Representationalism is a dead end

Synthese - Representationalism—the view that scientific modeling is best understood in representational terms—is the received view in contemporary philosophy of science. Contributions...     

The real problem for postmodernism

This essay is a critique of postmodernism and its relationship to family therapy. It is argued that the strengths of a postmodern approach (its relativism and narrative focus) are not unique but shared by traditions, modern and antiquarian, which the advocates of postmodernism now seek to displace both in the academy and the clinic. The negative baggage of accepting the emerging postmodernist orthodoxy is created, in the main, by the abandonment of a realist ontology. A variety of points are made about the relationship between postmodernism and general systems theory to highlight this point. At the end, critical or sceptical social realism is offered as a positive alternative to naïve realism or postmodernism. Some notes are made in conclusion about the implications of the essay's arguments for family therapists.     

Rawls's political postmodernism

John Rawls has recently shifted to a "freestanding" or "political" liberalism from his earlier "comprehensive" and "moral" liberalism. I argue that this move is based on several key features that make Rawlsian liberal pluralism indelibly postmodern. Two of the more obvious features are the denial of foundationalism and the rejection of a truth status for public-sphere justifications of the basic political structure. In conclusion, I suggest that a late-modern postliberalism is a viable alternative. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Beyond postmodernism: Logic as rhetoric

The essay reviews the relationship between logic and rhetoric under the conditions of historicity and shows how (and why) the rules of logic may be construed as projected from the rhetorical practices of actual societies; why and how they are subject to revision; and why there is reason to think it could not be otherwise.     

The end of the end of ideology

The "end of ideology" was declared by social scientists in the aftermath of World War II. They argued that (a) ordinary citizens' political attitudes lack the kind of stability, consistency, and constraint that ideology requires; (b) ideological constructs such as liberalism and conservatism lack motivational potency and behavioral significance; (c) there are no major differences in content (or substance) between liberal and conservative points of view; and (d) there are few important differences in psychological processes (or styles) that underlie liberal versus conservative orientations. The end-of-ideologists were so influential that researchers ignored the topic of ideology for many years. However, current political realities, recent data from the American National Election Studies, and results from an emerging psychological paradigm provide strong grounds for returning to the study of ideology. Studies reveal that there are indeed meaningful political and psychological differences that covary with ideological self-placement. Situational variables--including system threat and mortality salience--and dispositional variables--including openness and conscientiousness--affect the degree to which an individual is drawn to liberal versus conservative leaders, parties, and opinions. A psychological analysis is also useful for understanding the political divide between "red states" and "blue states."     

The end of ubuntu

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, there has been a concerted effort at reviving the notion of ubuntu. Variously conceived, it is seen as the authentic African ethical concept, a way of life, an authentic mode of being African, an individual ideal, the appropriate public spirit, a definition of life itself and the preferred manner of conducting public and private business. Thus, among other public displays of the spirit of ubuntu, the government of the day has deliberately chosen its service delivery mantra and its public slogan as Batho Pele (people first) to animate, or perhaps pay obeisance to, ubuntu. In this paper we seek to advance arguments that question such a public, widespread, and concerted ‘ubuntu-isation’ of the intellectual, business, public and private lives. Our project follows two main lines of reasoning. (1) We seek to show that the aggressive promotion of ubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa is an elitist project so conceived by the new black elite. It is conceived both as a restorative move that is aimed at securing the dignity of the black masses as well as an attempt at forging a so-called black identity. This line of reasoning will rely on similar historical cases on the continent that sought to aggressively promote an African mode of being, which coincided with both the end of colonialism and the rise of black elitism. We note that such attempts always ended in very public social and political failure. (2) We seek to question the desirability of ubuntu as a mark/guide of the spirit of the nation. Here our critique shall be concentrated on the disjunct that exists between the metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment of ubuntu and the stark ontological and ethical crisis facing the new elite and ‘our people’.     

Coda--after "The end of the end of ideology"

Replies to comments by M. Glassman and D. Karno and R. K. Unger, on the author's original article on ideology. J. T. Jost thanks Glassman and Karno for returning him to his philosophical roots. Glassman and Karno argued in favor of an "instrumental pragmatist" approach to the study of ideology that emphasizes the strategic, purposive, goal-directed nature of political rhetoric and belief. He agrees that such an approach is helpful and empirically sound. He also agrees that ideological movements are often orchestrated by elites (e.g., party leaders) for strategic political purposes in a top-down manner. There are several other points, however, on which Glassman and Karno seem to misunderstand him. Regarding Unger's comments, Unger pointed out, quite correctly, that Jost said relatively little about the role of religious ideology in his discussion of ideological polarization in the United States. The ideological gulf between religious traditionalists and secular humanists has indeed been widening since 1980, and it corresponds strongly to right-left differences in political attitudes. Jost mentioned, somewhat cryptically, at the end of his article that "similarly fruitful analyses could be undertaken with respect to religious and other belief systems," and he is grateful for Unger's invitation to elaborate on this point.