Impression Management Behavior in Assessment Centers: Artificial Behavior or Much Ado About Nothing?

Candidates’ assertive impression-management (IM) behaviors affect performance ratings during selection interviews, a finding that has caused some concern about selection interviews’ objectivity and accuracy. Similar effects have been proposed for assessment centers, yet research on IM in assessments centers is rare and inconclusive. This study uses trait-activation theory (Tett &; Guterman, 2000 Tett, R. P. and Guterman, H. A. 2000. Situation trait relevance, trait expression, and cross-situational consistency: Testing a principle of trait activation. Journal of Research in Personality, 34: 397–423. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) to predict how assertive IM-behaviors emerge and influence performance ratings during assessments centers. Results showed that candidates’ ingratiation behaviors related to observer ratings on the conceptually related AC-dimension cooperation, whereas self-promotion behaviors related to ratings on the dimensions leadership and planning. Furthermore, assertive IM behaviors during the assessment center construct-related validity and correlated significantly with candidates’ performance in non-evaluative situations. Consequently, assertive IM behaviors in personnel selection may pose less of a threat than frequently assumed but may partially reflect a behavioral manifestation of candidates’ underlying interindividual differences.     

Much Ado About Nothing? Some Comments on B. F. Skinner's Definition of Verbal Behavior

Some have suggested that the definition of verbal behavior offered by B. F. Skinner (1957) fails to capture the essence of language insofar as it is too broad and not functional. In this paper, I argue that the ambiguities of Skinner's definition are not an indictment of it, and that suggestions to the contrary are problematic because they suffer a critical error of scientific reasoning. Specifically, I argue that (a) no clear definition of verbal behavior is possible because there is no natural distinction between verbal and nonverbal behavior; (b) attempts at an immutable definition are essentialistic; and (c) Skinner's functional taxonomy of language is in no way affected by the particulars of any definition of verbal behavior.     

On Bayne and Chalmers’ Phenomenal Unity Thesis (or: Much Ado about Nothing)

Philosophia - According to the Phenomenal Unity Thesis (“PUT”) – most prominently defended by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers – necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of a...     

Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?

A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider, and reply to, seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way of softening the blow, I show how the counterexample itself suggests a plausible diagnosis of why this claim has seemed so plausible to so many.     

There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine

This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism (or moral realism as a moral doctrine), the paper highlights both their distinctness and their compatibility. In so doing, it underscores the affinities between Blackburnian quasi-realism and moral realism as a moral doctrine. Finally, this paper contends—in line with my earlier work on these matters—that moral realism as a moral doctrine points to the need for some reorienting of meta-ethical enquiries rather than for the abandoning of them.     

How Much for the Child?

In this paper we explore what sacrifices you are morally required to make to save a child who is about to die in front of you. It has been argued that you would have very demanding duties to save such a child (or any adult who is in similar circumstance through no fault of their own, for that matter), and some examples have been presented to make this claim seem intuitively correct. Against this, we argue that you do not in general have a moral requirement to bear more than moderate cost to save even a child who is just in front of you. Moreover, we explain why you have a much more demanding moral requirement in certain cases by appealing to the notions of undue risk and cost sharing.     

Why Care About Gender?

I address motivations that feminist philosophers have for being concerned about the “maleness” of philosophy and the “problem of difference” within feminist theory. An appropriate motivation for caring about both sets of issues is the desire not to oppress others. In order to be able to understand this motivation and to act on it, we need to retain gender as an analytical category.     

Skills and Knowledge - Nothing but Memory?

The aim of this article is to enquire into neuroscientific research on memory and relate it to topics of skill, knowledge and consciousness. The article outlines some contemporary theories on procedural and working memory, and discusses what contributions they give to sport science and philosophy of sport. It is argued that memory research gives important insights to the neuronal structures and events involved in knowledge and consciousness contributing to sport skills, but that these explanations are not exhaustive. The article argues that phenomenal consciousness in skills is not explained by the neuroscience of memory, and hence neither are skills.     

