Relational semantics for full linear logic

Relational semantics, given by Kripke frames, play an essential role in the study of modal and intuitionistic logic. In [4] it is shown that the theory of relational semantics is also available in the more general setting of substructural logic, at least in an algebraic guise. Building on these ideas, in [5] a type of frames is described which generalise Kripke frames and provide semantics for substructural logics in a purely relational form.In this paper we study full linear logic from an algebraic point of view. The main additional hurdle is the exponential. We analyse this operation algebraically and use canonical extensions to obtain relational semantics. Thus, we extend the work in [4], [5] and use their approach to obtain relational semantics for full linear logic. Hereby we illustrate the strength of using canonical extension to retrieve relational semantics: it allows a modular and uniform treatment of additional operations and axioms.Traditionally, so-called phase semantics are used as models for (provability in) linear logic [8]. These have the drawback that, contrary to our approach, they do not allow a modular treatment of additional axioms. However, the two approaches are related, as we will explain.     

Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals

In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.     

A general first-order solution to the ramification problem with cycles

We provide a solution to the ramification problem that integrates findings of different axiomatic approaches to ramification from the last ten to fifteen years. For the first time, we present a solution that: (1) is independent of a particular time structure, (2) is formulated in classical first-order logic, (3) treats cycles – a notoriously difficult aspect – properly, and (4) is assessed against a state-transition semantics via a formal correctness proof.This is achieved as follows: We introduce indirect effect laws that enable us to specify ramifications that are triggered by activation of a formula rather than just an atomic effect. We characterise the intended models of these indirect effect laws by a state-transition semantics. Afterwards, we show how to compile a class of indirect effect laws into first-order effect axioms that then solve the ramification and frame problems. We finally prove the resulting effect axioms sound and complete with respect to the semantics defined earlier.     

Linearization of the BCK-logic

In the paper we obtain a new characterization of the BCK-algebras which are subdirect product of BCK-chains. We give an axiomatic algebraizable extension of the BCK-calculus, by means of a recursively enumerable set of axioms, such that its equivalent algebraic semantics is definitionally equivalent to the quasivariety of BCK-algebras generated by the BCK-chains. We propose the concept of "linearization of a system" and we give some examples.     

Methodology of Transdisciplinarity

In this article, I will describe the methodology of transdisciplinarity. My analysis will be divided in several parts: what means “beyond disciplines”; the distinction between multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, indisciplinarity, and transdisciplinarity; the definition of disciplinary boundaries; the axioms of the methodology of transdisciplinarity: the notion of “levels of Reality”; the logic of included middle; and the universal interdependence. I will conclude by asserting that we are at the threshold of a New Renaissance.     

From IF to BI

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle.     

Extensive measurement with incomparability

Standard theories of extensive measurement assume that the objects to be measured form a complete order with respect to the relevant property. In this paper, representation and uniqueness theorems are presented for a theory that departs radically from this completeness assumption. It is first shown that any quasi-order on a countable set can be represented by vectors of real numbers. If such an order is supplemented by a concatenation operator, yielding a relational structure that satisfies a set of axioms similar to the standard axioms for an extensive structure, we obtain a scale possessing the crucial properties of a ratio scale. Incomparability is thus compatible with extensive measurement. The paper ends with a brief discussion on some possible applications and developments of this result.     

A Comprehensive Picture of the Decidability of Mereological Theories

The signature of the formal language of mereology contains only one binary predicate which stands for the relation “being a part of” and it has been strongly suggested that such a predicate must at least define a partial ordering. Mereological theories owe their origin to Le?niewski. However, some more recent authors, such as Simons as well as Casati and Varzi, have reformulated mereology in a way most logicians today are familiar with. It turns out that any theory which can be formed by using the reformulated mereological axioms or axiom schemas is in a sense a subtheory of the elementary theory of Boolean algebras or of the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras. It is known that the theory of partial orderings is undecidable while the elementary theory of Boolean algebras and the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras are decidable. In this paper, I will look into the behaviors in terms of decidability of those mereological theories located in between. More precisely, I will give a comprehensive picture of the said issue by offering solutions to the open problems which I have raised in some of my papers published previously.     

