Feminist consciousness raising,self-concept,and depression

This article summarizes a study in which before and after interviews and questionnaires were administered to 73 women who had registered for feminist consciousness-raising groups in the state of Connecticut, and three groups were observed over a period of 10 to 16 weeks, in order to explore the unintended psychological benefits of participation. The results show that consciousness raising may help women to increase their sense of control and externalize their attributions of blame, and may consequently increase self-esteem and reduce depression among participants. The article concludes with a discussion relating these results to studies on race and class differences in mental health, and comparing consciousness raising to psychotherapy.This article is based on research conducted with the aid of a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health in Psychosocial Epidemiology (5-T32-MH-14235). The assistance of Drs. Jerome K. Myers, Myrna M. Weissman, and Mary Curran is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Janet Lever and Mickey Schwartz for their most helpful comments.Currently an assistant professor of sociology at Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287     

Feminist identity development: Psychometric analyses of two feminist identity scales

N. E. Downing and K. L. Roush [(1985) “From Passive Acceptance to Active Commitment: A Model of Feminist Identity Development,”The Counseling Psychologist, Vol. 13, pp. 695–709] proposed a five-level developmental model of feminist identity that charts development from passive acceptance of traditional gender roles toward active commitment to feminist ideals and an egalitarian society. A Bargad and J. S. Hyde [(1991) “Women’s Studies: A Study of Feminist Identity Development in Women,”Psychology of Women Quarterly, Vol. 15, pp. 181–201] and K. M. Rickard [(1989) “The Relationship of Self-Monitored Dating Behaviors to Level of Feminist Identity on the Feminist Identity Scale,Sex Roles, Vol. 20, pp. 213–226] developed questionnaires to measure the Downing and Roush levels. The goal of the present study was to further explore the reliability and validity of the two feminist identity development scales. Participants included 198 female students who were taking either a women’s studies class or a general psychology class. They were administered Rickard’s and Bargad and Hyde’s scales of feminist identity development and a measure of cognitive development both at the beginning and end of the semester. Sixty-six percent of the participants classified themselves as Caucasian, 13% as Asian, 7% as African American, 4% as Hispanic, 3% as Indian, 5% as Other, and 2% left the item blank. Within this framework, we demonstrated support for (1) the psychometric/statistical properties of each scale, including (a) internal consistency and reliability, (b) component structure, (c) the relationship among the two scales, and (d) discrimination from social desirability; and (2) construct validity, as determined by (a) distinction between general psychology students who were interested in taking a women’s studies class in the future and those who were not, (b) the impact of a women’s studies class on feminist identity development, and (c) relationship of the scales to a measure of cognitive development. The authors wish to thank Richard Ashmore and Erich Labouvie for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We also would like to thank the instructors of the general psychology and women’s studies classes, especially Barbara Balliet, for allowing us to recruit participants in their classes.     

Feminist Relational Discourse Analysis: putting the personal in the political in feminist research

Discourse analysis is a useful and flexible method for exploring power and identity. While there are many forms of discourse analysis, all agree that discourse is the central site of identity construction. However, recent feminist concerns over power, agency, and resistance have drawn attention to the absence of participants’ first-hand experiences within broad discursive accounts (Lafrance &; McKenzie-Mohr 2014 Boonzaier, F 2014, ‘Talking against dominance: South African women resisting dominant discourse in narratives of violence’, in S McKenzie-Mohr &; MN Lafrance (eds.), Women voicing resistance: discursive and narrative explorations, Routledge, Hove, pp. 102–20.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Saukko 2008 Saukko, P 2008, The anorexic self: a personal, political analysis of a diagnostic discourse, State University of New York Press, Albany. [Google Scholar]). For those with an interest in power relations, such as feminist researchers, this is a problematic silence which renders the personal functions of discourse invisible. In this article, we argue that the “personal” and “political” are inextricable, and we make a case for putting the “personal” into broader discursive frameworks of understanding. Further, we assert that feminist research seeking to account for identity must more explicitly aim to capture this interplay. To this end, we argue that voice is the key site of meaning where this interplay can be captured, but that no clear analytical framework currently exists for producing such an account. In response, we propose Feminist Relational Discourse Analysis (FRDA) as a voice-centered analytical approach for engaging with experience and discourse in talk. We then set out clear guidance on how to do FRDA, as applied in the context of women working in U.K. policing. Finally, we conclude that by prioritizing voice, FRDA invites new and politicized feminist readings of power, agency, and resistance, where the voices of participants remain central to the discursive accounts of researchers.     

Feminist bioethics: toward developing a "feminist" answer to the surrogate motherhood question.

Although a wide variety of feminist approaches to bioethics presently share a common feminist methodology (sometimes referred to as "raising the woman question"), they do not all share the same feminist politics, ontology, epistemology, and ethics. As a result of their philosophical differences, feminist bioethicists do not always agree on which biomedical principles, practices, and policies are best suited to serving women's interests. In other words, some feminist bioethicists insist that so-called "assisted reproduction" enhances women's procreative liberty, while others claim that it does nothing of the sort. Although such disagreement among feminist bioethicists reassures the general public that the feminist "program" for bioethics is not ideologically monolithic, it also confuses the public, especially women. In order to overcome this confusion, feminist bioethicists should work toward developing the kind of shared theoretical base that will foster frequent consensus on the biomedical principles, practices, and policies most likely to serve the interests of most women in the U.S. today.     

Feminist Biologies: Revising Feminist Strategies and Biological Science

Rebecca Hannagan’s analysis of gender and leadership based in evolutionary biology challenges scholars to integrate research in biology with feminist insights. This commentary argues that this is a timely challenge and that that the project of integrating feminism and evolutionary biology in accounts of gender is necessary for bringing about more equitable futures. However, the commentary also suggests that biological inputs should be understood as operating within categories that feature substantial variation, that change through time, that are not independent and complete sources of human outcomes, and that biological factors interact with language and culture.     

Feminist and Activist

No abstract available for this article.     

The impact of feminist stereotypes and sexual identity on feminist self-identification and collective action

ABSTRACT

The present study sought to examine the role of sexual identity and exposure to stereotypes of feminism on women’s self-identification as a feminist, endorsement of feminist attitudes, and intention to engage in collective action. Participants (N = 312; all women) disclosed their sexual identity as either heterosexual or non-heterosexual (sexual minority) and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: exposure to positive stereotypes of feminists, to negative stereotypes of feminists, control condition (no exposure to stereotypes). Results showed stark differences between heterosexual and sexual minority women, with sexual minority women scoring significantly higher on self-identification as feminist, feminist attitudes, and collective action intentions. Exposure to positive stereotypes of feminists increased feminist self-identification regardless of sexual identity. Exposure to negative stereotypes reduced self-identification with feminism, and lower identification mediated the path between negative stereotyping and collective action. Implications of these findings for the advancement of women’s rights movements are discussed.     

Gender sceptics and feminist politics

Some feminist gender sceptics hold that the conditions for satisfying the concept woman cannot be discerned. This has been taken to suggest that (i) the efforts to fix feminism’s scope are undermined because of confusion about the extension of the term ‘woman’, and (ii) this confusion suggests that feminism cannot be organised around women because it is unclear who satisfies woman. Further, this supposedly threatens the effectiveness of feminist politics: feminist goals are said to become unachievable, if feminist politics lacks a clear subject matter. In this paper, I argue that such serious consequences do not follow from the gender sceptic position. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the ‘Stirling Political Philosophy Group’ meeting and am grateful to those present for their constructive criticisms. I am also grateful to Alan Millar, the anonymous referees for this journal and Jenny Saul (who has read more than one version of this paper!) for their detailed and extremely helpful comments and suggestions.     

Emotion and consciousness

Consciousness and emotion feature prominently in our personal lives, yet remain enigmatic. Recent advances prompt further distinctions that should provide more experimental traction: we argue that emotion consists of an emotion state (functional aspects, including emotional response) as well as feelings (the conscious experience of the emotion), and that consciousness consists of level (e.g. coma, vegetative state and wakefulness) and content (what it is we are conscious of). Not only is consciousness important to aspects of emotion but structures that are important for emotion, such as brainstem nuclei and midline cortices, overlap with structures that regulate the level of consciousness. The intersection of consciousness and emotion is ripe for experimental investigation, and we outline possible examples for future studies.     

Dreaming and consciousness

Abstract

Research in the second half of the twentieth century may finally have succeeded in constraining the boundaries of reasonable discussion about dreams and dreaming. Largely owing to physiological discoveries and psychophysiological methods for the representative sampling of human dreamlife, we now have a body of observations that delimits plausible explanations and theories.

For example, we now know that neither REM sleep nor its dreaming is a sporadic, fleeting response to intense psychic needs or peripheral organ states, but rather is an autonomous, cyclically recurring process which consumes relatively much of our sleep, indeed of our lives. We also know that the content of representatively sampled dreams of both adults (Snyder, 1970) and children (Foulkes, 1982) is generally realistic and mundane, rather than fantastic and bizarre. From this finding, and from direct com parisons of representatively sampled laboratory-collected dreams with spon taneously remembered home dreams (e.g. Foulkes. 1979). it has become apparent that the idea of dreaming as being full of strange and discontinuous imagery is a stereotype based on limited acquaintance with our own dreamlife. Specifically, our most ordinarily memorable dreams seem to be those relatively few that are particularly emotionally engaging, particularly unrealistic, or particularly odd in their imagery or thematic sequence. This leads us to underestimate the orderliness of a process that typically functions plausibly and coherently, in a similar if not identical manner to that which we believe (perhaps also stereotypically) characterises our non-dreaming experience.