What Are Emotions About?

This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist which reduces emotions to non-intentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist , the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids the reductionism of congitivist and emotivist accounts. The paper gives special attention to her notion of 'deep'objects of emotions and to her account of the expressivity of emotions, arguing that while the first is problematic, the second is a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of emotions in our moral lives.     

Mental multiplication: Nothing but the facts?

Current models of adult arithmetic performance assume that representation includes only facts and procedures. However, other kinds of representations such as an analog scale or sets of number multiples might be useful in a variety of multiplication-related tasks. Introducing the practice transfer paradigm, we demonstrate that associations between distinct representational structures can be detected via cross-task transfer, provided that initial performance is retrieval based. Results support the predictions of the integrated-structures model of multiplication knowledge. Implications for well-established item differences such as the problem-size effect are addressed, and the question of how integration occurs is considered.     

Should We Be Talking About Ethics or About Morals?

This article seeks to revisit the distinction between the words ethics and morals. First, we understand the word ethics to be focused on the way we seek to live our own life, and hence to connote a relativistic and essentially subjective perspective, whereas we understand the word morals to be focused on the way we should live our lives together, especially through sensitivity to viewpoints other than our own. Second, we perceive a usefulness in such a differentiation when the ethical values of those in a dilemmatic situation are conflicted in order to prioritize moral decision making in contemporary society. We argue that in our current era, characterized by a multiplicity of faiths and by pronounced value pluralism, a philosophical basis for moral decision making needs to be clearly attuned with intersubjectivity and interconnectivity among people. It should be able to determine principles of conduct toward others, no matter how one’s own ethical values, conceptions of the good, or life choices might differ from those of others. To do this, we relocate ethical decision making away from an essentially monological reflection on our own values and purposes into a social space wherein we have an inclusive, noncoercive, and reflective dialogue.     

Why Is There Nothing Rather Than Something?

This essay in the comparative metaphysic of nothingness begins by pondering why Leibniz thought of the converse question as the preeminent one. In Eastern philosophical thought, like the numeral 'zero' (?ūnya) that Indian mathematicians first discovered, nothingness as non-being looms large and serves as the first quiver on the imponderables they seem to have encountered (e.g., 'In the beginning was neither non-being nor being: what was there, bottomless deep?' RgVeda X.129). The concept of non-being and its permutations of nothing, negation, nullity, etc., receive more sophisticated treatment in the works of grammarians, ritual hermeneuticians, logicians, and their dialectical adversaries variously across Jaina and Buddhist schools. The present analysis follows the function of negation/the negative copula, nãn, and dialetheia in grammar and logic, then moves onto ontologies of non-existence and extinction and further suggestive tropes that tend to arrest rather than affirm the inexorable being-there of something. After a discussion of interests in being (existence), non-being and nothingness in contemporary metaphysics, the article examines Heidegger’s extensive treatment of nothingness in his 1929 inaugural Freiburg lecture, 'Was ist Metaphysik?', published later as 'What is Metaphysics?' The essay however distances itself from any pretensions toward a doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism.     

How Much do Chinese Applicants Fake?

More and more organizations have applicants who come from different cultural backgrounds, and according to new research, these cultural backgrounds matter for applicants' self‐presentational behavior (i.e., faking). If applicants come from China, can organizations assume that they will present themselves modestly, as suggested by Chinese norms? Or should organizations assume that there will be much self‐presentational behavior due to the high unemployment rate, at least among Chinese graduates? To answer this question, we obtained data from 307 Chinese applicants on their self‐presentational behavior, using the randomized response technique to ensure anonymity. We compared these data with similar data sets from the United States, Switzerland, and China. Contrary to the proposed modesty hypothesis in Chinese samples, perhaps due to high unemployment, self‐presentation was as prevalent in Chinese samples as in American samples.     

What's Bad About Bad Faith?

Abstract: Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.