A simplification of the theory of simplicity

Nelson Goodman has constructed two theories of simplicity: one of predicates; one of hypotheses. I offer a simpler theory by generalization and abstraction from his. Generalization comes by dropping special conditions Goodman imposes on which unexcluded extensions count as complicating and which excluded extensions count as simplifying. Abstraction is achieved by counting only nonisomorphic models and subinterpretations. The new theory takes into account all the hypotheses of a theory in assessing its complexity, whether they were projected prior to, or result from, projection of a given hypothesis. It assigns simplicity post-projection priority over simplicity pre-projection. It better orders compound conditionals than does the theory of simplicity of hypotheses, and it does not inherit an anomaly of the theory of simplicity of predicates — its failure to order the ordering relations. Drop Goodman's special conditions, and the problems fall away with them.     

Acts of perceptual inquiry: problems for any stimulus-based simplicity theory

Stimulus-specified simplicity is simply insufficient to predict the appearance of objects' 3D forms and figural shapes, etc., as originally intended. Which information a viewer chooses to attend can determine both what 3D structure is perceived and its attendant perceptual consequences; moreover, a shape's meaningfulness or denotivity [M.A. Peterson, Current Directions in Psychological Science 3 (1994) 105] can overcome simplicity-based figure-ground segregation. In both cases, perceptual consequences, such as subsequent perceived movements, are constrained or primed in ways that can help us corroborate and define what the viewer has perceived; that may help us in studying the underlying events in brain processing; and that should help in designing such perceptual applications as still and animated displays. Demonstrations, theoretical framework, and potential research tools are offered.     

Reflex theory,cautionary tale: misleading simplicity in early neuroscience

Synthese - This paper takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach to the topic of "simplicity out of complexity". The reflex theory was a framework within early...     

Drives and objects - notes on the change of drive theory

Freud’s drive theory has been questioned since the 1940s when Fairbairn created a metaphor of the mind that is not based on the tripartite model and drive theory. His work inspired others to elaborate on the significance of internal object relationships. According to the object relation theory, internal object relations are dynamic structures capable of generating meanings and action. Consequently, two distinct metapsychologies were created.The aim of this article is to show how the interaction of theories has initiated revisions of classic drive theory. Freud’s concept of drive and three synthesizing viewpoints between the two perspectives are discussed. Otto Kernberg addresses affects as a primary motivational system; the mother–infant relationship organizes affects to drives. Joseph Sandler adheres to classic drive theory but proposes that the ego’s attempt to protect the mind against psychic pain is as important as drive derivatives in motivating the mind. Laplanche proposes that the unconscious of the care-giving adult is the crucial factor for the constitution of an infant’s unconscious and drives. For Freud and Klein, drive is inherent. Contemporary writers, like Loewald and Laplanche, conceive drive as a function of the mind that is born out of the same matrix of interaction with the other elements of the mind.     

On simplicity of formulas

Simple formula should contain only few quantifiers. In the paper the methods to estimate quantity and quality of quantifiers needed to express a sentence equivalent to given one.     

Technical flaws in the coherence theory

Conclusion We have argued that Lehrer's definitions of coherence and justification have serious technical defects. As a result, the definition of justification is both too weak and too strong. We have suggested solutions for some of the problems, but others seem irremediable. We would also argue more generally that if coherence is anything like what Lehrer's theory says it is, then coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. While our current objections are directed at the letter of Lehrer's theory, other criticisms can be aimed at its very spirit. We would argue that coherence is unnecessary for justification because of the existence of basic beliefs, those about self-presenting states (I have a tingling sensation in my leg) or self-evident truths (All men are men). Such beliefs may be justified even though there are no other propositions in the subject's acceptance system that makes them more probable than competitors. Coherence is, moreover, insufficient for justification, because it ignores the inferential structure of the subject's acceptance system, and requires no justification of any kind for the subject's acceptance system itself. But we must develop these more fundamental objections on another occasion.     

