Integrating Fast and Frugal Heuristics with a Model of Memory‐based Cue Generation

Although the fast and frugal heuristics have been studied extensively, relatively little attention has been paid to how cues are generated to be used within the heuristics. The goal of this paper is to propose and test a memory‐based model of how cues are generated and used in cue‐based inferences. The current study advances theory by integrating the fast and frugal heuristics with HyGene, a memory‐based model of how decision makers generate and evaluate hypotheses. Using archival data in which memory retrieval variables were not directly manipulated, we demonstrate that participants' cue selection behavior is consistent with memory‐based retrieval. Further, by directly manipulating memory retrieval within a cue‐based stock‐forecasting task, we demonstrate that memory processes underlie cue use. Participants' cue use varied depending on the relationship between cue validity and the frequency with which the cues were seen during learning. The HyGene model provided the best account of the empirical data, providing further evidence for the critical role of memory in judgment and decision making. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychological plausibility of the theory of probabilistic mental models and the fast and frugal heuristics

The theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM; G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, & H. Kleinb?lting, 1991) has had a major influence on the field of judgment and decision making, with the most recent important modifications to PMM theory being the identification of several fast and frugal heuristics (G. Gigerenzer & D. G. Goldstein, 1996). These heuristics were purported to provide psychologically plausible cognitive process models that describe a variety of judgment behavior. In this article, the authors evaluate the psychological plausibility of the assumptions upon which PMM were built and, consequently, the psychological plausibility of several of the fast and frugal heuristics. The authors argue that many of PMM theory's assumptions are questionable, given available data, and that fast and frugal heuristics are, in fact, psychologically implausible.     

Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?

One challenge that has to be addressed by the fast and frugal heuristics program is how people manage to select, from the abundance of cues that exist in the environment, those to rely on when making decisions. We hypothesize that causal knowledge helps people target particular cues and estimate their validities. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Results show that when causal information about some cues was available (Experiment 1), participants preferred to search for these cues first and to base their decisions on them. When allowed to learn cue validities in addition to causal information (Experiment 2), participants also became more frugal (i.e., they searched fewer of the available cues), made more accurate decisions, and were more precise in estimating cue validities than was a control group that did not receive causal information. These results can be attributed to the causal relation between the cues and the criterion, rather than to greater saliency of the causal cues (Experiment 3). Overall, our results support the hypothesis that causal knowledge aids in the learning of cue validities and is treated as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues.     

Training fast and frugal heuristics in military decision making

Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt and are as effective as analytic decision methods.     

Sequential processing of cues in memory-based multiattribute decisions

When probabilistic inferences have to be made from cue values stored in long-term memory, many participants appear to use fast and frugal heuristics, such as “take the best” (TTB), that assume sequential search of cues. A simultaneous global matching process with cue weights that are appropriately chosen would mimic the decision outcomes, albeit assuming different cognitive processes. We present a reanalysis of response times (RTs) from five published experiments (n 5 415) and one new experiment (n 5 82) that support the assumption of sequential search. In all instances in which decision outcomes indicated the use of TTB’s decision rule, decision times increased monotonically with the number of cues that had to be searched in memory. Furthermore, RT patterns fitted the outcome-based strategy classifications, which further validates both measures.     

Classifying simulated air threats with fast and frugal heuristics

In three experiments, subjects learned to classify simulated aircraft using four probabilistic cues then classified test sets designed to contrast predictions of several compensatory and non-compensatory heuristics. Results indicated that a proportion of subjects appeared to use a non-compensatory fast and frugal heuristic but that significant proportions used less frugal compensatory decision rules. The relative proportions of subjects exhibiting responses consistent with the fast and frugal heuristic versus other decision rules was largely unaffected by manipulations of time pressure and perceived cue uncertainty. An extreme time constraint, however, did result in significant differences in the proportions of subjects who preferred non-compensatory to compensatory decision rules. These results suggest that it is possible to model multi-attribute decision tasks like threat assessment with a fast and frugal heuristic although no single heuristic is a general model for the simulated threat assessment task. Copyright © 2006 Crown in the right of Canada. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference tasks

The fast‐and‐frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non‐reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application of a heuristic and is not changed by the presence or absence of another cue. The parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model, in contrast, predicts that information is processed in a reciprocal fashion. Specifically, it assumes that subjective cue validities interactively affect each other and are modified to coherently support the favored choice. Corresponding to the model's simulation, we predicted the direction and the size of such coherence shifts. Cue validities were measured before, after (Experiment 1), and during judgment (Experiments 2 and 3). Coherence shifts were found in environments involving real‐world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in a domain for which the application of fast‐and‐frugal heuristics has been demonstrated (city‐size tasks). The results indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, but that they are interactively changed to form coherent representations of the task. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fluency heuristic: a model of how the mind exploits a by-product of information retrieval

