A DEFENSE OF BUDDHISM,MEDITATION, AND FREE WILL: A THEORY OF MENTAL FREEDOM

This is my response to the criticisms of Gregg Caruso, David Cummiskey, and Karin Meyers, in their roles as members of the “Author Meets Critics” panel devoted to my book, Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom at the 2019 annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, organized by Christian Coseru. Caruso's main objection is that I am not sufficiently attentive to details of opposing arguments in Western philosophy, and Cummiskey's and Meyers’ objections, similarly, are that I am insufficiently attentive to details of Buddhism. I argue that all such objections, however putatively correct, do not rise to the level of objections that actually undermine my account of mental freedom.     

WHY FREE WILL REMAINS A MYSTERY

Peter van Inwagen contends that free will is a mystery. Here I present an argument in the spirit of van Inwagen's. According to the Assimilation Argument, libertarians cannot plausibly distinguish causally undetermined actions, the ones they take to be exercises of free will, from overtly randomized outcomes of the sort nobody would count as exercises of free will. I contend that the Assimilation Argument improves on related arguments in locating the crucial issues between van Inwagen and libertarians who hope to demystify free will, while avoiding objections these arguments have faced.     

FREE WILL AND THE SOFT CONSTRAINTS OF REASON

This paper provides a new compatibilist definition of free will, which is an elaboration of the classic compatibilist view of free will as absence of restriction, with the help of the causal theory of action and some special categories. This new definition enables us to neutralize a very wide range of counterexamples in a systematic and compelling way, including those left unanswered by hierarchical definitions.¹     

FREE WILL AND LUCK

I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential.     

FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM,CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?     

FREE WILL HAS A NEURAL SUBSTRATE: CRITIQUE OF JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK'S DISCOVERING FREE WILL AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Abstract. Ably marshalling ideas from theology, philosophy, and neurology, personality theorist Joseph F. Rychlak criticizes mechanistic psychologists' neglect of will and responsibility; these human qualities involve dialectically considering alternatives. I disagree with Rychlaks suggestion of fundamental mystery in the minds transcendence of the body and believe transcendent mind is intimately related to biological evolution and the brain. For example, dialectics, seen in simpler forms in lower animals, may require neural inhibition, feedback circuits, and topographic mappings. However, epistemologically speaking, neuroscientists strongly need the human insights of work such as Rychlak's to understand the alternatives, in planning investigation at more microscopic levels.     

THE METAPHOR OF THE ARCHITECT IN DARWIN: CHANCE AND FREE WILL

In The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, published in 1868, Darwin used the metaphor of the architect to argue in favor of natural autonomy and to clarify the role of chance in his theory of adaptive change by variation and natural selection. In this article, I trace the history of this important heuristic instrument in Darwin's writings and letters and suggest that this metaphor was important to Darwin because it helps him to explain the role of chance, and gives an argument in favor of the free will.