RATIONAL VERSUS PLAUSIBLE ACCOUNTING EQUIVALENCES IN PREFERENCE JUDGMENTS

Subjective expected utility (SEU) embodies four distinct principles of rational behavior. Although all have been called into some question empirically, the least plausible and least studied is the property that formally equivalent gambles are treated as indifferent in preference. The paper describes some results that arise when this property is sharply weakened and to some degree replaced by alternative rational and not-so-rational-assumptions. The resulting utility representations, like SEU, are weighted averages of the utilities of consequences, but with the weights dependent on more than the underlying chance event. In rank-dependent cases, which arise from a restricted assumption about formally equivalent gambles, the weights depend on the rank position of the corresponding consequence. In ank-and sign-dependent models, they depend both on the rank position of the consequence associated to the event and on whether it is a gain or a loss. The theory giving rise to the latter involves an additional primitive, namely, joint receipt of gambles, in terms of which new rational and irrational assumptions are invoked. The result generalizes prospect theory to gambles with more than a single gain and a single loss.     

Theory and tests of the conjoint commutativity axiom for additive conjoint measurement

The empirical study of the axioms underlying additive conjoint measurement initially focused mostly on the double cancellation axiom. That axiom was shown to exhibit redundant features that made its statistical evaluation a major challenge. The special case of double cancellation where inequalities are replaced by indifferences–the Thomsen condition–turned out in the full axiomatic context to be equivalent to the double cancellation property but without exhibiting the redundancies of double cancellation. However, it too has some undesirable features when it comes to its empirical evaluation, the chief among them being a certain statistical asymmetry in estimates used to evaluate it, namely two interlocked hypotheses and a single conclusion. Nevertheless, thinking we had no choice, we evaluated the Thomsen condition for both loudness and brightness and, in agreement with other lines of research, we found more support for conjoint additivity than not. However, we commented on the difficulties we had encountered in evaluating it. Thus we sought a more symmetric replacement, which as Gigerenzer and Strube (1983) first noted, is found in the conjoint commutativity axiom proposed by Falmagne (1976, who called it the “commutative rule”). It turns out that, in the presence of the usual structural and other necessary assumptions of additive conjoint measurement, we can show that conjoint commutativity is equivalent to the Thomsen condition, a result that seems to have been overlooked in the literature. We subjected this property to empirical evaluation for both loudness and brightness. In contrast to Gigerenzer and Strube (1983), our data show support for the conjoint commutativity in both domains and thus for conjoint additivity.     

Modeling the Impact of Control on the Attractiveness of Risk in a Prospect Theory Framework

Many decisions involve a degree of personal control over event outcomes, which is exerted through one's knowledge or skill. In three experiments we investigated differences in decision making between prospects based on a) the outcome of random events and b) the outcome of events characterized by control. In Experiment 1, participants estimated certainty equivalents (CEs) for bets based on either random events or the correctness of their answers to U.S. state population questions across the probability spectrum. In Experiment 2, participants estimated CEs for bets based on random events, answers to U.S. state population questions, or answers to questions about 2007 NCAA football game results. Experiment 3 extended the same procedure as Experiment 1 using a within-subjects design. We modeled data from all experiments in a prospect theory framework to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. Participants weighted the probabilities associated with bets characterized by control so as to reflect greater risk attractiveness relative to bets based on random events, as evidenced by more elevated weighting functions under conditions of control. This research elucidates possible cognitive mechanisms behind increased risk taking for decisions characterized by control, and implications for various literatures are discussed.     

An alternative perspective on von Winterfeldt et al.'s (1997) test of consequence monotonicity

D. von Winterfeldt, N.-K. Chung, R. D. Luce, and Y. Cho (1997) provided several tests for consequence monotonicity of choice or judgment, using certainty equivalents of gambles. The authors reaxiomatized consequence monotonicity in a probabilistic framework and reanalyzed von Winterfeldt et al.'s main experiment via a bootstrap method. Their application offers new insights into consequence monotonicity as well as into von Winterfeldt et al.'s 3 experimental paradigms: judged certainty equivalents (JCE), QUICKINDIFF, and parameter estimation by sequential testing (PEST). For QUICKINDIFF, the authors found no indication of violations of "random consequence monotonicity." This sharply contrasts the findings of von Winterfeldt et al., who concluded that axiom violations were the most pronounced under that procedure. The authors found potential evidence for violations in JCE and certainty equivalents derived from PEST.     

Differentiating accounts of actual,suggested and fabricated childhood events using the judgment of memory characteristics questionnaire

Statement analysis procedures are used in forensic settings to classify reported events as experienced or non‐experienced. These procedures are typically validated using accounts of actual events and intentionally fabricated events. However, people can also unintentionally develop false memories. To examine whether inclusion of accounts of suggested events affects classification accuracy, we validated the judgment of memory characteristics questionnaire (JMCQ) statement analysis procedure using all three statement types. Participants attempted to recall two actual events and one suggested event from their childhood over two cognitive interviews, then intentionally fabricated an account of another childhood event. Fourteen of the 34 participants (41%) reported having experienced the suggested event. Independent raters then used the JMCQ to analyse and classify each type of statement from this participant subset. Inclusion of accounts of suggested events did not reduce classification accuracy. Raters tended to classify accounts of both fabricated and suggested events as non‐experienced. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE STRANGER AND THE SPOUSE AS TARGET PERSONS FOR COMPLIANCE-GAINING STRATEGIES: A SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY MODEL1

This study examines the use of compliance-gaining message strategies in “interpersonal” versus “noninterpersonal” relationships. Subjects were asked how likely they would be to use persuasive strategies in a hypothetical situation involving either a spouse (interpersonal situation) or new neighbors (noninterpersonal situation). A subjective expected utility model is proposed to account for subjects' choice of strategies. According to the SEU model, subjects weigh the expected advantages and disadvantages of strategies both in terms of their persuasiveness and their effects on the relationship with the persuadee. Regression analysis supported the use of the SEU model to predict subjects' choice of strategies. Situational comparisons of SEU indicated that most strategies are rated more persuasive, less likely to damage the personal relationship, and more likely to be used in the spouse situation than in the neighbor situation.     

Brightness of different hues is a single psychophysical ratio scale of intensity

Recent studies based on testable behavioral axioms have concluded that psychological scales of subjective intensive attributes involving the ears and eyes form ratio scales. These studies have shown that a certain commutativity of proportion property must hold under either successive increases or successive decreases, with all other independent dimensions fixed. However, until recently limited attention has been paid to whether such subjective intensity scales differ when a dimension independent of intensity, such as frequency or wavelength (e.g., pitch in audition, hue in vision) is varied. Using a simple and favorably tested theoretical model for global psychophysics, Luce, Steingrimsson, and Narens (2010) arrived at a necessary and sufficient cross-frequency, commutativity condition for there to exist a common intensity ratio scale. Here we show that brightness--already established to be a ratio-scalable dimension--and hue satisfy the same conditions.     

Bad Luck Once Again

In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like the event‐causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent’s choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom‐level control over it.     

生涯适应力与择业焦虑：注意偏向和归因的认知加工作用

为了探讨生涯适应力与择业焦虑的关系及内部的认知加工过程。采用点探测范式测量注意偏向,问卷法调查大学生的生涯适应力、归因和择业焦虑。结果发现：（1）生涯适应力既能直接负向预测择业焦虑,又能通过积极事件归因方式、及注意偏向和积极事件归因方式的链式中介作用间接预测择业焦虑。（2）在生涯适应力与择业焦虑的关系中受到消极事件归因方式的调节作用：只有消极事件积极归因时,生涯适应力才会影响择业焦虑。研究结果揭示了择业焦虑的内部作用过程,丰富了生涯适应力通过注意偏向和积极事件归因方式影响择业焦虑的解释视角,为通过归因和注意偏向的调整缓解不同生涯适应力个体择业焦虑提供了重要参考。     