Interpolation in Extensions of First-Order Logic

We prove a generalization of Maehara’s lemma to show that the extensions of classical and intuitionistic first-order logic with a special type of geometric axioms, called singular geometric axioms, have Craig’s interpolation property. As a corollary, we obtain a direct proof of interpolation for (classical and intuitionistic) first-order logic with identity, as well as interpolation for several mathematical theories, including the theory of equivalence relations, (strict) partial and linear orders, and various intuitionistic order theories such as apartness and positive partial and linear orders.

     

Models of Deduction*

In standard model theory, deductions are not the things one models. But in general proof theory, in particular in categorial proof theory, one finds models of deductions, and the purpose here is to motivate a simple example of such models. This will be a model of deductions performed within an abstract context, where we do not have any particular logical constant, but something underlying all logical constants. In this context, deductions are represented by arrows in categories involved in a general adjoint situation. To motivate the notion of adjointness, one of the central notions of category theory, and of mathematics in general, it is first considered how some features of it occur in set-theoretical axioms and in the axioms of the lambda calculus. Next, it is explained how this notion arises in the context of deduction, where it characterizes logical constants. It is shown also how the categorial point of view suggests an analysis of propositional identity. The problem of propositional identity, i.e., the problem of identity of meaning for propositions, is no doubt a philosophical problem, but the spirit of the analysis proposed here will be rather mathematical. Finally, it is considered whether models of deductions can pretend to be a semantics. This question, which as so many questions having to do with meaning brings us to that wall that blocked linguists and philosophers during the whole of the twentieth century, is merely posed. At the very end, there is the example of a geometrical model of adjunction. Without pretending that it is a semantics, it is hoped that this model may prove illuminating and useful. *Since the text of this talk was written in 1999, the author has published several papers about related matters (see ‘Identity of proofs based on normalization and generality’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (2003), 477–503, corrected version available at: http://arXiv.org/math.LO/0208094; other titles are available in the same archive).     

Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth

In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. (Martin and Woodruff independently developed this semantics, but not to the same extent as Kripke.) Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of the land amid a variety of options. Our results will also provide technical fodder for the methodological remarks of the companion paper to this one.     

Some Notes on Boolos’ Semantics: Genesis,Ontological Quests and Model-Theoretic Equivalence to Standard Semantics

The main aim of this work is to evaluate whether Boolos’ semantics for second-order languages is model-theoretically equivalent to standard model-theoretic semantics. Such an equivalence result is, actually, directly proved in the “Appendix”. I argue that Boolos’ intent in developing such a semantics is not to avoid set-theoretic notions in favor of pluralities. It is, rather, to prevent that predicates, in the sense of functions, refer to classes of classes. Boolos’ formal semantics differs from a semantics of pluralities for Boolos’ plural reading of second-order quantifiers, for the notion of plurality is much more general, not only of that set, but also of class. In fact, by showing that a plurality is equivalent to sub-sets of a power set, the notion of plurality comes to suffer a loss of generality. Despite of this equivalence result, I maintain that Boolos’ formal semantics does not committ (directly) second-order languages (theories) to second-order entities (and to set theory), contrary to standard semantics. Further, such an equivalence result provides a rationale for many criticisms to Boolos’ formal semantics, in particular those by Resnik and Parsons against its alleged ontological innocence and on its Platonistic presupposition. The key set-theoretic notion involved in the equivalence proof is that of many-valued function. But, first, I will provide a clarification of the philosophical context and theoretical grounds of the genesis of Boolos’ formal semantics.     

Inexact Knowledge with Introspection

Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common knowledge in situations of bounded rationality.     

