论角色道德

所谓“角色道德”,就是承担社会角色所必须遵守的道德。“角色道德”以个人社会角色所承担的权利和义务为评价行为善恶的标准。凡实现社会角色所赋予的权利并履行社会角色所承担义务的行为,皆是道德行为。凡不实现社会角色所赋予的权利不履行社会角色所承担义务的行为,皆是不道德的行为。“角色道德”把实现社会角色权利、履行社会角色义务的差异,看做是道德水平的差异。角色道德大体可分为三大类:     

工作场所不文明行为与职场排斥间的螺旋效应

工作场所不文明行为与职场排斥间的螺旋效应模型可用道德排除理论和情感事件理论解释。根据道德排除理论遭受工作场所不文明行为会导致受害者与实施者心理距离增加, 进而对实施者实施职场排斥; 从旁观者视角来看, 目睹工作场所不文明行为会影响旁观者的道义公正感和互动公平感进而表现出对实施者的职场排斥, 且该中介过程受到利他性的调节。同样, 基于情感事件理论, 遭受职场排斥会导致职场排斥受害者的消极情绪水平增加促使其成为工作场所不文明行为的实施者。     

论道德权利

在道德生活中,人们之间的关系应当是一种相互的权利与义务关系。道德义务的实质,即是社会和他人对个体的行为要求。但是,由于人们之间的利益关系不可能只是单向的义务关系,因此,有社会和他人对个人的行为要求,也必然有个人对社会和他人的行为要求,这种行为要求,属于道德范围的,便是道德权利。道德权利的客观基础便是社会和他人对个人利益应负的责任。     

道德权利不是科学的伦理学范畴

关于道德权利的提法,在立论上欠妥。(一)不用权利这一范畴,也能保证道德对人们利益的维护。道德通过约束个体行为,维护整体利益,然后用整体利益来保证个人利益的实现。约束即是对个体权利的限制,这种限制叫作道德义务。可见,恰恰不是权利,而是义务范畴,间接地维     

建言行为与政治行为之间的关系：基于道德凭证机制的研究

基于道德许可理论的道德凭证机制以及道德一致性的理论线索,探究了在职场排斥调节作用下以及在感知的建设性变革责任的抑制性调节作用下,建言行为通过心理权利影响政治行为的过程。对555名员工及其上司进行问卷调查,结果显示,在职场排斥作为边界条件影响下的建言行为通过心理权利的中介作用正向影响政治行为,而感知的建设性变革责任作为抑制性边界条件负向调节心理权利的这种中介关系。研究结果从理论和实证上解释了职场排斥是激发建言行为通过心理权利产生道德凭证效应的边界条件,而感知的建设性变革责任作为边界条件能够抑制这种效应的发生。     

人权的儒学进路

麦尔登反对自然权利说,而将权利根植于真实的人际关系和道德社群之中,在其看来,一个人拥有权利就意味着他与他人处于某种道德关系之中,他也有义务履行或是避免某些行为,以支持他人的道德努力。所谓权利,就是从应当履行或避免某些行为的人或人们的角度来看的道德关系。麦尔登不赞成个人主义单子式的独立、自主的自我观,呼吁一种对人的具体实在的观点。麦尔登重视家庭的地位,认为人们从家庭中来学习如何实现对他人的义务以及如何维护自己的应得,并将其扩充至家庭之外更为广泛的社会关系中。麦尔登的思想很多与儒家是相通的,为将权利观念融入儒家思想体系提供了很好的理论借鉴。     

关于道德的三个问题

一、准则与习俗:道德怎样变成了形式? 康德认为道德主要是由原则组成的。这种观点与那种认为道德主要是一个社会参与的问题,其中有些是可以用准则术语加以解释的观点,形成了鲜明的对比。例如一个战士十分清楚地知道某种行为是错误的,尽管他说不出它为什么是错的,也提不出任何禁止这一错误行为的准则或原则来。那么,他是怎么知道那种行为是错误的呢?因为他是在一种社会习俗中成长起来的,经过长期的熏陶使他明白了某类行为是不应当做的,因而也是不道德的。这需要一个原则吗?不一定,以前,他常常见到这     

生殖技术视阈中的生育权利与生育责任

在自然生殖的范围内,对于没有生育能力的人来说,其生育权利和相应的生育责任不具有真正的道德价值和实在意义。生殖技术的发展突破了自然生殖的传统藩篱,给生育权利和生育责任带来了前所未有的道德冲击和伦理挑战。尽管应用生殖技术和拒斥生殖技术都会受到谴责和称赞,但是不应当囿于这样的道德悖论而裹足不前。实际上,生育权利内部的冲突蕴含着生育权利对生殖技术视阈的生育责任的诉求。生育责任源自行动者完成事件的因果属性,这意味着生育技术主体必须对其行为后果做出回应。这种回应主要有三大层面:人类实存律令赋予生殖技术的责任、生育技术自身蕴含的责任以及生殖技术应用的责任。因此,我们应当在把握生育权利和生育责任的内涵和二者内在联系的基础上,利用先进的生育技术正当地维系生育权利,勇敢地承担相应的生育责任,进而彰显出崇高无上的人性尊严和道德目的。     

勒维:"文化身分与道德责任"

我们的文化身分能够免除我们对某些行为所负的责任吗?这是一个颇有争议的问题.这里,我们只涉及文化身分与道德责任之间关系的问题.首先,我们假设行为在道德上是错误的.其次,我们必须将道德责任同法律责任区别开来.出于何种缘由我们认为文化身分可以免除当事人的道德责任?有一种观点认为,如果文化身分能够免除当事人的道德责任,那么可以确信他们对其行为的错误性是无知的.因此,文化身分免除当事人的道德责任可以参照其对相关行为无知的责任.我们通过以下与之相左观点的分析,验证该观点是否合理.     

