SCIENCE AND REALITY, RELIGION AND GOD: A REPLY TO HARRY PROSCH

Abstract. Michael Polanyi saw his epistemology as restoring the capacity of a scientific age to believe again in the reality of God known through religion. This central feature of Polanyi's thought, discussed in my book The Way of Discovery , is disputed by Harry Prosch, co-author with Polanyi of Meaning. Prosch's argument is that while in Polanyi's view science deals with an independent reality, religion and theology do not and are only works of our imagination. This article answers Prosch with a review of Polanyi's Christian affiliations, his conceptions of the common ground of science and religion, the levels of reality to which both science and religion provide access, and his expressed aim to liberate faith from scientific dogmatism.     

BRIDGING SCIENCE AND RELIGION: "THE MORE" AND "THE LESS" IN WILLIAM JAMES AND OWEN FLANAGAN

There is a kinship between Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem and William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience that not only can help us to understand Flanagan's book but also can help scholars, particularly scholars of religion, to be attentive to an important development in the realm of the "spiritual but not religious." Specifically, Flanagan's book continues a tradition in philosophy, exemplified by James, that addresses questions of religious or spiritual meaning in terms accessible to a broad audience outside the context of organized religions. Both James and Flanagan are concerned to refute the popular perception that the sciences of the mind pose a threat to meaning and particularly to meaningful processes of human growth and transformation. Where James used the subconscious to bridge between science and religion and persuade his readers of the reality of the More, Flanagan uses a scientifically grounded understanding of transcendence to enchant his readers into believing in Less. Although I think that Flanagan's attempt to link the psychological and sociocultural levels of analysis via the concept of transcendence is scientifically premature, his attempt at a naturalistic spirituality raises questions of definition that scholars of religion need to take seriously.     

Polanyi's Finalism

Although Michael Polanyi's model of science and his construal of the nature of the real are usually thought to be congenial to religion and although Polanyi himself says that "the stage on which we thus resume our full intellectual powers is borrowed from the Christian scheme of Fall and Redemption" (Polanyi 1958, 324), theologians have given little attention to the model of God he presents. The metaphysical and theological vision unfolded in part 4 of Personal Knowledge is a thoughtful alternative to materialist versions of neo-Darwinism and provides a platform for revisiting four long-standing controversies at the interface of science and religion: whether life and mind can be completely specified in terms of physical analysis, whether nature can be adequately understood without appeal to final causes, whether natural selection adequately explains life's diverse forms, and whether knowledge can be fully objectified. Through an exploration of Polanyi's contribution to these discussions, we undertake to show not only that his treatment of God as a cosmic field is strikingly original but also that in reinstating activity as a metaphysical category, he reconstructs our understanding of our creaturely hope and calling.     

James's “Transfigured Nature”: Where Art and Religion Converge

This essay explores ways in which William James's appreciation for art finds expression in his psychology of religion. Portraiture art reveals his perception of his distance from his religious subjects, whereas landscape art reveals his personal appropriation of religion and self-identification with the religiously-minded. Furthermore, landscape art draws attention to the feminine, even maternal aspect of religion, the aspect to which James was especially receptive.     

Michael Polanyi, Tacit Cognitive Relativist

Celebrated as a theorist of science, and a source of stimulating ideas for theologians and philosophers of religion, Michael Polanyi explicitly denied cognitive relativism. Yet cognitive relativism, this paper suggests, is implied by Polanyi's account of conceptual frameworks and intellectual controversies.
In ' The Stability of Beliefs ' (1952) Polanyi understands conceptual frameworks (science, psychoanalysis, Azande witchcraft, Marxism) as embedded in, and as expressed in the use of, their own languages. The language-with-theory limits the range of discussable subjects, interprets relevant facts in its own terms, permits only certain questions to be asked, with answers to these questions serving to confirm the framework.
In Polanyi's masterwork, Personal Knowledge (1958), these ideas inform his discussion of controversies over scientific frameworks and frameworks vying to become part of science. In each controversy, frameworks are logically disconnected, Polanyi foreshadowing the incommensurability thesis
I argue that Polanyi's ideas satisfy recognised criteria of cognitive relativism. Perception is undetermined by objects and conditioned by language. Empirical propositions, in Polanyi's view, are accepted as true only within a conceptual framework. Polanyi regards supporters of logically disconnected frameworks as thinking differently, living in different worlds, speaking different languages and as experiencing communication failure. There is no framework-independent argument or evidence to distinguish any framework as the best available approximation to the truth. Frameworks are logically disconnected and incommensurable.     

