任务切换机制研究的理论争议与整合

任务切换是执行控制的一种重要功能。切换代价是量化执行控制持续时间的指标。并广泛应用于各个研究领域。但是切换代价在多大程度上体现了执行控制的作用,仍然还存在争论．当前主要存在任务设置重构、任务设置惯性和联结竞争三种理论。本文首先介绍了三种理论的基本观点和实验证据,以及对任务切换加工机制的分析;其次阐明了对三种理论进行整合的相关研究;最后分析了进一步研究的方向。     

颜色类别知觉效应的机制：语言的作用

颜色类别知觉效应(Category Perception, CP效应)表明, 在颜色之间物理差异距离相等的前提下, 个体区分不同类别的颜色比区分同一类别的颜色更快、更准确。这一效应产生的机制成为普遍进化理论和Sapir-Whorf假设之间争论的重要证据。支持CP效应由语言驱动的学者提出了CP效应单侧化、受语言即时任务影响、跨语言研究和神经生理机制等证据, 以表明语言在CP效应中起决定性的作用; 支持CP效应具有普遍性的学者以CP效应双侧化、婴儿的CP效应、跨语言的反证等证据提出了质疑。近年来, 出现了第三种观点, 认为在颜色CP效应中语言驱动机制和普遍机制并存, 这种理论是普遍进化理论和Whorf假设的折衷观点。从支持CP效应由语言驱动的证据、支持CP效应独立于语言的证据以及支持两种机制并存的观点等三个方面入手, 可分析颜色CP效应的产生机制及语言在其中所起的作用, 未来研究可从概念系统渗入知觉系统的角度进行拓展。     

对解释伪忽视机制的两种理论的初步检验

以视野因素对伪忽视的影响为切人点来考察注意的右半球优势理论与表征的空间变形理论对伪忽视机制的解释。使用灰度标尺任务和三视野速示迫选的实验方法研究视野和操作用手因素对伪忽视的影响。结果显示,只有将两种理论结合起来才能对伪忽视机制作出更好的解释。     

区域创新体系的机制初探

由于理论准备不足和实践经验缺乏,目前多数创新型城市的建设思路,未能体现出区域创新体系的特色和优势。其中一个重要原因是对区域创新体系的机制问题研究不够。本文从区域创新体系机制的制度前提、创新路径和机制结构三个方面,探讨了区域创新体系机制的特点,以求能对各地建设创新型城市的实践有所启示。     

儿童反语理解的心理机制

反语是指使用与本意相反的字面形式表达本意的一种修辞形式,在儿童言语发展领域中是一种难度较大的认知对象。该对儿童在反语理解任务中的困难根源进行了探讨,介绍了目前关于儿童反语理解的心理机制研究的两种主要途径,一是采用成人反语识别理论去解释儿童反语理解的心理过程,二是从二阶心理理论角度开展的解释儿童反语理解的心理机制的尝试,最后在暗示假装理论和二阶心理理论的框架下对现有的研究证据进行了整合的讨论,并对未来研究提出了建议。     

员工感知被信任影响工作投入的心理机制：维度差异及理论比较

领导－员工之间的信任是工作场所中宝贵的资源,但有关领导对员工的信任及其作用机制的研究相对缺乏。以423名企业员工为被试,通过问卷调查法从被信任方角度考察了员工感知被信任对工作投入的影响及其机制,并比较了三种主导解释理论的相对有效性。结果显示：感知被信任与工作投入正相关,但其具体作用机制有赖于感知被信任的不同维度;相对于不确定管理理论和认知评估理论,社会交换理论更能有效解释感知被信任与工作投入的关系。     

调整与通达:锚定效应心理机制的研究进展

调整和通达是锚定效应心理机制的两种代表性观点,近年来,关于这两种机制的研究不断推进,产生了有限理性观、社会认知理论、双加工理论、态度改变理论等研究视角。从调整或通达单一解释模型发展到对复合机制的检验;从单锚效应机制的阐释发展到对双锚效应心理过程的探讨。未来研究应在选择通达加工过程的思维层面和内涵、不同性质问题下锚定效应机制的差异性、锚定效应内外部影响因素及神经心理机制研究等方面进一步深化。     

提取引起的遗忘的认知机制

提取引起的遗忘(RIF)指提取某个信息导致对其它相关信息的遗忘,揭示其内在机制是记忆和遗忘领域的一个重要的研究课题。近20年来,各路研究者分别从干扰理论、抑制理论或情境依赖说出发,试图找到引发RIF的唯一的认知机制。基于对有关RIF的认知机制的实证研究的系统分析,可以发现三个理论均有一定的支持证据,因此导致RIF的原因可能包括抑制、干扰和情境的改变等三个方面。今后该领域可结合多种技术手段对这一多元论观点进行直接的检验。     

