进行了详细阐释。最后对情境作用理论体系对当代心理学的影响和启示进行了说明,可以为未来心理学的发展指明方向。     

个性的比较心理学研究

个性的比较心理学研究,实质上是指动物个性研究。文章首先探讨了个性的比较心理学研究的理论基础,在此基础上简要介绍了个性的比较心理学研究的策略和方法,并就个性的比较心理学研究对当代个性心理学发展的积极意义进行了初步的分析。     

The sunk cost effect across species: A review of persistence in a course of action due to prior investment

The sunk cost effect is the bias or tendency to persist in a course of action due to prior investments of effort, money or time. At the time of the only review on the sunk cost effect across species (Arkes & Ayton, 1999), research with nonhuman animals had been ecological in its nature, and the findings about the effect of past investments on current choice were inconclusive. However, in the last decade a new line of experimental laboratory‐based research has emerged with the promise of revolutionizing the way we approach the study of the sunk cost effect in nonhumans. In the present review we challenge Arkes and Ayton's conclusion that the sunk cost effect is exclusive to humans, and describe evidence for the sunk cost effect in nonhuman animals. By doing so, we also challenge the current explanations for the sunk cost effect in humans, as they are not applicable to nonhumans. We argue that a unified theory is called for, because different independent variables, in particular, investment amount, have the same influence on the sunk cost effect across species. Finally, we suggest possible psychological mechanisms shared across different species, contrast and depreciation, that could explain the sunk cost effect.     

The sunk‐time effect: An exploration

We explored the potential for a sunk‐cost effect in the realm of time. Questionnaire studies (Experiments 1–4) obtained a sunk‐time effect that was robust to manipulations of prospective value, individual versus group consequences, and the effort or enjoyment inherent in the time. Behavioral experiments (Experiments 5–7) also suggested a sunk‐time effect and found support for a personal responsibility by sunk‐cost interaction on choice behavior. We discuss theoretical implications and a potential connection to animal sunk‐cost phenomena. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sunk Cost,Emotion, and Commitment to Education

The influence of prior, irretrievable, investment (sunk cost) on commitment to a course of education was investigated. The moderating effects of the emotions of anger and fear over this commitment decision were also investigated. A total of 425 participants (214 male) with a mean age of 19.92 years were recruited from an undergraduate population. A computer program simulated the process of arranging to undertake a course of education. Participants were induced to feel either anger or fear and, then, invested one of three amounts of sunk cost (under budget, on budget, or over budget) to signing up for a course. Participants then decided how much time they wished to commit to this course or to an alternative, identical course with a better chance of success. Results revealed a significant sunk cost effect of prior investment on commitment to a course of education. Results also revealed that anger increased the magnitude of this sunk cost effect. Results did not reveal any effect of fear on the sunk cost effect. Theoretical implications and practical applications were discussed.     

The role of probability of success estimates in the sunk cost effect

The sunk cost effect is manifested in a tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment has been made. Arkes and Blumer (1985) showed that a sunk cost increases one's estimated probability that the endeavor will succeed [p(s)]. Is this p(s) increase a cause of the sunk cost effect, a consequence of the effect, or both? In Experiment 1 participants read a scenario in which a sunk cost was or was not present. Half of each group read what the precise p(s) of the project would be, thereby discouraging p(s) inflation. Nevertheless these participants manifested the sunk cost effect, suggesting p(s) inflation is not necessary for the effect to occur. In Experiment 2 participants gave p(s) estimates before or after the investment decision. The latter group manifested higher p(s), suggesting that the inflated estimate is a consequence of the decision to invest. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sunk Cost and Commitment to Dates Arranged Online

The influence of prior, irretrievable, investment (sunk cost) on commitment to a date arranged online was investigated. Participants were recruited from an undergraduate population. There were 145 participants (86 female) with a mean age of 19.42 years. Participants took part in a computer simulation of the process of arranging a date online. Participants invested one of five amounts of sunk cost into this process. Participants were then presented with the choice of attending the date arranged online or attending a (superior) blind date. Participants chose how much time that they wanted to commit to the (inferior) date arranged online. Results revealed a significant sunk cost effect (p = 0.003). The implications of the sunk cost effect having an influence over human relationships are discussed.     

Sunk Cost and Commitment to Medical Treatment

The influence of prior, irretrievable, investment (sunk cost) on commitment to medical treatment was investigated. Three studies were run investigating the influence of sunk cost in the form of money, time, and effort. A total of 637 participants (314 male) with a mean age of 19.58 years were recruited from an undergraduate population. A computer program simulated the process of arranging a course of physiotherapy. Participants invested one of three amounts of sunk cost (under budget, on budget, or over budget) into arranging sessions with a chiropractor. Participants then decided how much time they wished to commit to these chiropractor sessions or to an alternative treatment with a better chance of success. Results revealed a significant effect of invested money, a significant effect of invested effort, but no effect of invested time. Invested money produced a sunk cost effect, while invested effort appeared to exert influence via cognitive dissonance. The implications for healthcare decision-making are discussed.     

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: Avoiding the losses of past decisions

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.     

The mental accounting of sunk time costs: why time is not like money

The sunk‐cost effect, an irrational attention to non‐recoverable past costs while making current decisions, has been documented widely in the domain of monetary costs. In this paper, I study the effect of past time investments on current decisions. In three experiments using choice situations, I demonstrate that the sunk‐cost effect is not observed for past investments of time, but the effect reappears when the investments are expressed as monetary quantities. I further propose that this ‘pseudo‐rationality’ is due to the fact that individuals lack the ability to account for time in the same way as they account for money. In two additional experiments, I facilitate the accounting of time and show that the irrational sunk‐cost effect reappears. In a final experiment, I test my propositions in a setting where subjects make real investments of time and subsequently make real choices. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.