A semantic attack on divine-command metaethics

According to divine-command metaethics (DCM), whatever is morally good or right has that status because, and only because, it conforms to God’s will. I argue that DCM is false or vacuous: either DCM is false, or else there are no instantiated moral properties, and no moral truths, to which DCM can even apply. The sort of criticism I offer is familiar, but I develop it in what I believe is a novel way.     

How you can help,without making a difference

There are many cases in which people collectively cause some morally significant outcome (such as a harmful or beneficial outcome) but no individual act seems to make a difference. The problem in such cases is that it seems each person can argue, ‘it makes no difference whether or not I do X, so I have no reason to do it.’ The challenge is to say where this argument goes wrong. My approach begins from the observation that underlying the problem and motivating the typical responses to it is a standard, intuitive assumption. The assumption is that if an act will not make a difference with respect to an outcome, then it cannot play a significant, non-superfluous role in bringing that outcome about. In other words, helping to bring about an outcome requires making a difference. I argue that the key to solving the problem is to reject this assumption. I develop an account of what it is to help to bring about an outcome, where this does not require making a difference, and I use this explain our reasons for action in the problem cases. This account also yields an error theory that explains why the standard assumption is so tempting, even though it is mistaken.     

Good,Evil, and the Necessity of an Act

Kant asserts that the formula of the schools “nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni” is undoubtedly certain when clearly expressed (KpV 177). Conversely, doubt reflects a failure clearly to express it. Once we comprehend the concepts of the formula, of the good (bonum) and of desire (appetitus), there is no doubting it. In recent times, the formula has fallen into doubt. If Kant is right, then this shows a lack of clarity with respect to the concepts the formula conjoins. I want to suggest that Kant is right: the formula of the schools is undoubtedly certain. I first explain in Kant’s own terms why there is no such thing as doubting the formula. Then I approach it from a different angle, provided by what I take to be the unclarity that affects current thought on the topic.     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.     

Self-defence Against the Innocent

Do we have the right to defend ourselves against innocent aggressors? If I amattacked in a lift by a knife-wielding lunatic, may I kill or maim him to protect my own life? On one view the insane man’s plight is his bad luck and I am under no obligation to let it be transferred to me. On the opposing view it is my bad luck to be under attack and I have no right to transfer it to an innocent man by killing him to protect myself. It is perhaps becauseneither of these opposing viewpoints is obviously preferable to the other that there is no consensus about the question. Nevertheless we can find considerations for favouring the first view over the second.     

The pretense of psychology as science: The myth of mental illness in Statu Nascendi

If I was profoundly shocked by the Varieties [of Religious Experience, by William James], that was not because some of the facts described in it were such as I would rather not hear about. They were, on the whole, amusing. Nor was it because I thought James was doing his work clumsily. I thought he did it very well. It was because the whole thing was a fraud.... Psychology... regarded as the science of the mind, is not a science. It is what “phrenology” was in the early nineteenth century, and astrology and alchemy in the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: the fashionable scientific fraud of the age.... There were, I held, no merely moral actions, no merely political actions, and no merely economic actions. Every action was moral, political, and economic.     

A Noneist Account of the Doctrine of Creatio ex Nihilo

I spell out a problem with the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo: that, contra the doctrine, it is not possible to efficiently cause something from nothing. This is because an efficient cause requires a material cause in order to have an effect. The material cause supplies the potency that the efficient cause actualises. Because nothingness has no potencies, there is nothing for an efficient cause to actualise. I show that this objection presupposes that the theory of noneism (the proposition that some things do not exist) is false. I postulate that the universe (i.e. the created order) is a non-existent item and so there is no problem with the claim that it was efficiently caused to come from nothing – the universe has no being anyway. After rehearsing the rather strong reasons in favour of the truth of noneism, I deal with two objections that are peculiar to my claim that the universe lacks reality: that creation possesses characteristics that are sufficient to render it existent and that a non-existent object has its properties independent of divine fiat. I show that there are sensible replies to both objections. With regard to the first I show that the possession of such characteristics at most shows that the universe has an ontological status that is equivalent to some reference point. With regard to the second I argue that the Characterisation Principle (i.e. in some world – not necessarily the actual world – an object has the properties that it is characterised as having) entails that non-existent objects possess their properties in virtue of some existent entity and that the only plausible candidate for such an entity is a divine mind of some sort.     