道德义务与超道德的行为

区别道德义务与超道德行为对于我们认识道德的本质和合理的道德要求具有重要意义。一个人的行为是否道德取决于它是否满足了道德义务所要求的,而不取决于它是否满足了超道德的要求。满足了道德义务的行为是道德的行为,违反了道德义务的行为是不道德的行为,而没有违反道德义务的行为或者不为道德义务所禁止的行为则是道德上可允许的行为。将超道德的行为混同于道德义务会导致超道德的要求,在实践中会引起种种弊病。     

Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong

Rights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy (contra Waldron, Enoch, and Herstein). Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the alternatives. The stubborn intuition that individuals have a right to do wrong in some cases can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering.     

A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism

If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question “Is what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?” with Neither.     

Therapeutic versus genuine cloning: what are the real moral issues?

In order to answer the question raised in the title of my paper, I first put forward a general ethical theory, which is based on the traditional maxim neminem laedere. Second, I show how this principle in conjunction with certain assumptions concerning the value of life entails certain fundamental bioethical principles. Thus killing a living being Y is morally wrong whenever the intrinsic value of the life that Y would otherwise live is positive. But procreating a living being Y is prima facie (i.e., with regard to the interests of Y) morally neutral, i.e. neither bad nor good. Third I will argue that the question of moral rights should always be reduced to the question of the morality of certain corresponding actions. In particular, granting Y a right to life should be taken to mean that it would be morally wrong if someone else were to put an end to Y's life. In a similar vein, I suggest answers to some other questions of the reproductive rights issue. Fourth, with respect to the controversial issue of genuine cloning, I do not see any compelling moral reasons against this utopian way of procreating full-grown individuals. Nevertheless, I think there are a lot of other good (pragmatic, rational) reasons not to try to produce a human Dolly. Finally, as regards the use or abuse of human embryos as potential suppliers of stem-cells for the cure of other people's diseases, it seems morally safe to perform experiments at least with those embryos which, like spare embryos that remained from measures of in vitro fertilization, would not have a life anyway. It's more difficult to decide, however, whether it would be morally safe to produce embryos (for instance through cloning) only for the sake of using them in the aforementioned way.     

Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?

The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyer's professional ethics, such as the right of defence and the so‐called principle of ‘adversarial’ litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defence are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally permissible to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong.     

On the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence

ABSTRACT Nuclear deterrence has struck many people as morally perplexing because it is a case in which it appears to be right to threaten, and in a sense intend, what it would be wrong to do. Section 1 explores the assumptions that are necessary to generate this moral paradox. Some moral theorists, however, have refused to embrace this paradox, contending instead that nuclear deterrence is immoral in principle precisely because it is wrong to threaten that which it would be immoral to do. Section 2 rebuts this contention and seeks to reduce the apparent paradoxicality of nuclear deterrence to manageable proportions. This is not to maintain, though, that nuclear deterrence is morally permissible in the world in which we live; consequently, Section 3 surveys some of the factors relevant to a moral assessment of the legitimacy of the actual practice of nuclear deterrence.     

Frankfurt-Type Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility

I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant moral assessments including assessments of moral blameworthiness.     

Telling Others to Do What You Believe Is Morally Wrong: The Case of Confucius and Zai Wo

Can it ever be morally justifiable to tell others to do what we ourselves believe is morally wrong to do? The common sense answer is no. It seems that we should never tell others to do something if we think it is morally wrong to do that act. My first goal is to argue that in Analects 17.21, Confucius tells his disciple not to observe a ritual even though Confucius himself believes that it is morally wrong that one does not observe the ritual. My second goal is to argue against the common sense answer and explain how Confucius can be justified in telling his disciple to do what Confucius thought was wrong. The first justification has to do with telling someone to do what is second best when the person cannot do what is morally best. The second justification has to do with the role of a moral advisor.     

Amorality

Actions are usually grouped into one of several moral categories. Familiar ones include the morally required, the morally permitted, and the morally prohibited. These categories have been expanded and/or refined to include the supererogatory and the “suberogatory”. Some eschew deontic categories such as the above, but nevertheless allow the existence of two comparative moral categories, i.e., the morally better or morally worse. At the risk of adding to the clutter, I want to explore the possibility of yet a further category, viz., amoral action, or actions that, strictly speaking, lack any moral status whatsoever. I think admitting the existence of amoral actions is not only plausible in its own right, but has consequences for our understanding the nature of moral obligation.     

A Defense of a Particularist Research Program

What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration.