Disability Cosmology: The Practice of Making Disability Worlds

The practice of making disability worlds is investigated both theoretically, in the context of developments in disability studies, in particular in the cultural model of disability, and practically in two examples, namely inclusive education environments and public environments. Theoretically, we argue that disability worlds can be better understood by introducing the notion of disability cosmology as the largest possible perspective on the making of disability worlds. A cultural model research perspective of disability consists then of the complementary study of disability identity, culture and cosmology. The practical examples work out the particularities of making and understanding disability worlds. In the making of disability worlds, much attention goes to the ways in which disability worlds relate to the normative world; for example in the formation of boundaries and transgressions, but also fundamentally how disability adds to becoming human.     

From Modal Discourse to Possible Worlds

The possible-worlds semantics for modality says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in some possible world. Given classical prepositional logic, one can easily prove that every consistent set of propositions can be embedded in a ‘maximal consistent set’, which in a sense represents a possible world. However the construction depends on the fact that standard modal logics are finitary, and it seems false that an infinite collection of sets of sentences each finite subset of which is intuitively ‘possible’ in natural language has the property that the whole set is possible. The argument of the paper is that the principles needed to shew that natural language possibility sentences involve quantification over worlds are analogous to those used in infinitary modal logic.     

Goodman and Putnam on the Making of Worlds

Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.     

Worlds within Worlds: Kabbalah and the New Scientific Paradigm

Beginning with relativity and quantum theory, the deterministic view that has dominated and shaped Western culture for more than 2,500 years has begun to unravel, leading to the emergence of a new paradigm. This new paradigm effectively reformulates the project of science, conceiving of existence as an interpenetrating web of coevolving, cocreative relationships. By exploring Kabbalah and the new scientific paradigm within the context of shared evolutionary principles, I seek to demonstrate a viable alternative to the prevailing deterministic worldview. By going beyond the limits of determinism and re–visioning existence as an evolutionary, emergent phenomenon, we can establish a new basis for an authentic dialogue between science and religion.     

Caught Between Two Worlds:

No abstract available for this article.     

Possible Worlds: A Neo-Fregean Alternative

I outline a neo-Fregean strategy in the debate on the existence of possible worlds. The criterion of identity and the criterion of application are formulated. Special attention is paid to the fact that speakers do not possess proper names for worlds. A broadly Quinean solution is proposed in response to this difficulty.     

Impossible Worlds

Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds‐based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds‐based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources.     

决策的三参照点理论:从原理到应用

三参照点理论(Tri-Reference Point Theory,Wang,2008a; Wang& Johnson,2012)以底线、现状和目标为参照点,将决策结果空间划分为失败、损失、获益和成功4个功能区域.根据3个参照点的心理权重的排序:底线＞目标＞现状,该模型继而推导出跨越不同区域的以现状为分界的双S-型的价值函数,以及据此产生的对于跨越不同参照点的预期结果的偏好转换、和损失-获益及失败-成功的两种不对称性.总之,风险决策的基本任务在于,在使得达到目标的可能性最大化的同时使底线不保的可能性最小化.三参照点理论将统计学和金融学中的均值与方差(均差)分析与行为决策研究中的参照点效应有机地结合在一起;在面对不同的风险选项时,通过分析各个预期结果的均差分布与3个参照点之间的关系作出适应性的决策.本文介绍了三参照点理论的基本推论、运行原则、实证检验、以及它与期望效用理论和前景理论相比较的异同之处.同时我们也探讨了三参照点理论对实践中管理决策的指导意义和多重启示.     

Two Worlds: African American Men's Negotiation of Predominantly White Educational and Occupational Worlds

Negotiating 2 worlds, a predominantly White opportunity structure and one's community of origin, often produces distress among persons of color. in this qualitative study, the author examines the perspectives and competencies of African American men who negotiate 2 worlds and suggests that bicultural competence may facilitate participation in the opportunity structure while maintaining identification with one's racial group. Desenvolverse en dos mundos, una estructura de oportunidades predominantemente Blanca y la propia comunidad de origen, genera con frecuencia angustia entre las personas de color. En este estudio cualitativo, el autor examina las perspectivas y competencias de varones Afroamericanos que se desenvuelven en dos mundos distintos y sugiere que la competencia bicultural puede facilitar su participación en la estructura de oportunidades, manteniendo a la vez la identificación con el propio grupo racial.     

Prism Adaptation During Target Pointing From Visible and Nonvisible Starting Locations

The performance of subjects whose starting limb location was visible when pointing to a sagittal target during exposure to prismatic displacement showed immediate target acquisition, but aftereffects of exposure were absent. When starting limb location was not visible, accurate exposure performance was slow to develop, but aftereffects were substantial. Visible starting location evoked a zeroing-in control strategy on the basis of relative-location coding, which rapidly reduced performance error but disabled detection of spatial misalignment between sensorimotor systems. When starting location was not visible, absolute-location coding of the displaced target initiated movement that had to be corrected subsequently by visual feedback. In this case, comparison of the initial erroneous movement code with the limb location that achieved the target enabled misalignment detection and consequent realignment.     

Making Group Brainstorming More Effective: Recommendations From an Associative Memory Perspective

Much literature on group brainstorming has found it to be less effective than individual brainstorming. However, a cognitive perspective suggests that group brainstorming could be an effective technique for generating creative ideas. Computer simulations of an associative memory model of idea generation in groups suggest that groups have the potential to generate ideas that individuals brainstorming alone are less likely to generate. Exchanging ideas by means of writing or computers, alternating solitary and group brainstorming, and using heterogeneous groups appear to be useful approaches for enhancing group brainstorming.     

Worlds in Motion: Temporality and Historicality

ABSTRACT

Worlds are always in motion; what kind of movement is at stake? In this essay, I will argue that Heidegger moves beyond Hegel by making the concept of world central to phenomenology. But how do worlds move? As history, Heidegger says; yet his initial attempt to interpret history, in the final sections of Being and Time, is at certain moments hampered by his attempt to ground the historicality of shared world in the temporality of individual Dasein. Derrida then moves beyond Heidegger by addressing paradoxes in our understanding of time and history. This allows Derrida to introduce the ethical dimension of world from the start as we are called to acknowledge that the Other brings their own world and awaits our response. Worlds are both singular and shared; and in any case, they move (and move us).