Boundedly rational heuristics for inference can be surprisingly accurate and frugal for several reasons. They can exploit environmental structures, co-opt complex capacities, and elude effortful search by exploiting information that automatically arrives on the mental stage. The fluency heuristic is a prime example of a heuristic that makes the most of an automatic by-product of retrieval from memory, namely, retrieval fluency. In 4 experiments, the authors show that retrieval fluency can be a proxy for real-world quantities, that people can discriminate between two objects' retrieval fluencies, and that people's inferences are in line with the fluency heuristic (in particular fast inferences) and with experimentally manipulated fluency. The authors conclude that the fluency heuristic may be one tool in the mind's repertoire of strategies that artfully probes memory for encapsulated frequency information that can veridically reflect statistical regularities in the world.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When one cue is not enough: combining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing

One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) have been shown to perform accurately. However, such strategies cannot deal with compound cues. We propose the Take The Best Configural Cue (TTB-Configural) as a fast and frugal heuristic that processes compound cues. In a series of three experiments, we analysed whether participants used this heuristic when making cue-based inferences on which of two alternatives had a higher criterion value. In two of the experiments, two cues were amalgamated into a valid compound cue by applying the AND or the OR logical rule, respectively. In the third experiment, there was no valid compound cue. Within each experiment, we also manipulated causal mental models through instructions. In the configural causal model, cues were said to act through the same causal mechanism. In the elemental causal model, cues were said to act through different causal mechanisms. In the neutral causal model, the causal mechanism was not specified. When a highly valid compound existed, and participants had a configural causal model, for the majority of them the strategy that could best account for their choices was TTB-Configural. Otherwise, the strategy that best predicted their choices was the Take The Best (TTB) heuristic.     

Fast and frugal versus regression models of human judgement

Following Brunswik (1952), social judgement theorists have long relied on regression models to describe both an individual's judgements and the environment about which such judgements are made. However, social judgement theory is not synonymous with these compensatory, static, structural models. We compared the characterisations of physicians' judgements using a regression model with that of a non-compensatory process model (called fast and frugal). We found that both models fit the data equally well. Both models suggest that physicians use few cues, that they disagree among themselves, and that their stated cue use is discrepant with the models' stated cue use. However, the fast and frugal model is easier to convey to physicians and is also more psychologically plausible. Implications for how social judgement theorists conceptualise the process of vicarious functioning are discussed.     

Most people do not ignore salient invalid cues in memory-based decisions

Former experimental studies have shown that decisions from memory tend to rely only on a few cues, following simple noncompensatory heuristics like "take the best." However, it has also repeatedly been demonstrated that a pictorial, as opposed to a verbal, representation of cue information fosters the inclusion of more cues in compensatory strategies, suggesting a facilitated retrieval of cue patterns. These studies did not properly control for visual salience of cues, however. In the experiment reported here, the cue salience hierarchy established in a pilot study was either congruent or incongruent with the validity order of the cues. Only the latter condition increased compensatory decision making, suggesting that the apparent representational format effect is, rather, a salience effect: Participants automatically retrieve and incorporate salient cues irrespective of their validity. Results are discussed with respect to reaction time data.     

Contributions of automatic and controlled processes to the analysis of hierarchical structure

Three experiments provide evidence that 2 mechanisms, 1 automatic and 1 controlled, produce variations in the efficiency with which local and global forms are processed. Targets are identified faster if they appear at the same level (global or local) as the target on the previous trial. M. R. Lamb, B. London, H. M. Pond, and K. A. Whitt (1998) provided evidence that the beneficial effect of level repetition is due to an automatic process that is outside voluntary control. In the present experiments, pretrial cues informed participants as to the level of the upcoming target. Valid cues benefited performance, whereas invalid cues harmed performance relative to noninformative neutral cues. This was so even when the relation between the cue and the level it signaled was arbitrary, indicating that the cues initiated voluntary shifts of attention. The benefit associated with level repetition, however, was unaffected by the cues. These data suggest that the benefit of level repetition results from a process that is not subject to voluntary control.     

When one cue is not enough: Combining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing

One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) Gigerenzer, G. and Todd, P. M. 1999. “Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox”. In Simple heuristics that make us smart, Edited by: Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. and the ABC Research Group. 3–34. New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar] have been shown to perform accurately. However, such strategies cannot deal with compound cues. We propose the Take The Best Configural Cue (TTB-Configural) as a fast and frugal heuristic that processes compound cues. In a series of three experiments, we analysed whether participants used this heuristic when making cue-based inferences on which of two alternatives had a higher criterion value. In two of the experiments, two cues were amalgamated into a valid compound cue by applying the AND or the OR logical rule, respectively. In the third experiment, there was no valid compound cue. Within each experiment, we also manipulated causal mental models through instructions. In the configural causal model, cues were said to act through the same causal mechanism. In the elemental causal model, cues were said to act through different causal mechanisms. In the neutral causal model, the causal mechanism was not specified. When a highly valid compound existed, and participants had a configural causal model, for the majority of them the strategy that could best account for their choices was TTB-Configural. Otherwise, the strategy that best predicted their choices was the Take The Best (TTB) heuristic.     

