The Role of Contingency Adduction in the Creative Act

The Psychological Record - This article discusses the potential role of contingency adduction in creative behavior. Some have characterized creativity as the study of generativity. Generativity is...     

Conscious Action/Zombie Action

I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience of acting. According to this account, the experience of acting is (at the very least) a temporally extended, co‐conscious collection of agentive and perceptual experiences, functionally integrated and structured both by multimodal perceptual processing as well as by what an agent is, at the time, trying to do.     

Conscious Motivations of Adolescent Visual Artists and Creative Writers: Similarities and Differences

This exploratory study was designed to expand the field’s understanding of talented adolescent visual artists and creative writers and their conscious motivations for engaging in these creative activities. Accordingly, 233 talented high school visual arts (n = 151) and creative writing (n = 82) students were asked to rate the degree to which they believed their creative activities were motivated by each of a wide range of possible motivations. The students in both fields reported being very strongly motivated by the opportunities their activities provided them to use their imaginations, feel free, sense that they were being their “true” selves, regulate their emotions, capture moments in time, deepen their self-understanding, express themselves, improve their skills, and enhance their self-esteem. Some of these motivations correspond closely to those highlighted by theories of intrinsic motivation, competence motivation, and self-actualization, several are similar to those which have been reported by professional artists and writers, and some suggest that the students may have derived important psychological benefits from their creative activities. Theoretically plausible differences between the motivational profiles of the visual and creative writing students were identified and discussed.     

Suggestive Parallels between Kirton's A-I Theory of Creative Style and Koestler's Bisociative Theory of the Creative Act

ABSTRACT Kirton's Adaption-Innovation (A-I) theory of cognitive style was reviewed with particular regard to the three factors [Sufficiency of Originality, Efficiency, and Rule/Group Conformity] assumed to underlie the basic (AI) continuum. The basic additive model (AI = SO + E + R) set out by Kirton was then related to Koestler's bisociative theory of the creative act. The compatibility of the two theories offered mutual support for both. The intent of this paper is to explore connections between Kirton's Adaption-Innovation Theory and Koestler's theory of the creative act. In Koestler's distinctive term, the “bisociation” of the two theories offers interesting possibilities for reciprocal illumination. Kirton's work, initiated by the publication (Kirton, 1976) of his measure of creative style, the Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory (KAI), will be sketched first, followed by a brief overview of Koestler's 1963 monograph (Koestler, 1967). Parallels between the two theories will be suggested in a final section that casts the three Kirton factor/traits into the conceptual framework of the creative act set out by Koestler.     

The Creative Brain/The Creative Mind

In the past few decades, neuroscience research has greatly expanded our understanding of how the human brain functions. In particular, we have begun to explore the basis of emotions, intelligence, and creativity. These brain functions also have been applied to various aspects of behavior, thought, and experience. We have also begun to develop an understanding of how the brain and mind work during aesthetic and religious experiences. Studies on these topics have included neuropsychological tests, physiological measures, and brain imaging. These different techniques have enabled us to open up a window into the brain. It is by understanding the functioning of the creative brain that we begin to understand the concept of the creative mind. It is through the use of emotions and other higher cognitive functions that the brain and mind can create ideas, music, literature, and ultimately our entire repertoire of behaviors. How these different creative abilities are derived can also be traced to various parts of the brain and how they function. Modern neuroscience allows us to begin to understand the creative aspect of the brain and mind and perhaps can take us one step further toward understanding the most profound types of aesthetic and religious experiences.     

Conscious Vision in Action

It is natural to assume that the fine‐grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH), according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a “zombie” processing stream whose sources of bottom‐up spatial information are entirely non‐conscious (Clark, 2007, 2009; Goodale & Milner, 1992, 2004a; Milner & Goodale, 1995/2006, 2008). In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to “recognizing objects, selecting targets for action, and determining what kinds of action, broadly speaking, to perform” (Clark, 2007, p. 570). Our aim in this study is to show that the available evidence not only fails to support this dichotomous view but actually reveals a significant role for conscious vision in motor programming, especially for actions that require deliberate attention.     

Conscious and effortful or effortless and automatic: a practice/performance paradox in motor learning

High cognitive effort has been frequently related to better indices of motor learning through the study of many different paradigms. However, automaticity presumably invokes minimal cognitive processing but has often been related to high-level motor performance, which suggests a paradox. The objective of this study was to approach this paradox by examining the viability of the use of different cognitive strategies during practice and performance which promote the benefits of high cognitive effort and automaticity. Members of the university community (14 men and 15 women) divided into 3 groups practiced a discrete precision task. All participants completed four sessions totaling 320 trials and were tested on retention and transfer seven days later. Findings suggest that it is indeed possible to benefit from both effortful and minimal cognitive processing strategies and that they should be used complementarily.     

大脑半球互动对创造性科学问题提出能力的影响

以124名本科生为被试,通过划分利手程度(实验一)与添加眼动刺激(实验二)的方法,系统考察了大脑半球互动对创造性科学问题提出能力的影响作用。结果发现:(1)与强右利手被试相比,混合利手被试在创造性科学问题提出能力测验上的得分更高;(2)与非眼动组被试相比,眼动组被试在创造性科学问题提出能力测验上的表现更好;(3)大脑半球互动与问题情境在灵活性品质上存在交互作用,大脑半球互动对开放性问题灵活性品质的影响大于封闭性问题。     

意识思维和无意识思维对复杂决策的影响

以大学生为被试,以汽车作为实验材料,通过对12条汽车属性信息的操纵,设置出四款优差不同的汽车。通过对汽车的优差选择,探察在属性信息逐条呈现的情况下,有意识思维与无意识思维对复杂决策的影响。研究结果表明:在反应时上,无意识思维下的决策时间要比有意识思维下的决策时间长;在选择的正确率上,有意识思维决策的结果要优于无意识思维决策的结果;在信息回忆量上,有意识思维决策的回忆量要多于无意识思维决策的回忆量,这与无意识思维理论是相违背的。     

Logical Self-Reference as a Model for Conscious Experience

The structure of autoreferential statements that describe (or serve as a logical model for) the human conscious experience is analyzed. Autoreferential statements are introduced by autoreferential definitions, such as a=F(a, x), where F is a Boolean function and x is some atomic statement describing the content of the experience, or by analogous systems of inter-related definitions, such as a=F(b, x, y) and b=G(a, x, z). It is argued that only "noncreative" (systems of) definitions introduce statements that describe conscious experience, the noncreativeness meaning that no statement with non-tautological content can be derived from these definitions. The structure of such (systems of) definitions is comprehensively characterized in a series of theorems. A potential of the model in addressing empirical data is illustrated by applying it to the choice between two alternatives in the absence of a preference criterion. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Dynamic Creative Interaction Networks and Team Creativity Evolution: A Longitudinal Study

To assess the dynamical effects of creative interaction networks on team creativity evolution, this paper elaborates a theoretical framework that links the key elements of creative interaction networks, including node, edge and network structure, to creativity in teams. The process of team creativity evolution is divided into four phases, including formation, growth, maturity and decline/restart. The importance of domain‐relevant knowledge, creativity‐relevant skill, interaction frequency, interaction length, network density and closeness centrality are emphasized in specific phases of team creativity evolution in a complex creative context. To test our assumptions, a longitudinal study of creative teams in a “Challenge Cup” Creative Business Plan Competition for university students is performed and the full networks of 17 creative entrepreneur teams are mapped. Both static comparison and dynamic analysis are conducted to analyze the relationship between creative interaction networks and team creativity evolution. For specific phases of team creativity evolution, we find confirmation of our predictions. The implications of dynamic creative interaction networks for all the phases of creative teams from formation to decline/restart are discussed.     

Metacognition as a Moderator of Creative Ideation and Creative Production

Recent theoretical work has called for exploration of the moderating effects of cognitive factors on the relationship between creative ideation and creative production. The Cognitive-Creative Sifting model suggests skills in processing and transforming information influence the association. This study used the Runco Ideational Behavior Scale, Metacognitive Awareness Inventory, and Creative Behavior Inventory to test the moderating effect. Medium to large moderator effects (f² = .015 to f² = .041) were observed across previous theoretically proposed aspects of metacognition. A large, statistically significant moderator effect was observed for overall metacognition (f² = .031). Observed differences across subcomponents of metacognition paralleled theoretical connections between metacognition and creativity. Further studies are suggested using more diverse creativity measures, as well as tests for other cognitive sifters. Implications for educational practice, particularly regarding the creatively gifted, are offered.