The effects of labelling,expert testimony,and information processing mode on juror decisions in SVP civil commitment trials

Expert witnesses offering testimony in sexually violent predator civil commitment trials may use diagnostic labels that are either familiar (e.g. ‘psychopath’) or unfamiliar (e.g. ‘paraphilia’) to jurors. Using predictions based on cognitive experiential self-theory, we explored the influence of testimony type (clinical versus actuarial) and diagnostic label (psychopath versus paraphilia) on jurors motivated to adopt either an experiential processing mode (PM; in which heuristic cues may be strongly relied upon) or an analytic rational PM. Consistent with previous research, our results indicated that when given a psychopathic diagnostic label, mock jurors motivated to process information experientially were more influenced by clinical testimony, whereas mock jurors induced into a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. However, experientially oriented jurors given a paraphilia diagnostic label did not show the expected influence of clinical expert testimony, and instead were more persuaded by actuarial testimony. These findings are discussed from a judgement and heuristics cues framework. The implications of several procedural suggestions are examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determining dangerousness in sexually violent predator evaluations: cognitive-experiential self-theory and juror judgments of expert testimony

Past research examining the effects of expert testimony on the future dangerousness of a defendant in death penalty sentencing found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific clinical expert testimony and tend to devalue scientific actuarial testimony. This study was designed to determine whether these findings extend to civil commitment trials for sexual offenders and to test a theoretical rationale for this effect. In addition, we investigated the influence of a recently developed innovation in risk assessment procedures, Guided Professional Judgment (GPJ) instruments. Consistent with a cognitive-experiential self-theory based explanation, mock jurors motivated to process information in an experiential condition were more influenced by clinical testimony, while mock jurors in a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. Participants responded to clinical and GPJ testimony in a similar manner. However, participants' gender exerted important interactive effects on dangerousness decisions, with male jurors showing the predicted effect while females did not. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

The role of death qualification and need for cognition in venirepersons' evaluations of expert scientific testimony in capital trials

The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of death qualification in venirepersons' evaluations of expert scientific testimony in capital trials. 200 venirepersons from the 12th Judicial Circuit in Bradenton, FL completed a booklet that contained the following: one question that measured their attitudes toward the death penalty; one question that categorized their death-qualification status; the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984); a summary of the guilt phase of a capital case (which included the cross-examination of the state's expert witness); verdict preference; five questions concerning participants' evaluations of the expert's testimony; the penalty phase of a capital case; sentence preference; and standard demographic questions. Results indicated that death-qualified venirepersons were more likely to demonstrate a low need for cognition and view ambiguous expert scientific testimony as valid, important in their decision-making processes, unbiased, and of high quality. Finally, death-qualified participants were more conviction- and death- prone than their excludable counterparts. Surprisingly, death-qualified and excludable jurors did not differ with respect to whether or not they felt that the expert followed correct procedures. Legal implications and applications are discussed.     

Influences of credibility of testimony and strength of statistical evidence on children’s and adolescents’ reasoning

According to dual-process models that include analytic and heuristic modes of processing, analytic processing is often expected to become more common with development. Consistent with this view, on reasoning problems, adolescents are more likely than children to select alternatives that are backed by statistical evidence. It is shown here that this pattern depends on the quality of the statistical evidence and the quality of the testimonial that is the typical alternative to statistical evidence. In Experiment 1, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 64) were presented with scenarios in which solid statistical evidence was contrasted with casual or expert testimonial evidence. When testimony was casual, children relied on it but adolescents did not; when testimony was expert, both children and adolescents relied on it. In Experiment 2, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 83) were presented with scenarios in which casual testimonial evidence was contrasted with weak or strong statistical evidence. When statistical evidence was weak, children and adolescents relied on both testimonial and statistical evidence; when statistical evidence was strong, most children and adolescents relied on it. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for dual-process accounts of cognitive development.     

Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always Persuasive1

This study investigates the impact of different types of expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In two hypothetical court cases involving eyewitnesses, expert testimony was presented that was either sample-based (presenting the results of a research program on eyewitness identification) or person-based (presenting information about the particular eyewitness under consideration); the expert either offered causal explanations for his unreliability claim or failed to do so. Two additional control groups (with and without eye-witness identification) were not presented with any expert testimony. The results indicate that subjects who had been confronted with an expert statement made more lenient judgments about the offender but did not discount the eyewitness identification completely. Sample-based information had a moderate impact on the subjects' judgments, regardless of whether or not causal explanations were given. Person-based testimony was the most influential type of expert advice when a causal explanation was provided but the least influential one when no reasons were given. The practical (international differences in admissibility of expert testimony) and theoretical implications (processing of base-rate information) of these findings are discussed.     

Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases: The effects of evidence,coherence and credentials on juror decision making

Psychological experts have been used increasingly to testify in child sexual abuse cases, yet little research has investigated what specific factors make experts effective. This study examined the potential effects that credentials, evidence strength and coherence may have on juror decision making. Sixty‐four mock jurors read cases of child sexual abuse, followed by experts' testimony and rated guilt of the defendant, effectiveness of the expert testimony and credibility of the victim. Evidence strength and coherence of the testimony affected all dependent variables, and the interaction was significant. Guilt ratings of the defendant were lower and the victim was rated as less credible when both evidence strength and coherence were low. The credentials of the expert, however, had negligible impact. These findings indicate that experts can be effective and impact jurors when testimony is either high in coherence or high in evidence. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decisions: Gender of the Expert and Testimony Complexity1

The present study investigated whether people used the gender of an expert witness as a heuristic cue to evaluate the evidence presented by the expert. Specifically, the gender of the expert and the complexity of the expert's testimony (low, high) were varied systematically within a simulated civil trial involving an antitrust price‐fixing agreement. It was expected that the male expert would be more persuasive than the female expert, but only when the testimony presented was complex. As predicted, this interaction was revealed across a range of dependent measures. Somewhat unexpected was the finding of a female expert advantage in the low‐complexity condition. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Juror Need for Cognition and Sensitivity to Methodological Flaws in Expert Evidence1

This study examined whether need for cognition (NC) moderated jurors' sensitivity to methodological flaws in expert evidence. Jurors read a sexual harassment trial summary in which the plaintiff's expert presented a study that varied in ecological validity, general acceptance, and internal validity. High NC jurors found the defendant liable more often and evaluated expert evidence quality more favorably when the expert's study was internally valid vs. missing a control group; low NC jurors did not. Ecological validity and general acceptance did not affect jurors' judgments. Ratings of expert and plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and expert evidence quality were positively correlated with verdict. Theoretical implications for the scientific reasoning literature and practical implications for trials containing psychological science are discussed.     

Turning Believers into Skeptics: 3-Year-Olds' Sensitivity to Cues to Speaker Credibility

Under most circumstances, children (and adults) can safely assume that the testimony they hear is true. In two studies, we investigated whether 3-year-olds (N = 100) would continue to hold this assumption even if the person who provided the testimony behaved in an uncertain, ignorant, and/or distracted manner. In Study 1, children were less likely to trust that, for example, a key-like object was a spoon if the speaker indicated uncertainty about her testimony (e.g., “I think this is a spoon”) than if she simply labeled the object ostensively (e.g., “This is a spoon”). In Study 2, 3-year-olds were also more skeptical about a speaker's testimony when she had earlier made an obvious naming error and seemed distracted, but not when she either made an error or seemed distracted. These results indicate that 3-year-olds can respond differently to the same testimony, depending on the speaker's behavior.     

Expert evidence by psychologists: Sometimes problematic and often premature

This article provides a critical review of two major types of expert evidence: (a) clinical assessments, and (b) generalizations drawn from psychological research. Strong arguments both for and against both types of testimony have been offered by legal experts and psychologists. These arguments are evaluated and the conclusion is drawn that there are two fundamental problems for psychologists in the role of expert. First, the types of assessments clinicians are asked to make (e.g., concerning the accused's mental state at the time of committing the offense) may exceed the capacity of the discipline; such assessments are problematic. Second, the research foundation that psychologists employ in court does not always apply to the court situation in the way experts imply; the application of laboratory research findings to real world contexts is sometimes premature. The article concludes with an admonition that psychologists should adopt a more conservative response to requests to provide expert evidence.     

Alcohol and aggression without consumption. Alcohol cues, aggressive thoughts, and hostile perception bias

Researchers and the lay public have long known of a link between alcohol and aggression. However, whether this link results from alcohol's pharmacological effects or is merely an artifact of the belief that alcohol has been consumed (i.e., placebo effect) has been debated. The current experiments examined the propensity for alcohol-related cues to elicit aggressive thoughts and hostile perceptions in the absence of alcohol or placebo consumption. In Experiment 1, participants made faster lexical decisions concerning aggression-related words following alcohol-related primes compared with neutral primes. In Experiment 2, participants who first were exposed to alcohol advertisements subsequently rated the behavior of a target person as more hostile than participants who initially viewed control advertisements. Furthermore, this effect was largest among participants who most strongly associated alcohol and aggression. Findings are discussed in terms of semantic network theory and links in memory between alcohol and its anticipated effects.     

The accumulating effects of shared expectations

This research examined whether self‐fulfilling prophecies and perceptual confirmation effects accumulated across people. Trios of same‐sex participants, each consisting of two interviewers and one target, were randomly assigned to one of three conditions that served to manipulate interviewers' expectations (i.e., non‐hostile vs. hostile) and the similarity of their expectations (i.e., similar vs. dissimilar) for targets. Each trio participated in an interaction in which interviewers asked targets questions. Targets' hostility during the interaction and interviewers' impressions of targets' hostility following the interaction served as the primary dependent variables. Results indicated that perceptual confirmation effects accumulated across interviewers. Even though targets' behavior during the interaction did not differ across conditions, interviewers nonetheless judged targets as more hostile when both interviewers expected targets to be hostile than when only one did. The authors discuss these findings in terms of the potential implications for those who have multiple inaccurate and unfavorable expectations held about them. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

认识性信任：学龄前儿童的选择性学习

人类个体对外界知识的获取很大程度上依赖于沟通, 即他人的证言。对儿童来说尤其如此。发展心理学家最近致力于研究学龄前儿童对他人证言的信任。一方面, 学龄前儿童往往会盲目地接受他人所告知的信息, 表现为轻信偏差; 另一方面, 儿童在知识学习上又会表现出高度的胜任力, 他们会借助一系列线索保证获取更为可靠的信息, 包括知识性线索和社会性线索。正如有关婴儿是否存在心理理论尚有争论, 儿童认识性信任的潜在机制也存在两种不同的取向, 涉及儿童是否理解信息者的心理状态。尽管对儿童知识性信息的研究取得了大量的成果和发现, 未来仍有许多问题值得探讨。     

The influence of FMRI lie detection evidence on juror decision-making

In the current study, we report on an experiment examining whether functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) lie detection evidence would influence potential jurors' assessment of guilt in a criminal trial. Potential jurors (N = 330) read a vignette summarizing a trial, with some versions of the vignette including lie detection evidence indicating that the defendant was lying about having committed the crime. Lie detector evidence was based on evidence from the polygraph, fMRI (functional brain imaging), or thermal facial imaging. Results showed that fMRI lie detection evidence led to more guilty verdicts than lie detection evidence based on polygraph evidence, thermal facial imaging, or a control condition that did not include lie detection evidence. However, when the validity of the fMRI lie detection evidence was called into question on cross-examination, guilty verdicts were reduced to the level of the control condition. These results provide important information about the influence of lie detection evidence in legal settings. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social inference and individual differences in aggression: Evidence for spontaneous judgments of hostility

This research examined the hypothesis that aggressive vs. nonaggressive individuals differ in their spontaneous trait inferences, i. e., inferences made without any conscious intention of inferring characteristics of an actor. We anticipated that spontaneous processing conditions would be more revealing of aggressive/nonaggressive differences than would conditions that prompt deliberate inference processes. We used a cued-recall paradigm. Aggressive and nonaggressive subjects were instructed to memorize sentences that were open to either hostile or nonhostile interpretations. Sentence recall was then cued by either hostile dispositional terms or by words that were linked semantically to the element of the sentences. Within the spontaneous inference condition, semantic cues prompted twice as much recall as hostile cues among nonaggressive subjects, whereas dispositional cues aided recall more than semantic cues among aggressive subjects. As predicted, within the delinerate inference conditions there were no aggressive/nonaggressive differences. The nature of spontaneous vs. deliberate inferential processes and the advantages of spontaneous inference paradigms for testing predictions about schema-based processing in aggression are discussed. © 1995 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

‘The witness who saw, /he left little doubt’: a comparative consideration of expert testimony in mental disability law cases in common and civil law systems

The question of how courts assess expert evidence—especially when mental disability is an issue—raises the corollary question of whether courts adequately evaluate the content of the expert testimony or whether judicial decision making may be influenced by teleology (‘cherry picking’ evidence), pretextuality (accepting experts who distort evidence to achieve socially desirable aims), and/or sanism (allowing prejudicial and stereotyped evidence). Such threats occur despite professional standards in forensic psychology and other mental health disciplines that require ethical expert testimony. The result is expert testimony that, in many instances, is at best incompetent and at worst biased. The paper details threats to competent expert testimony in a comparative law context—in both the common law (involuntary civil commitment laws and risk assessment criminal laws) and, more briefly, civil law. We conclude that teleology, pretextuality, and sanism have an impact upon judicial decision making in both the common law and civil law. Finally, we speculate as to whether the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is likely to have any impact on practices in this area. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.