The self and the passions

Jane McIntyre's authoritative presentation of the changes Hume makes in the Second Enquiry and the Dissertation on the Passions to the role of sympathy show that he has there left behind the centrality of the idea of the self in the Treatise, and made his philosophy less systematic but more comprehensive.     

Hobbes and the Imitation of God

This note discusses the implications of an incorrect quotation that appeared in Ted H. Miller's article, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Constraints that Enable the Imitation of God', from Inquiry42.2 (1999). Although surely inadvertent, this error is significant because the author uses it to support the thesis that Hobbes envisions philosophers imitating God by creating order out of chaos. The correct quotation from Leviathandoes not support such a thesis, and the paragraph in Leviathanfrom which it is taken actually runs counter to it. The correct quotation, taken in its context, and a passage from De Corporecited by Professor Miller reveal that Hobbes encourages philosophers to imitate God by following the order of creation in contemplation. In other words, philosophers imitate God by imitating the creation.     

Hobbes on Laughter

It has been common to read Hobbes as having an egoistic psychology, and those who have discussed his remarks about laughter (notably Heyd, Watkins and Hutcheson) have taken them to support that interpretation, dealing only rather briefly with what Hobbes actually says about laughter. I argue that Hobbes did not have an egoistic psychology, and that a more detailed consideration of his remarks about laughter, putting them in the context of other things he says, shows that they are consistent with his not having an egoistic psychology. His concern with laughter is as the expression of a passion, and specifically with a passion aroused by somebody's attempt to dishonour one, recognition of which fact changes the inferences we can reasonably draw from his remarks about laughter, given his more general claims about human nature.     

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.     

Authorization and the Right to Punish in Hobbes

This article answers questions about the consistency, coherence, and motivation of Hobbes's account of the right to punish. First, it develops a novel account of authorization that explains how Hobbes could have consistently held both that the subjects do not give the sovereign the right to punish and also that they authorize the sovereign to punish. Second, it shows that, despite appearances, the natural and artificial elements of Hobbes's account form a coherent whole. Finally, it explains why Hobbes thought it was important to establish the sovereign's right to punish apart from the sovereign's power to punish.     

霍布斯人权思想论要

托马斯·霍布斯是 17世纪英国伟大的哲学家和政治思想家。他在对科学理论探索的过程中 ,揭露、批判了封建专制制度和天主教会压迫、摧残人民的罪恶 ,积极倡导关于人的自由权、财产权、平等权和安全权等思想 ,对英国、法国的资产阶级革命的发展产生重要的影响