The pretense of psychology as science: The myth of mental illness in Statu Nascendi

If I was profoundly shocked by the Varieties [of Religious Experience, by William James], that was not because some of the facts described in it were such as I would rather not hear about. They were, on the whole, amusing. Nor was it because I thought James was doing his work clumsily. I thought he did it very well. It was because the whole thing was a fraud.... Psychology... regarded as the science of the mind, is not a science. It is what “phrenology” was in the early nineteenth century, and astrology and alchemy in the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: the fashionable scientific fraud of the age.... There were, I held, no merely moral actions, no merely political actions, and no merely economic actions. Every action was moral, political, and economic.     

Deflating Compositionality

My approach to the compositionality of meaning is deflationary in two respects. In the first place it shows that there is no need for a Tarski-style truth-theoretic account of it, and thereby avoids the difficult methodological and technical problems that would have to be solved on such an account. And in the second place it shows that compositionality imposes no constraint whatsoever on theories of lexical meaning. On the first of these points I am opposing Davidson and the tradition in semantics that he instigated. On the second point I am opposing Fodor and Lepore who have denounced various accounts of lexical meaning (including the one I favour – the use theory) for not squaring with compositionality. My plan for this paper is to outline the deflationary approach, to sketch its advantages, and to defend it against objections that have been made by Davidson, Fodor and Lepore.     

Constructing and Expanding a Framework: Opportunities for Developing Acculturation Research

Reading the seven commentaries has provided me with an opportunity to reflect further on many of the issues confronting researchers and practioners in the field of migration studies. Because the area is so complex, it is not surprising that there is great diversity in coverage and in perspectives. However, many of the points made are similar in that they all suggest emphasis, elaboration, or addition to the text and figures that I presented. My reply is that no text (no matter how generous the word allocation), nor figure (no matter how complicated), can represent every aspect of the realities of the acculturation process. I (and others) have previously written on many of the points made, and I will take this opportunity to refer to them, and to link them to what I presented in the lead article.     

The Inference to the Best Means

I was in bondage in Missouri, too. I can't say that my treatment was bad. In one respect I say it was not bad, but in another I consider it was as bad as could be. I was a slave. That covers it all. I had not the rights of a man.

It cannot be too often repeated: peasants and workmen have no natural rights, not one. Only we ought instantly to add, that kings and nobles have none either.     

Defending the Objective List Theory of Well‐Being

The objective list theory of well‐being holds that a plurality of basic objective goods directly benefit people. These can include goods such as loving relationships, meaningful knowledge, autonomy, achievement, and pleasure. The objective list theory is pluralistic (it does not identify an underlying feature shared by these goods) and objective (the basic goods benefit people independently of their reactive attitudes toward them). In this paper, I discuss the structure of this theory and show how it is supported by people's considered judgments. I then respond to three objections. First, I argue that there is no conceptual reason to favor a monistic theory of well‐being over a pluralistic one (such as the objective list theory). Second, I argue that states of affairs can benefit people even though they hold no positive reactive attitudes toward them. And, third, I argue that objective list theorists can identify a fairly‐determinate list of basic goods.     

Much Ado About Nothing? Some Comments on B. F. Skinner's Definition of Verbal Behavior

Some have suggested that the definition of verbal behavior offered by B. F. Skinner (1957) fails to capture the essence of language insofar as it is too broad and not functional. In this paper, I argue that the ambiguities of Skinner's definition are not an indictment of it, and that suggestions to the contrary are problematic because they suffer a critical error of scientific reasoning. Specifically, I argue that (a) no clear definition of verbal behavior is possible because there is no natural distinction between verbal and nonverbal behavior; (b) attempts at an immutable definition are essentialistic; and (c) Skinner's functional taxonomy of language is in no way affected by the particulars of any definition of verbal behavior.     