Analyzing runs of an event occurring in a series with other kinds of events

A method for analyzing runs of an event occurring in a series with other kinds of events is presented. The first step of the analysis is to determine whether the event of interest occurs in longer runs than would be expected by chance. For this purpose, a cumulative frequency histogram, consisting of the relative proportions of runs as a function of length, is compared with a theoretically derived frequency histogram by means of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The theoretical histogram is the outcome of a Bernoulli process; it represents the distribution of run lengths that would be expected by chance for a given base-rate probability of occurrence of the event of interest. Iteratively applied Z tests are proposed as a post hoc procedure for use when the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals that the histogram of runs is not comparable to the theoretical histogram. The results reveal how the two histograms differ. Performing the same analysis on the class of all other events reveals whether runs occur in proximity. When they do, the frequency histogram for the event should be recalculated, allowing for brief intervening runs of other events, and tested with the appropriate theoretical distribution.     

Back to the future: Temporal perspective in the explanation of events

Prospective hindsight involves generating an explanation for a future event as if it had already happened; i.e., one goes forward in time, and then looks back. In order to examine how shifts in perspective might influence people's perceptions of events, we investigated two possible factors: temporal perspective (whether an event is set in the future or past) and uncertainty (whether the event's occurrence is certain or uncertain). In the first experiment, temporal perspective showed little influence while outcome uncertainty strongly affected the nature of explanations for events. Explanations for sure events tended to be longer, to contain a higher proportion of episodic reasons, and to be expressed in past tense. Evidence from the second experiment supports the view that uncertainty mediates not the amount of time spent explaining, but rather subjects' choice of explanation type. The implications of these findings for the use of temporal perspective in decision aiding are discussed.     

Reasoning about conjunctive probabilistic concepts in childhood.

While adults are known to exhibit biases when making conjunctive probability judgments, little is known about childhood competencies in this area. Participants (aged between four and five years, eight and ten years, and a group of young adults) attempted to select the more likely of two events, a single event, and a conjunctive event containing, as one of its components, the single event. The problems were such that the objective probabilities of the component events were potentially available. Children in both age groups were generally successful when the single event was likely. However, when it was unlikely, a majority of children rejected it, choosing the conjunctive event instead, thereby committing the conjunction fallacy. A substantial minority of adults also committed the fallacy under equivalent conditions. It is concluded that under certain conditions children are capable of normative conjunctive judgments but that the mechanisms underpinning this capacity remain to be fully understood.     

On the role of rarity information in speakers’ choice of frame

In this article, we examine conversational behaviors when people describe the outcomes of uncertain events. We propose a new hypothesis, frame choice based on rarity information, that is built on the basis of one prominent measure of informativeness (i.e., self-information). The hypothesis predicts that when speakers can choose one of two logically equivalent frames for describing the outcome of an uncertain event (e.g., the results of the roll of a die or a medical operation), they prefer the frame denoting an event that is known or perceived to be rare. Four experiments using frame choice tasks provide evidence that speakers’ choice of frame is explained well by the rarity hypothesis.     

Imagination inflation: a statistical artifact of regression toward the mean

In the imagination inflation procedure of Garry, Manning, Loftus, and Sherman (1996), subjects rated a list of events in terms of how likely each was to have occurred in their childhood. Two weeks later, some of the events were imagined; control events were not. The subjects then rated the likelihood of occurrence for each event a second time. Garry et al. (1996) reported that the act of imagining the target events led to increased ratings of likelihood. This finding has been interpreted as indicating that false events can be suggestively planted in memory by simply having people imagine them. The present study tests and confirms the hypothesis that the results that have been attributed to imagination inflation are simply a statistical artifact of regression toward the mean. The experiment of Garry et al. (1996) was reproduced (with some procedural changes), using younger and older adults. The results of Garry et al. (1996) were replicated; likelihood ratings for events initially rated low in likelihood did increase from Time 1 to Time 2. However, ratings for events initially rated high in likelihood decreased under the same conditions, and these results were consistent with the imagined target events, the target events not imagined, and the nontarget events.