WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF FRAZER

This paper provides a systematic exposition of what Wittgenstein took to be the fundamental error committed by James George Frazer, author of the classic anthropological work The Golden Bough, in his account of ritual practices. By construing those rituals in scientific or rationalistic terms, as aimed at the production of certain effects, Frazer ignores, according to Wittgenstein, their expressive and symbolic dimension. It is, moreover, an error to try to explain the powerful emotions evoked even today by traditions such as fire festivals (which may once have involved human sacrifice) by searching for their causal origins in history or prehistory; the disquieting nature of such practices needs to be understood by attending to the inner meaning they already have in our human lives. Certain important general lessons are drawn about the necessarily limited power of scientific and causal explanations when it comes to alleviating many of our fundamental perplexities not just in the area of anthropology but in philosophy as well. ¹ 1 Originally published in French as ‘Wittgenstein, Critique de Frazer’, Agone 23 (2000), pp. 33–54. Translated into English (with minor editorial corrections and additional bibliographical references and abstract) specially for the present issue of Ratio by John Cottingham, by kind permission of Jacques Bouveresse and Editions Agone, Marseilles. English version © John Cottingham. The translator is grateful to Severin Schroeder and Christopher Wingfield for helpful corrections to an earlier draft.
     

LOGICAL SYNTAX IN WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

P.M.S. Hacker has argued that there are numerous misconceptions in James Conant's account of Wittgenstein's views and of those of Carnap. I discuss only Hacker's treatment of Conant on logical syntax in the 'Tractatus'. I try to show that passages in the 'Tractatus' which Hacker takes to count strongly against Conant's view do no such thing, and that he himself has not explained how he can account for a significant passage which certainly appears to support Conant's reading.     

WITTGENSTEIN'S PERSONALITY AND HIS RELATIONS WITH FREUD'S THOUGHT

In this contribution the author examines the connections between Wittgenstein's personality and his attitude to Freud's psychoanalytic theories in the light of biographies of the philosopher, published exchanges of letters between him and his sisters, his 'secret' diaries from the time of the First World War, his diaries from the nineteen-thirties and the writings in which he discusses Freud and psychoanalysis. The paper quotes liberally from all these sources. Following an account of Wittgenstein's cultural and family background in Vienna and his subsequent peripatetic life, hypotheses are presented concerning his personality, sexuality and 'internal' theology, together with some ideas about his relationship with his family (in particular, his parents and sisters) and his critique of Freud's theories, with particular reference to dreams and their interpretation. Wittgenstein emerges as a highly original philosopher who is, however, emotionally disturbed and restless. His personality is found to have narcissistic aspects that moulded his behaviour and thought, and the author contends that his mental suffering caused him to apply psychological and psychoanalytic categories to his philosophy.     

WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PICTURE "THEORY" OF MEANING

Recently, commentators such as Kenny and Hacker have disagreed about whether Wittgenstein's early picture theory of meaning is at all compatible with his later theory of "meaning-as-use". Arguing in favor of their compatibility, Kenny finds that meaning-as-use supplements, rather than rivals the earlier conception of meaning:     

MOTIVES FOR PHILOSOPHIZING DEBUNKING AND WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Abstract: In this article I contest a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations —a reading of it as debunking philosophy. I concede that such a reading is not groundless, but I show why it is nonetheless mistaken. To do so, I distinguish two different ways of viewing Philosophical Investigations and its concern with philosophical problems, an External View and an Internal View. On the External View, readers of the book are taken to know ahead of time what philosophical problems are. On the Internal View, readers are not taken to know this ahead of time: the task of the book is to disclose what philosophical problems are, to show them coming into being. One thing disclosed is our participatory role in philosophical problems coming to be. Learning about the nature of philosophical problems is thus learning about our own nature; metaphilosophical knowledge is in part self-knowledge. If the Internal View is correct (as I believe it is), then Philosophical Investigations does not debunk philosophy but provides a different conception of philosophy and the philosopher's task.