An index of factorial simplicity

An index of factorial simplicity, employing the quartimax transformational criteria of Carroll, Wrigley and Neuhaus, and Saunders, is developed. This index is both for each row separately and for a factor pattern matrix as a whole. The index varies between zero and one. The problem of calibrating the index is discussed.The research reported in this paper was supported in part by the Office of Computing Activities, National Science Foundation.     

The deadlock of absolute divine simplicity

In this article, I explain how and why different attempts to defend absolute divine simplicity fail. A proponent of absolute divine simplicity has to explain why different attributions do not suppose a metaphysical complexity in God but just one superproperty, why there is no difference between God and His super-property and finally how a absolute simple entity can be the truthmaker of different intrinsic predications. It does not necessarily lead to a rejection of divine simplicity but it shows that we may consider another conception of divine simplicity compatible with some metaphysical complexity in God.     

Clinical notes on a case of transvestism in a child

This clinical presentation describes the therapeutic process of a 5-year-old male child presenting as a main symptom quasi-delusional feminine enactments starting at an early age, which persisted for most of his five-year treatment. This symptom was understood in terms of an attempt at restitution, itself the result of being confronted with an autistic structure stemming from a series of traumatic incidents during the oral phase: his mother's pregnancy, abortion, depression and subsequent three-month absence at the end of his first year of life. The clinical material, drawings included, illustrates the interplay of oral, anal and phallic levels, with enactment predominant in sessions. The oral traumatic situation initially led to anal-manic play, then to quasi-delusional female personifications in sessions, later surfacing as an annihilating 'black hole'. All the above issued into a broad enacted phallic-genital unfolding that dramatised an oral-genital primal scene, in the course of which he managed to structure his male identity. Near the end of the analytic process the analysand reworked the 'stages' of the link to the analyst. To end, based on the clinical material, the respective participation of the early and the late Oedipus complex is examined.     

One or two dimensions in spontaneous classification: a simplicity approach

When participants are asked to spontaneously categorize a set of items, they typically produce unidimensional classifications, i.e., categorize the items on the basis of only one of their dimensions of variation. We examine whether it is possible to predict unidimensional vs. two-dimensional classification on the basis of the abstract stimulus structure, by employing Pothos and Chater's simplicity model of spontaneous categorization [Pothos, E. M., & Chater, N. (2002). A simplicity principle in unsupervised human categorization. Cognitive Science, 26, 303-343]. The simplicity model provides a quantitative measure of how intuitive a particular classification is. With objects represented in two dimensions, we propose that a unidimensional classification will be preferred if it is more intuitive than all possible two-dimensional ones, and vice versa. Empirical results supporting this proposal are reported. Implications for Goodman's paradox are discussed.     

On the role of simplicity in science

Simple assumptions represent a decisive reason to prefer one theory to another in everyday scientific praxis. But this praxis has little philosophical justification, since there exist many notions of simplicity, and those that can be defined precisely strongly depend on the language in which the theory is formulated. The language dependence is a natural feature—to some extent—but it is also believed to be a fatal problem, because, according to a common general argument, the simplicity of a theory is always trivial in a suitably chosen language. But, this trivialization argument is typically either applied to toy-models of scientific theories or applied with little regard for the empirical content of the theory. This paper shows that the trivialization argument fails, when one considers realistic theories and requires their empirical content to be preserved. In fact, the concepts that enable a very simple formulation, are not necessarily measurable, in general. Moreover, the inspection of a theory describing a chaotic billiard shows that precisely those concepts that naturally make the theory extremely simple are provably not measurable. This suggests that—whenever a theory possesses sufficiently complex consequences—the constraint of measurability prevents too simple formulations in any language. This explains why the scientists often regard their assessments of simplicity as largely unambiguous. In order to reveal a cultural bias in the scientists’ assessment, one should explicitly identify different characterizations of simplicity of the assumptions that lead to different theory selections. General arguments are not sufficient.