XI—Internalising Practical Reasons

Practical reasons figure in both the justification and the causal explanation of action. It is usually assumed that the agent's state of believing rather than what they believe must figure in the causal explanation of action. But, that the agent believes something is not a reason in the sense of being part of the justification of what they do. So it is often concluded that the justifying reason is a different sort of thing from the causally motivating reason. But this means that in a causal process of acting the justifying reasons have done their work by the time the agent has the appropriate beliefs and desires. Transforming these into behaviour is not guided by reason. This conception of action in which there is no role for reason in the part of the process where anything actually gets done is not acceptable. So the original assumption that beliefs rather than the believed facts figure in the causal explanation of action should be challenged.     

Imagination as laboratory

The theme, 'Science and the Symbolic', may be approached via either concept. From one side, we may track how imagination, fantasy, and even dreams have initiated scientific theory and lines of research. From the other, we may look to the mythopoeic musings of the human mind for themes of proto-science and/or proto-psychology, and attempt to discern if they follow a method which may be called scientific. Neuroscientists such as Edelman and Llinas honour imagination as the carrier of emergent properties, and depth psychoanalysts see it as a vector toward actualization. What mind imagines through what the alchemists termed 'true imagination' may eventually be realized through what brain and body may conceive and execute.     

Science as Structured Imagination

This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that scientific creativity — like other forms of creativity — is structured and constrained by prior ontological expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful epistemic tool to overcome these constraints. While current research on analogies in scientific understanding focuses on near analogies, where target and source domain are close, we argue that distant analogies — where target and source domain differ widely — are especially useful in periods of intense conceptual change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies from the history of science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists like Darwin, and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen.     

Imagination as Expansion of Experience

This paper proposes a developmental view on imagination: from this perspective, imagination can be seen as triggered by some disrupting event, which generates a disjunction from the person’s unfolding experience of the “real” world, and as unfolding as a loop, which eventually comes back to the actual experience. Examining recent and classical theorization of imagination in psychology, the paper opposes a deficitary view of imagination to an expansive notion of imagination. The paper explores Piaget, Vygotsky, Harris and Pelaprat & Cole consider: 1) What does provoke a “rupture” or disjunction? 2) What are the psychological processes involved in the imaginary loop? 3) What nourishes such processes? 4) What are the consequences of such imaginary loop, or what does it enable doing? The paper proposes to adopt an expansive view of imagination, as Vygotsky proposed—a perspective that has been under-explored empirically since his seminal work. To stimulate such sociocultural psychology of imagination, two empirical examples are provided, one showing how children make sense of metaphor in an experimental setting, the other showing a young person using a novel met at school as symbolic resource.     

Motivation as an epistemic ground

In several papers, Mark Wrathall argued that French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, identifies a sui generis type of grounding, one not reducible to reason or natural causality. Following the Phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty called this form of grounding “motivation,” and described it as the way in which one phenomenon spontaneously gives rise to another through its sense. While Wrathall’s suggestion has been taken up in the practical domain, its epistemic import has still not been fully explored. I would like to take up the epistemic dimension of Wrathall’s thought in this paper. Following Wrathall, I explain how motivation can help us understand the manner in which perceptions ground singular, experiential judgments. But I extend this work in two ways. First, I suggest some additional considerations that support Wrathall’s view. Second, I argue that motivation can also help account for the way perceptions ground general judgments. My aim here will not be so much to rule out other answers to these longstanding epistemological questions, as to show that motivation carves out an attractive epistemological space.

     

Anticipated Guilt as Behavioral Motivation

The current study posits that messages used to elicit behaviors to help unknown others must present substantial perceptions of a threat and efficacy to be successful. Given that many prosocial helping messages depict a threat to unknown others, the current investigation proposed that anticipated guilt is a motivating force behind individuals' willingness to engage in behaviors to avert the unknown‐other‐directed threat. Specifically, this study hypothesized that messages which induce substantial perceptions of (a) threat, (b) response‐efficacy, and (c) self‐efficacy would result in feelings of anticipated guilt that subsequently motivate behavioral intent and, ultimately, behaviors to avert the threat to unknown others and avoid the future guilt that they might feel personally. Brehm's (1966) psychological reactance theory, however, notes that such appeals might result in reactance and thus decrease compliance with a message's prescribed actions. Two research questions were posed to determine (a) whether or not individuals experience reactance and (b) what effect, if any, reactance has on compliance. Additionally, participants' accuracy in forecasting guilt was assessed. The proposed model and research questions were tested by focusing on the topic of bone marrow donation. Participants were assigned randomly to one of three message conditions (control and two experimental messages), completed a questionnaire and returned to complete a follow‐up survey 7–10 days later. The data were consistent with the proposed model, and additional findings indicated that participants did not experience psychological reactance and were not accurate when forecasting future feelings of guilt.     