A critical examination of Michael Polanyi's conception of skills

In this paper I will consider some of the main issues in Michael Polanyi's discussion of ‘Skills’ from Chapter 4 of his book Personal Knowledge published in 1958.The concept of ‘skill’ features prominently in psychological theories of human performance in activities such as games, gymnastics, swimming and dance; such theories are often applied to other spheres of human activity in which issues about skill acquisition arise. It is not surprising to discover that skill theory is considered to be essential to the study of human movement and physical education. Physical education teachers in schools have consistently maintained that ‘skill acquisition’ is a major objective for the P.E. curriculum — see Kane 1974. Yet concepts such as ‘skill’, ‘ability’ and ‘know-how’ are constituent features of practical knowledge therefore the notion of ‘skill acquisition’ on its own will not do as a curriculum objective since all instances of skill and practical knowledge are specific to their contexts, namely, to different practical activities. If particular activities are valued in schools in the pursuit of children's learning and education it seems necessary to clarify the epistemological features of such activities in order to understand what it means to teach them and what it means for children to learn and know-how to perform them successfully. It is in these respects that the concept of ‘skill’ in different human activities should attract the interest of physical education students. In order to draw attention to major features of Polanyi's thesis on the nature of ‘skill’ I shall consider the relevance of his ideas about skill and knowledge in relation to human action theory. I suggest that misconceptions may arise in teaching and learning theories relating to ‘playing soccer’ if the basic underlying ideas about ‘skill’ in human activities are inconsistent with ideas about human action or, say, practical reasoning. It is this issue that is not, in my view, attended to by Polanyi in his discussion of ‘skill’. Thus, if my criticisms of Polanyi's ideas are shown to be valid it will be necessary, by implication that is, to exercise caution before any attempt is made to use his thesis as a basis from which to formulate ideas about teaching skills and skill acquisition. The extensive use I make of quotations from Polanyi's writings is necessary because it is towards Polanyi's use of language in his explanation of ‘skills’ that much of my criticism is directed. It is hoped that what follows may provide students of human movement and physical education with an insight into Polanyi's view of ‘skills’ in particular and to issues related to skill theory and human action in general.     

ANIMALS AS KIN: THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF MARC BEKOFF'S WORK

Abstract. Although the disciplines of religion and science often may seem to be at cross purposes with each other, some individuals are attempting to bridge the gap, particularly with regard to animals. Cognitive ethologist Marc Bekoff, who studies animals in their natural habitat, has addressed in his work the implications of the findings of animal study for religion and ethics. I provide here an overview of some of his most important ideas for the study of religion and animals. Bekoff argues that the differences between humans and animals are primarily ones of degree rather than kind and that our similarities are greater than our differences‐and that this reality should influence our actions. I explore three issues in particular. First, Bekoff's work, with his view of evolution, challenges the traditional Christian hierarchy of beings. Second, this evolutionary connection needs to move us in the direction of modifying our treatment of animals to make it more ethical. Third, our understanding of and relationship with animals can deepen our own spirituality. Applying some of Bekoff's findings to our religious and ethical understandings of and treatment of animals can move us closer to the peaceable kingdom toward which we all strive.     

THE EARTH CHARTER AND BIODEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY‐FIRST CENTURY

This essay introduces the themes that motivate the three articles that follow. Their common aim is to explore the connections between the Earth Charter and the concept of biodemocracy with the intention of highlighting ways of thinking about the relationship between science, religion, and the environment in the twenty‐first century. Informed by the science of ecology and written by scholars of religion, the articles included here seek to integrate movements and ideas as diverse as postmodern thought, the much‐debated thought of Lynn White, jr. (his preferred spelling), and the synergy emerging between the Earth Charter and Journey of the Universe.     

QUESTIONING POLANYI'S MEANING: A RESPONSE TO RONALD HALL

Abstract. Michael Polanyi's distinction between the indicative meaning of scientific statements and the symbolic and metaphorical meaning of art and religion, presented in Meaning , is based on an abstraction from concrete experience and betrays an inadequate understanding of religious discourse, particularly the discourse of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In fact, Polanyi's vision in Personal Knowledge , which analyses the priority of personal action to all achievements of explication, seems either to be denied or forgotton by the positions taken in Meaning. Hence, the argument here is that Meaning is a deviation from Personal Knowledge and a step away from the resources necessary to grasp adequately the logic of religious discourse.     

关于“去神话化”问题

采用客观化方式的自然科学必然要去神话化。但人的存在是向将来敞开的历史性生存,历史科学既需要自然科学式的去神话化,又不能像自然科学那样简单地消除神话,而是需要通过一种生存主义解释来找出神话的意义,即把其真实意图还原为对人之本真生存的言说。基督教信仰和关于上帝行为的言说可以最终不采用神话的方式。     

MORALITY THROUGH INQUIRY,MOTIVE THROUGH RHETORIC: THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE EPOCH OF THE ANTHROPOCENE

In an epoch marked by the threat of global warming, the conflicts between science and religion are no longer simply matters that concern only intellectual elites and armchair philosophers; they are in many ways matters that will determine the degree to which we can meet the challenges of our times. John H. Evans's Morals Not Knowledge represents an important provocation for those committed not only to using scientific method as a resource for making moral judgments but also to creating political alliances with religious constituencies. In this important work, Evans argues that most conflicts between science and religion do not concern a clash between two contradictory ways of knowing, but rather a clash over our moral responsibilities and ultimate values. In my response to his work, I suggest that integrating both John Dewey's pragmatic understanding of the moral situation and Kenneth Burke's rhetorical interpretation of motives helps bolster Evans's cause and provides support for a political movement that aims to bridge the divide between science and religion in the epoch of the Anthropocene.     

Of Means and Ends: Religion and the Search for Significance

This article attempts to depolarize the concepts of means and ends in the psychology of religion. It is argued that everyone uses his or her religion. However, religion can be used in constructive as well as destructive ways. The critical question is not whether religion is lived or used, as Allport suggested, but how religion is used and to what ends. Thinking about religion as means and ends rather than means or ends offers a framework for organizing the richly diverse forms and functions of religious life, spiritual as well as nonspiritual. It provides a way to conceptualize and study the widely used but poorly defined notion of religious orientation. It also offers a way to evaluate the efficacy of religion in living.     

RELIGION AND THE MODE OF PRACTICE IN MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

Michael Oakeshott's religious view of the world stands behind much of his political and philosophical writing. In this essay I first discuss Oakeshott's view of religion and the mode of practice in his own terms. I attempt next to illuminate his idea of religion by describing it in less technical language, drawing upon other thinkers such as Georg Simmel and George Santayana, who share similar views. I then evaluate Oakeshott's view as a whole, considering whether his ideas about religion can stand up to careful scrutiny and whether they have value for present-day reflection on religion.     

Mysticism,Reality, Illusion,and the Freudian Critique of Religion

Freud's critique of religion cannot be fully understood if his ontogenetic perspective is explored outside of his phylogenetic perspective. The former allows for illusionistic thought processes that are orthogonal to reality claims. The latter requires consideration of empirical claims to truth within a social psychological perspective. It is only the phylogenetic perspective that allows Freud to maintain that religion is delusional, whether or not it is also illusional. Freud's rejection of "as if" philosophies as exemplified by Vaihinger is based upon his refusal to allow religious truth claims to escape their empirical, social foundations. Recent efforts to revive psychological theories of religion rooted only in illusionistic thought, as exemplified in the use of Winnicott's conceptualization, must confront social psychological issues similar to those articulated within Freud's phylogenetic view. A mystical reading of Freud is suggested in which claims to truth within psychoanalysis, science, and religion can be confronted in an empirical and inherently social manner.     

Is This Relevant? Physician Perceptions,Clinical Relevance,and Religious Content in Clinical Interactions

Despite wide support among physicians for practicing patient‐centered care, clinical interactions are primarily driven by physicians’ perception of relevance. While some will perceive a connection between religion and patient health, this relevance will be less apparent for others. I argue that physician responses when religious/spiritual topics come up during clinical interactions will depend on their own religious/spiritual background. The more central religion is for the physician, the greater his or her perception of religion's impact on health outcomes and his or her inclusion of religion/spirituality within clinical interactions. Using a nationally representative sample of physicians in the United States and mediated path models, I estimate models for five different physician actions to evaluate these relationships. I find that a physician's religious background is strongly associated with whether or not he or she thinks religion impacts health outcomes, which is strongly predictive of inclusion. I also find that not all of the association between inclusion and physicians’ religious background is mediated by thinking religion impacts health outcomes. Issues of religion's relevance for medicine are important to the degree that religious beliefs are an important dimension of patients’ lives.     

