Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief?

My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the degrees of justification of the corresponding beliefs. There are two ways in which degrees of justification can be computed within this framework. I argue that there is not any way of doing the calculations in a broadly probabilistic manner. The only alternative looks to be a thoroughly non-probabilistic way of thinking wedded to the thought that justification is closed under competent deduction. However, I argue that such a view is unable to capture the intuitive notion of justification, for it leads to an uncomfortable dilemma: either a widespread scepticism about justification, or drawing epistemically spurious distinctions between different types of lotteries. This should worry anyone interested in well-founded belief.     

Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?

To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one's information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for S is to ask if x is a problem for S’s ability to acquire true belief and avoid false belief. To ask if there is a problem for S with x as such is to ask if it is impossible to solve the problem for S while leaving x as is. I argue that, if we consider the five most plausible candidate epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, dependency, and lack of epistemic autonomy—we see for each candidate that it is either not an epistemic problem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such.     

Is There a Religious Revival among Hungarian Jews Today?

There are about 100,000 Jews in Hungary today. Most dwell in the capital, Budapest. Few are registered with the official Jewish community and most are assimilated. Since the demise of Communism in 1989, there has been a resurgence of Jewish life. However, can we say that there is a religious revival? There are new forms of Jewish religious life, but I argue that the revival is more cultural than religious in that more Jews are prepared to acknowledge their Jewish identity. In short, Jews are 'coming out'.     

Do Near-Death Experiences Provide a Rational Basis for Belief in Life after Death?

In this paper I suggest that near-death experiences (NDEs) provide a rational basis for belief in life after death. My argument is a simple one and is modeled on the argument from religious experience for the existence of God. But unlike the proponents of the argument from religious experience, I stop short of claiming that NDEs prove the existence of life after death. Like the argument from religious experience, however, my argument turns on whether or not there is good reason to believe that NDEs are authentic or veridical. I argue that there is good reason to believe that NDEs are veridical and that therefore it is reasonable to believe in the existence of what they seem to be experiences of, namely, a continued state of consciousness after the death of the body. I will then offer some comments on the philosophical import of NDEs, as well as reflections on the current state of contemporary philosophy in light of the neglect of this phenomenon.     

Is Psychology a Cognitive Science?

ABSTRACT Since the 1970s there has been a significant paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviourism and towards cognitive psychology. Indeed a recent survey discovered that by 1983 more than half American psychologists were describing their approaches as cognitive. However, while behaviourism has had an identifiable philosophical 'line' in positivism, reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive model, such a framework has been noticeably lacking from cognitive psychology. A view of cognitive psychology based on functionalism and ideas from systems analysis is put forward.     

Teaching Theology and Religious Studies Is There A Problem?

This paper discusses a problem which is largely, though not exclusively, peculiar to the older universities in Great Britain where, in recent years, many long-established departments of Christian theology have expanded their area of responsibility to include religious studies. However, the author believes that what he has to say is not without relevance to universities and colleges outside of Great Britain which have inherited and continue to maintain a confessional bias in teaching theology and religion.     

Is There a Role for Psychology in Ulcer Disease?

The discovery of the importance of bacterial factors in the etiology of ulcer disease has led to a neglect of psychological factors. However, both earlier theoretical and empirical approaches implicating these factors are supported by more recent studies, both epidemiological and experimental. While not ignoring the unquestioned role of Helicobacter, it is important for future research to recognize the multi-factorial nature of ulcer disease by which several factors, including stress, bacteria and non-steroid antiinflammatory drugs, may interact to drive a pre-pathology (erosions or ulcerations) to a pathological state (ulcer). Calls for general eradication programs should be cautioned in the light of possible unwanted side effects.     

Cognitive Performance in Adults’ Daily Lives: Is There a Lab-Life Gap?

This article addresses the “lab-life gap” in cognitive aging research as an important issue of ecological validity in developmental research. Older adults often function competently in complex everyday situations despite age-related deficits on laboratory-based cognitive tasks. Therefore, to what extent do lab-based cognitive tasks predict real-life outcomes in older adults? Our review shows that although they are similar, measures of everyday cognitive competence predict relevant outcomes beyond basic measures. We provide our perspective on critical questions concerning the relevance of everyday cognitive tests in our ever-changing world, new methods of everyday cognitive assessment, and whether everyday cognition can be improved.     

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.     

Religious Belief and Freedom of Expression: Is Offensiveness Really the Issue?

An objection frequently brought against critical or satirical expressions, especially when these target religions, is that they are ‘offensive’. In this article, I indicate why the existence of diverse and conflicting beliefs gives people an incentive to formulate their complaints in the language of offence. But I also cast doubt on whether people, in saying they are offended really mean to present that as the foundation of their complaint and, if they do, whether their complaint should weigh with us. These doubts do not apply to everything we might find offensive; in particular, they do not apply to simple cases of ‘sensory offence’; but they do apply to ‘belief-based offence’. Relying on offence also implies, inequitably, that different faiths should be differently protected depending on their susceptibility to offence; and the faithful themselves should worry about the flimsiness of claims based on ‘bare knowledge’ offence. I propose a principle of respect for beliefs as a differently grounded and more plausible reason for curbing our treatment of others’ beliefs. However, that principle has a limited compass and is hemmed in by the claims of free expression. It is also less suited to dictating the content of law than to influencing our conduct within the law.     

IFPS - Is There a Difference?

This paper tries to answer a question about the difference between IFPS and other psychoanalytical institutions. The author states that there is a linkage between the ethics of psychoanalysis and the ethics of the institution. The ethics can not be represented by rules or standards of prerequisites, but by creating a space where the unconscious as desire, singularity and difference takes place. The bureaucratic organization and the hierarchy in the categories of members of IPA institutions goes straight against the transgressor experience of the unconscious. The training analysis under such conditions leads to an identification process with the training analyst, giving as final result standardized, homogeneous, obedient analysts. The author describes a new experience in the training of analysts in his institution without any kind of interference from IFPS. Finally, he concludes that differences exists between the two institutions and that they are mainly due to the identification process typical for IPA and the process of ''choice'' in IFPS.     

Is There a Philosophy of Information?

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.     

Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement?

This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. This essay suggests two ways in which the agent is involved in the process of overcoming this obstacle.