On axiomatizations of public announcement logic

In the literature, different axiomatizations of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) have been proposed. Most of these axiomatizations share a “core set” of the so-called “reduction axioms”. In this paper, by designing non-standard Kripke semantics for the language of PAL, we show that the proof system based on this core set of axioms does not completely axiomatize PAL  without additional axioms and rules. In fact, many of the intuitive axioms and rules we took for granted could not be derived from the core set. Moreover, we also propose and advocate an alternative yet meaningful axiomatization of PAL  without the reduction axioms. The completeness is proved directly by a detour method using the canonical model where announcements are treated as merely labels for modalities as in normal modal logics. This new axiomatization and its completeness proof may sharpen our understanding of PAL  and can be adapted to other dynamic epistemic logics.     

Well-founded semantics for defeasible logic

Fixpoint semantics are provided for ambiguity blocking and propagating variants of Nute’s defeasible logic. The semantics are based upon the well-founded semantics for logic programs. It is shown that the logics are sound with respect to their counterpart semantics and complete for locally finite theories. Unlike some other nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms such as Reiter’s default logic, the two defeasible logics are directly skeptical and so reject floating conclusions. For defeasible theories with transitive priorities on defeasible rules, the logics are shown to satisfy versions of Cut and Cautious Monotony. For theories with either conflict sets closed under strict rules or strict rules closed under transposition, a form of Consistency Preservation is shown to hold. The differences between the two logics and other variants of defeasible logic—specifically those presented by Billington, Antoniou, Governatori, and Maher—are discussed.     

Finite Basis Theorem for Filter-distributive Protoalgebraic Deductive Systems and Strict Universal Horn Classes

We show that a finitely generated protoalgebraic strict universal Horn class that is filter-distributive is finitely based. Equivalently, every protoalgebraic and filter-distributive multidimensional deductive system determined by a finite set of finite matrices can be presented by finitely many axioms and rules.     

Axiomatizing the Logic of Imagination

In a recent paper Berto introduces a semantic system for a logic of imagination, intended as positive conceivability, and aboutness of imaginative acts. This system crucially adopts elements of both the semantics of conditionals and the semantics of analytical implications in order to account for the central logical traits of the notion of truth in an act of imagination based on an explicit input. The main problem left unsolved is to put forward a complete set of axioms for the proposed system. In the present paper I offer a solution to this problem by providing a complete axiomatization of a generalization of the original semantics. The difficulty in proving completeness lies in the fact that the modalities that capture the notion of truth in an act of imagination are neither standard nor minimal, so that the construction of the canonical model and the proof of the truth lemma are to be substantially modified.

     

Canonicity for Intensional Logics Without Iterative Axioms

David Lewis proved in 1974 that all logics without iterative axioms are weakly complete. In this paper we extend Lewiss ideas and provide a proof that such logics are canonical and so strongly complete. This paper also discusses the differences between relational and neighborhood frame semantics and poses a number of open questions about the latter.     

Combinator Logics

Combinator logics are a broad family of substructual logics that are formed by extending the basic relevant logic B with axioms that correspond closely to the reduction rules of proper combinators in combinatory logic. In the Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logic each such combinator logic is characterized by the class of frames that meet a first-order condition that also directly corresponds to the same combinator's reduction rule. A second family of logics is also introduced that extends B with the addition of propositional constants that correspond to combinators. These are characterized by relational frames that meet first-order conditions that reflect the structures of the combinators themselves.     

Revision algebra semantics for conditional logic

The properties of belief revision operators are known to have an informal semantics which relates them to the axioms of conditional logic. The purpose of this paper is to make this connection precise via the model theory of conditional logic. A semantics for conditional logic is presented, which is expressed in terms of algebraic models constructed ultimately out of revision operators. In addition, it is shown that each algebraic model determines both a revision operator and a logic, that are related by virtue of the stable Ramsey test.The author is grateful for a correction and several other valuable suggestions of two anonymous referees. This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.