Thus, studies of representatively sampled dreaming have shown that dream imagery itself typically is realistic or plausible (Dorus, Dorus, & Rechtschaffen, 1971). that dream speech typically is both grammatically correct and appropriate to the imagined situation in which it is embedded (Heynick, 1983). that the feelings accompanying dream imagery typically are appropriate to the imagined situations which they accompany (Foulkes, Sullivan, Kerr, & Brown, 1988), and that, overwhelmingly often, dreams progress over time in a continuous rather than a discontinuous way (Foulkes & Schmidt, 1983).

Such data indicate the need to radically revise or replace most older dream theories from the clinical tradition. Given the role that physiologists and physiological methods played in the development of these data, it was perhaps inevitable that dream theories would begin to be framed in reductionist terms. And, since the 19505, there have been many attempts to “explain” dream phenomena through their reduction to neurophysiological processes (e.g. Crick & Mitchison, 1983; Hobson & McCarley, 1977)     

Substantivity in feminist metaphysics

Elizabeth Barnes and Mari Mikkola raise the important question of whether certain recent approaches to metaphysics exclude feminist metaphysics. My own approach (from my book Writing the Book of the World) does not, or so I argue. I do define “substantive” questions in terms of fundamentality; and the concepts of feminist metaphysics (and social metaphysics generally) are nonfundamental. But my definition does not count a question as being nonsubstantive simply because it involves nonfundamental concepts. Questions about the causal structure of the world, including the causal structure of the social world, are generally substantive because their answers are not sensitive to any alternate, equally good conceptual choices we could have made. I also argue that such questions are substantive regardless of the ontology of social kinds.     

Feminist Metanoia and Soul-Making

This article critiques tradition Christian understanding of sin and alienation and the process of conversion through reception of transcendent grace. It reconstructs the understanding of human transformation from a perspective of feminist spirituality and ethics. Fallenness is reinvisioned in terms of women's subjugation by patriarchal social and cultural systems, and conversion is seen in terms of the process by which women's journey leads them to question these systems and embark on a process of emancipation from them to create a new self and a new society. Both alienation and transformation are viewed in terms of the interrelation of the psychic and the social.     

Secularity,gender, and emancipation: thinking through feminist activism and feminist approaches to the secular

In this article, I engage with feminist discussions about secularity, gender, and emancipation. The feminist study of the secular was spurred by interventions of Saba Mahmood [2005. The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press], and can be seen as a critical engagement with at least one basic assumption that underlies much of progressive thinking – that secularism is beneficial for women and LGBTQ subjects. I begin by exploring how the Belgian feminist activist platform Baas Over Eigen Hoofd! (Boss Over One’s Own Head!) builds a locally suited theory and practice of emancipation. I analyse how BOEH! raises questions about gender and secularity. Second, I zoom-out by mapping feminist studies of the secular in Western European contexts, distinguishing various analytical approaches and visions on social-political secular emancipatory alternatives. To conclude, I relate local feminist activism to feminist academic discussions, and argue that there is a continued need for thinking about shared emancipatory futures.     

Feminist Therapy

No abstract available for this article.     

Predictors of feminist self-labeling

This study investigated the relations of demographic and attitudinal variables on self-labeling as a feminist. Male (N=22) and female (N=83) primarily white (79%) college students and other adults responded to a questionnaire assessing their opinion of the feminist movement, perceptions of feminists, agreement with profeminist attitudes toward women's roles, belief in the importance of collective vs. individual action, political liberalism, and perceived discrimination. Although self-labeling as a feminist was significantly related to all of the above, with the exception of perceived discrimination, two major predictors were shown to be independently important: profeminist attitudes toward women's roles and opinion of the feminist movement.     

A Lesbian Feminist Subscale for the Feminist Perspectives Scale

In an attempt to increase the breadth offeminist perspectives assessed by the FeministPerspectives Scale (FPS2; Henley, Meng, O'Brien,McCarthy, & Sockloskie, 1998), we developed andpsychometrically evaluated a new subscale that assesses lesbianfeminist attitudes. As do the six other subscales of theFPS2, the Lesbian Feminist subscale includes 10attitudinal and 3 behavioral items. We conducted 3 studies with 287 respondents (58% EuropeanAmerican, 15% Latino, 13% Asian, and 6% AfricanAmerican); 88% were women and most were collegeeducated. Findings from these preliminary psychometricevaluations support the subscale's reliability (Cronbach'salpha = .91) and validity. We offer recommendations forthe scale's use and discuss its potentiallimitations.