ŚŪNYATĀ AND KOKORO: SCIENCE–RELIGION DIALOGUE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT

When we read books or essays about the dialogue between “religion and science,” or when we attend conferences on the theme of “religion and science,” we cannot avoid the impression that they actually are dealing, almost without exception, not with a dialogue between “religion and science,” but with a dialogue between “Christianity and science.” This could easily be affirmed by looking at the major publications in this field. But how can the science–religion dialogue take place in a world where conventional Christian concepts of God, religion, and science are foreign and unfamiliar? Is the critique that the scientist plays God still valid when there is no “God” at all? This article tries to answer the questions mentioned above, and seeks to sketch out some aspects of the science–religion dialogue in Japan which I believe could contribute a new paradigm for understanding and describing ultimate reality.     

Reflections on Israel Scheffler's Philosophy of Religion

The burden of this piece is to draw together into a coherent whole the somewhat diverse strands of Israel Scheffler's thought on the philosophy of religion. Extrapolating from personal discussions with Professor Scheffler, various of his books, articles, and other unpublished materials authored and kindly provided by him, I contend that he adumbrates a post-empiricist rendering of religious belief which masterfully avoids some philosophical problems, while unwittingly giving rise to others. Committed to the view that the methodology of science – in one or other of its more acceptable guises – provides the most reliable measure of the content and structure of reality. Scheffler is bound conceptually to redefine Jewish belief in such a way that the traditional conflict between religion and science never emerges. Consistent with this end, he is concerned to divest traditional Judaism of its metaphysical garb, so that what remains are simply the matters of living to which religion ought properly on his view address itself. The Bible is thus reconceptualized as a piece of rich literature, of no real difference in logical kind to any other piece of rich literature, except that it defines uniquely, along with the Torah and other relevant Jewish literature, the history of the particular community whose perception of human values and meaningfulness forms the core of what it is to be Jewish.While I have no quibble whatsoever with Scheffler that the Bible and other religious teachings provides a profound reservoir for cognitive insight into the matters of quality living and appropriate social interaction, I argue that the divorce of religious values from the metaphysics of religion is in the end misguided. My problem with Scheffler's philosophy of religion is not so much with what he has found to be central to religion, as what he has failed to find in religion. By jettisoning its metaphysical basis, he has jettisoned what is inevitably fundamental to Judaism – namely, a resolute belief in God. This being so, an atheist could more readily adopt Scheffler's version of Judaism than could the theist – an outocme which should be problematic for both the theist and the atheist.     

THE DUALISTIC,DISCARNATE PICTURE THAT HAUNTS THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

A dualistic, discarnate picture haunts contemporary cognitive science of religion (CSR). Cognitive scientists of religion generally assert or assume a reductive physicalism, primarily through unconscious mental mechanisms that detect supernatural agency where none exists and a larger purpose to life when none exists. Accompanying this focus is a downplaying of conscious reflection in religious belief and practice. Yet the mind side of dualism enters into CSR in interesting ways. Some cognitive scientists turn practitioners of religion into dualists who allegedly believe in disembodied spirits. By emphasizing supernatural agency, CSR neglects nonpersonal powers and meanings in religion, both in terms of magical thinking and practice and of nonpersonal conceptions of divinity. Additionally, some cognitive scientists of religion declare that all humans are innate dualists. They use this alleged dualism to explain beliefs about both an afterlife and transfers of consciousness. Finally, some call on this dualism to serve a salvific function, trying to salvage some meaning to human life.     

WINNICOTT AND HELPLESSNESS: DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY,RELIGION, AND PERSONAL LIFE

The author examines Winnicott's theory of development from the perspective of existential helplessness, arguing that (a) his views illuminate healthy (and unhealthy) aspects of religion, and (b) express his stance toward the helplessness of dying and death. The author contends that Winnicott understood the infant's psychic growth in relation to the reality of existential helplessness and absolute dependency. Four interrelated, dynamic paradoxes embedded in Winnicott's developmental perspective are discussed, and these paradoxes are seen as frameworks to depict his notions of ego, transitional objects, and true/false selves. The author posits that religion, which Winnicott included under the rubric of transitional phenomena, can be understood in relation to existential helplessness and can be assessed in terms of the degree to which these paradoxes are dynamic.