Curved saccade trajectories reveal conflicting predictions in associative learning

We report how the trajectories of saccadic eye movements are affected by memory interference acquired during associative learning. Human participants learned to perform saccadic choice responses based on the presentation of arbitrary central cues A, B, AC, BC, AX, BY, X, and Y that were trained to predict the appearance of a peripheral target stimulus at 1 of 3 possible locations, right (R), mid (M), or left (L), in the upper hemifield. We analyzed as measures of associative learning the frequency, latency, and curvature of saccades elicited by the cues and directed at the trained locations in anticipation of the targets. Participants were trained on two concurrent discrimination problems A+R, AC+R, AX+M, X+M and B+L, BC+L, BY+M, Y+M. From a connectionist perspective, cues were predicted to acquire associative links connecting the cues to the trained outcomes in memory. Model simulations based on the learning rule of the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model revealed that for some cues, the prediction of the correct target location was challenged by the interfering prediction of an incorrect location. We observed that saccades directed at the correct location in anticipation of the target curved away from the location that was predicted by the interfering association. Furthermore, changes in curvature during training corresponded to predicted changes in associative memory. We propose that this curvature was caused by the inhibition of the incorrect prediction, as previously has been suggested with the concept of distractor inhibition (Sheliga, Riggio, & Rizzolatti, 1994; Tipper, Howard, & Houghton, 2000). The paradigm provides a new method to examine memory interference during associative learning.     

The similarity heuristic

Decision makers often make snap judgments using fast‐and‐frugal decision rules called cognitive heuristics. Research into cognitive heuristics has been divided into two camps. One camp has emphasized the limitations and biases produced by the heuristics; another has focused on the accuracy of heuristics and their ecological validity. In this paper we investigate a heuristic proposed by the first camp, using the methods of the second. We investigate a subset of the representativeness heuristic we call the “similarity” heuristic, whereby decision makers who use it judge the likelihood that an instance is a member of one category rather than another by the degree to which it is similar to others in that category. We provide a mathematical model of the heuristic and test it experimentally in a trinomial environment. In this environment, the similarity heuristic turns out to be a reliable and accurate choice rule and both choice and response time data suggest it is also how choices are made. We conclude with a theoretical discussion of how our work fits in the broader “fast‐and‐frugal” heuristics program, and of the boundary conditions for the similarity heuristic. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Retrospective revaluation in humans: Learning or memory?

The phenomenon of retrospective revaluation has posed considerable problems for many associative learning theories as it involves a change in the associative strength of a cue on trials on which that cue is absent. The present series of experiments pursues this idea of changes in associative strength between evoked representations of cues, in an effort to establish, de novo, an excitatory connection between two cues simultaneously activated in memory. Given the finding of Dwyer, Mackintosh, and Boakes (1998) that simultaneous activation of absent cues in the memory of rats resulted in learning comparable to that seen inretrospective revaluation, we expected that if retrospective revaluation was found in humans, then excitatory learning due to simultaneous activation would also be seen. This was not the case. The implications of our results are discussed in terms of Dickinson and Burke's (1996) modified SOP model and a version of McLaren's (1993) APECS network. We conclude that many of the effects attributed to learning in retrospective revaluation studies are better thought of as due to changes in the retrievability of items in memory.     

Easy comes,easy goes? The link between learning and remembering and its exploitation in metacognition

The cue-utilization view in metacognition assumes that judgments of learning (JOLs) are based on inferences from mnemonic cues deriving from the online processing of items during learning. This view calls for a specification of the underlying heuristics, their validity in predicting memory performance, and the extent to which they are utilized. This study examines one such heuristic: easily learned, easily remembered (ELER). We first show that ease of learning, as indexed by self-paced study time and by the number of trials to acquisition, is indeed a valid cue for recall success. We then demonstrate that this correlation between learning and rememberingunderlies metacognitive predictions about the future recallability of different items. The results are discussed in terms of the idea that metacognitive judgments incorporate knowledge about the internal ecology of cognitive processes, much as the perception of the external world embodies knowledge about the ecological structure of the environment.     

Within-compound associations in retrospective revaluation and in direct learning: A challenge for comparator theory

In three human causal learning experiments we investigated the role of within-compound associations in learning about absent cues versus learning about present cues. Different theoretical approaches agree that within-compound associations are essential for learning about absent cues-that is, for retrospective revaluation. They differ, however, with regard to the role of within-compound associations for learning about present cues-that is, for direct learning. A memory test was used to assess within-compound associations. Experiment 1 used a blocking/release from overshadowing design, Experiment 2 used a conditioned inhibition design, and Experiment 3 used a higher-order cue selection design. In all experiments, first-order retrospective revaluation was significantly correlated with within-compound associations, but no significant correlations were found for the direct learning conditions. In addition to this, second-order retrospective revaluation in Experiment 3 was positively correlated to joint knowledge of first-order and second-order within-compound associations. Furthermore, cue selection effects were stronger for direct learning conditions than for retrospective learning conditions. These results are at variance with the comparator hypothesis but are in agreement with a modified associative theory and with the suggestion that retrospective revaluation might be due to rehearsal processes.