RAWLS AND CARNAP ON DOING PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT METAPHYSICS

Abstract:  Some philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen, view Rawls's rejection of metaphysical claims, encapsulated in his method of avoidance, as being compatible with the "anti-philosophical" stance, the view that metaphysical debates are sterile and should be abandoned to be replaced by practically viable forms of thinking. This paper shows that this reading of the method of avoidance is incorrect and argues that the method of avoidance is in fact comparable to Carnap's higher-order standpoint of neutrality with regards to different frameworks. This sheds new light on Rawlsian theory and situates it within the empiricist tradition.     

BETWEEN THE LINES OF AGE: REFLECTIONS ON THE METAPHYSICS OF WORDS

Abstract: The central concern of this paper is the nature of the relation between words on the one hand and their occurrences on the other. I argue here that while Kaplan's “common currency” conception of words is immune to much of the criticism to which Cappelen has subjected it, it runs afoul of the role words play in communication. And I sketch an alternative conception – the type‐continuant model – which shares the virtues but avoids the vices of Kaplan's conception.     

EXPLAINING THE LIMITS OF OLSSON'S IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT

In his groundbreaking book, Against Coherence (2005), Erik Olsson presents an ingenious impossibility theorem that appears to show that there is no informative relationship between probabilistic measures of coherence and higher likelihood of truth. Although Olsson's result provides an important insight into probabilistic models of epistemological coherence, the scope of his negative result is more limited than generally appreciated. The key issue is the role conditional independence conditions play within the witness testimony model Olsson uses to establish his result. Olsson maintains that his witness model yields charitable ceteris paribus conditions for any theory of probabilistic coherence. Not so. In fact, Olsson's model, like Bayesian witness models in general, selects a peculiar class of models that are in no way representative of the range of options available to coherence theorists. Recent positive results suggest that there is a way to develop a formal theory of coherence after all. Further, although Bayesian witness models are not conducive to the truth, they are conducive to reliability.     

HEIDEGGER AND THE APPROPRIATION OF METAPHYSICS

Heidegger's deconstruction of the history of Western metaphysics has been a major influence behind poststructural critiques of modernity as well as more apologetic attempts to maintain a dialogue with historical sources, such as Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. This bifurcation has intensified the ambiguity of Heidegger's project: was it an attempt to relinquish philosophical ties to the past or a call for a fundamental reinterpretation of them? In this article I argue the latter, focusing my analysis on Heidegger's notions of appropriation and historicity. On the one hand, appropriation is the hermeneutical event by which ontology is reinfused into a reading of historical sources. On the other hand, historicity is the self‐reflexive historical involvement by which we become aware of what contemporary, philosophical conditions necessitate this reengagement. In the end, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics arises from this self‐reflexivity. It deconstructs the prevailing misunderstandings of philosophical sources in order to allow for reinterpretation at a revivified ontological level constantly in view of the question of being.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS FOR THE LIFE OF FAITH

This essay proceeds, first, with an analysis of the theme of overcoming metaphysics in Kant and Heidegger to see just what it is that needs overcoming and how this might be of service to the life of biblical, ecclesial faith. This is followed by an account of how Jean‐Luc Marion sees the right kind of phenomenology as performing this task and of John Milbank's counterclaim that “only theology overcomes metaphysics”. Marion's position is then defended as a genuine, if partial overcoming that needs theology for its completion. Finally, a brief account is offered of the authentically metaphysical dimension of theology.     

A PROOF OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF COMPLETING INFINITELY MANY TASKS

In this article, I argue that it is impossible to complete infinitely many tasks in a finite time. A key premise in my argument is that the only way to get to 0 tasks remaining is from 1 task remaining, when tasks are done 1‐by‐1. I suggest that the only way to deny this premise is by begging the question, that is, by assuming that supertasks are possible. I go on to present one reason why this conclusion (that supertasks are impossible) is important, namely that it implies a new verdict on a decision puzzle propounded by Jeffrey Barrett and Frank Arntzenius.