Approach‐Avoidance Motivation and the Use of Affect as Information

Individuals often rely on their affect for information. However, positive or negative affect may not be informative for individuals who are more prone to feel affect of this particular valence in general, unless they chronically monitor their internal states. A series of studies demonstrates that differences in individuals’ internal versus external focus of attention and in trait affective valence associated with their approach versus avoidance motivation determine reliance on affect as information. Specifically, our findings show that while positive affect is used as an input in product satisfaction judgments regardless of individuals’ approach versus avoidance motivation, negative affect is used only by individuals with a predominant approach motivation.     

Motivation as a predictor of outcomes in school‐based humanistic counselling

Background: Recent years have seen a growth in the provision of counselling within UK secondary schools, and research indicates that it is associated with significant reductions in psychological distress. However, little is known about the moderators and mediators of positive therapeutic benefit. In the field of adult mental health, motivation has been found to be one of the strongest predictors of therapeutic outcomes, and it was hypothesised that this may also be a predictor of outcomes for young people in school‐based counselling services. Aims: To assess the relationship between young people's motivation for counselling and its effectiveness within a secondary school setting. Sample: Eighty‐one young people (12–17 years old) who attended school‐based humanistic counselling services in Scotland. Method: Clients completed a measure of motivation for counselling at the commencement of their therapeutic work and a measure of psychological wellbeing at the commencement and termination of counselling. Results: Motivation for counselling was not found to be significantly related to outcomes. Discussion: The results indicate that the association between motivation and outcomes may be weaker in young people as compared with adults. However, a number of design factors may also account for the non‐significant findings: insufficient participants, marginal reliability of the motivation measure and social desirability effects.     

Imagination

This paper begins by examining a text in which one writer, Richard Ford, is discussing both the persona and the work of another writer, Raymond Carver. Ford's positive reaction to Carver provides us with a puzzle as to what the basis for it is. I suggest that what he is really admiring is a kind of originality that he detects in Carver. I try to specify the constitutive rules for the generation of this form of originality. They seem to take the form of at once being able to preserve what is valuable in existing material and yet managing to add what could be said to be missing. I then argue that, if Carver is doing this sort of work, so too is Ford. Having seen various examples of a kind of originality, I argue that the process we have been seeing might be formulated as the exercise of imagination, and address the issue of the possible significance of accomplishing such imaginative work. If, as many contemporary philosophers and workers in the human sciences have argued, there is no escape from the need for interpretation, there is a problem of what could ever be a satisfactory interpretation. I suggest that the idea or the possibility of an imaginative interpretation could be a way of providing such satisfaction.     

Unrepressing the Kingdom: Pastoral Theology as Aesthetic Imagination

This essay draws from Jesus?? convictions, expressed in the Gospel of Luke and elsewhere, that the kingdom of God is to be found within and among persons and is epitomized in the lives of infants and young children. It locates children??s intuitions of the kingdom in their aesthetic sensibilities and capacity for artistic abandon, and considers possible psychosocial mechanisms, especially psychoanalytic conceptualizations of repression and its consequences for honest self-expression, by which these intuitions and sensibilities become displaced over time. It conceives of pastoral theology, like psychotherapy and the arts, as an heroic effort to unearth repressed shame and desire, i.e., to find language for what matters most, in service to recovering childlike attunement to the beauty of God??s kingdom.     

Motivation as a function of success frequency

Motivation and Emotion - It is well-established that intermediate challenge is optimally motivating. We tested whether this can be quantified into an inverted-U relationship between motivation and...     

Goal Theories of Motivation as Rigorous Humanism

Over the past few decades, there has been increasing interest among social, clinical, and personality psychologists in the topic of human agency in general and personal goals in particular. Goal theories of motivation are described and analyzed from the perspective of Rychlak's rigorous humanism. Studying goals may actually be more of a methodology than a theory. A number of different theories could lead to the study of goals as a primary research methodology. However, not all such theories will meet Rychlak's criteria for rigorous humanism. The role of goals in Logical Learning Theory is discussed.