Against the Political Exclusion of the Incapable

Political exclusion on grounds of incapacity is the primary remaining source of exclusion from the franchise. It is appealed to by states and theorists alike to justify excluding young people (under 18) and many people with cognitive disability from the franchise. Defenders of this exclusion claim that no wrong is done by this exclusion and that states gain some significant benefits from this restricting of the franchise. I have argued elsewhere that political exclusion as currently practiced in modern liberal democratic states in fact causes significant harms, as it excludes some people who have the relevant capacity for political participation. Here, I argue that the exclusion of incapable actors prevents no significant harms to democratic outcomes, and that it confers no significant democratic benefits on the states practising this exclusion. As such, I argue that we ought to heavily modify and perhaps even abandon the capacity standard for political inclusion.     

Color,Relativism, and Realism

It is plausible to think that some animals perceive the world as coloreddifferently from the way humans perceive it. I argue that the best way ofaccommodating this fact is to adopt perceiver-relativism, the view that colorpredicates express relations between objects and types of perceivers.Perceiver-relativism makes no claim as to the identity of color properties;it is compatible with both physicalism and dispositionalism. I arguehowever for a response-dependence version of it according to which an object counts as red (for a type of perceiver) iff it standardly looks red to normal perceivers (of that type). Finally, I develop a notion of minimal realism on which this account counts as realist despite its subjectivist elements, in that it is committed to the objectivityof truth.     

What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?

Peter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I will argue that it has both the uses they discussed—it can be used for making claims about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are, and it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experiments. Furthermore, it can be useful in explanations. More generally, I will argue that more coarse-grained concepts (like confirmation) can be useful, even when we have more fine-grained concepts (like credences).     

THE PAINS OF R-GEORGE,ROBOT

In this essay I wish to raise the question of whether it is meaningful to say that a certain sort of robot is in pain. This is, of course, not an empirical question. There exists no robot of the sort I shall describe. But, I shall argue, if such a robot did in fact exist, it would be meaningful to say it is in pain.     

Is There Savings for Pavlovian Fear Conditioning after Neurotoxic Basolateral Amygdala Lesions in Rats?

Considerable evidence indicates an important role for amygdaloid nuclei in both the acquisition and expression of Pavlovian fear conditioning. Recent reports from my laboratory have focused on the impact of neurotoxic lesions of the basolateral complex of the amygdala (BLA) on conditional freezing behavior in rats. In these studies, I have observed severe effects of posttraining BLA lesions on the expression of conditional freezing even after extensive presurgical overtraining (25-75 trials). Moreover, I have found no evidence for sparing of fear memory (i.e., savings) in these rats when I assess their rate of reacquisition relative to BLA rats receiving minimal training (1 trial). In these experiments, freezing behavior was assessed using a conventional time-sampling procedure and expressed as a response probability. Although this measure is well established in the literature, it is conceivable that it is not sensitive to spared memory in rats with BLA lesions. To address this issue, I present a more detailed analysis of freezing behavior that quantifies latency to freeze, the number of freezing bouts, the duration of freezing bouts, and the probability distribution of bout lengths. I also include control data from untrained (no-shock) rats. Consistent with my earlier reports, I find no evidence of savings of fear memory in rats with neurotoxic BLA lesions using several measures of freezing behavior. These results reiterate the conclusion that fear memory, as it is expressed in freezing behavior, requires neurons in the BLA.     

Functionalism and propositions

Conclusion Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects.     

Can we Describe Possible Circumstances in which we would have Most Reason to Believe that Time is Two‐dimensional?

How one answers the question whether time could be two‐dimensional depends upon what one takes to be the essential properties of time. I assume that it is essential to time that it has a ‘sense’ or ‘direction’; and, on the basis of this assumption, I argue that no‐one has yet succeeded in giving a clear account of how it could be that time is two‐dimensional. In particular, I argue that no‐one has yet succeeded in describing possible circumstances in which we would have serious reason to entertain the hypothesis that time is two‐dimensional.