互联网连接性降低自主性的机制与后效

万物可互联了, 时间却稀缺了, 情感也耗竭了。把这三种现实工作中的趋势关联起来的关键概念是自主性：员工不能自主控制工作时间引发时间稀缺和情感耗竭。过往研究认为, 在一般情景中, 互联网连接性会增加自主性。但是, 当处于一种不对称的权力依赖关系中时, 互联网连接性反而会降低自主性。借助权力依赖理论, 相对依赖性和家长式领导监控氛围是逆转互联网连接性增强自主性的关键条件。通过引入权力依赖理论, 从一个新颖的视角探讨互联网连接性降低自主性的作用机制及其后效, 所构建的理论模型挑战了以往文献中互联网连接性增加自主性的主流理论观点, 也为互联网连接性环境下的自主性问题构建了一个新的理论基础。     

面孔识别的认知发展机制

关于面孔识别能力的认知发展机制问题,目前存在两种不同的观点。一种是面孔特殊性发展理论,认为儿童的面孔识别之所以不如成人,是由于儿童和成人对面孔的加工方式不同,代表性理论有部分加工-结构加工理论,内部特征-外部特征加工理论,多维空间理论等。另一种是一般认知能力观点,认为儿童很早就具备了成人式的面孔加工方式,之后面孔识别任务中成绩的提高都可归因于一般认知能力的发展。在对两种观点进行评述的基础上,对未来的面孔识别研究提出了建议。     

Pictures,perspective and possibility

This paper argues for a possible worlds theory of the content of pictures, with three complications: depictive content is centred, two-dimensional and structured. The paper argues that this theory supports a strong analogy between depictive and other kinds of representation and the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.     

On Classification of Scientific Revolutions

The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Is ZF a hack?: Comparing the complexity of some (formalist interpretations of) foundational systems for mathematics

This paper presents Automath encodings (which are also valid in LF/λP) of various kinds of foundations of mathematics. Then it compares these encodings according to their size, to find out which foundation is the simplest.

The systems analyzed in this way are two kinds of set theory (ZFC and NF), two systems based on Church's higher order logic (Isabelle/Pure and HOL), three kinds of type theory (the calculus of constructions, Luo's extended calculus of constructions, and Martin-Löf's predicative type theory) and one foundation based on category theory.

The conclusions of this paper are that the simplest system is type theory (the calculus of constructions), but that type theories that know about serious mathematics are not simple at all. In that case the set theories are the simplest. If one looks at the number of concepts needed to explain such a system, then higher order logic is the simplest, with twenty-five concepts. On the other side of the scale, category theory is relatively complex, as is Martin-Löf's type theory.

(The full Automath sources of the contexts described in this paper are one the web at http://www.cs.ru.nl/~freek/zfc-etc/.)     

孤独症的认知障碍研究及其评述

执行功能紊乱理论(Theory of Executive Dysfunction)、弱的中央统合理论(Weak Central Coherence theory)和心理理论假说(The Theory of Mind Hypothesis)是解释孤独症认知障碍的三种重要理论。本文着重通过回顾以往的实验研究来探讨三种理论的产生、发展及前进的方向, 以及三大理论之间的关系。三者可能从不同侧面诠释了孤独症认知障碍的机制, 如何综合起来更好地揭示孤独症的认知障碍和病理机制, 尚需深入和全面的研究。同时更多地考虑不同认知因素的交互影响以及研究的生态学效度, 可能是进一步研究需要考虑的问题。     

Mobilization and participation in trade union action: An expectancy-value approach*

The mobilization of trade union members to participate in the activities of their union is a complex process of persuading and activating. Curiously, the literature on union participation has paid little attention to this process. In this paper an expectancy-value theory of willingness to participate in action is presented. Central to this theory is the assumption that the willingness to participate in an activity or action of a trade union is a function of the perceived costs and benefits for participants of involvement in that activity or action. In the light of this theory two kinds of mobilization are distinguished: consensus mobilization and action mobilization. The theory was applied in studying three mobilization campaigns of a Dutch trade union: (a) a campaign concerning an imminent conflict about a planned reorganization, and (b) two campaigns over the annual negotiations for a collective labour agreement. This paper describes the developed theory and uses results from the three studies to test and illustrate it.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

Nordenfelt's Theory of Disability

This paper is an attempt to provide a critical evaluation of the theory of disability put forward by Lennart Nordenfelt. The paper is in five sections. The first sets out the main elements of Nordenfelt's theory. The second section elaborates the theory further, identifies a tension in the theory, and three kinds of problems for it. The tension derives from Nordenfelt's attempt to respect two important but conflicting constraints on a theory of health. The problems derive from characterisation of the goals of persons; the difficulty which Nordenfelt has in respecting the plausible view that there is a distinction between illness and disability; and the presence in the theory of other strongly counter-intuitive implications. In section three a defence of Nordenfelt is attempted from within the resources available within his own theory. This defence seeks to exploit his distinctions between a person who is ill and one who is generally disabled and that between first- and second-order disabilities. However, it is concluded that there are insufficient resources within Nordenfelt's theory to fend off the criticisms developed in section two. The fourth section of the paper attempts a defence of Nordenfelt. It is claimed that introduction of the concept of capacity helps to explain differences between problem cases in the theory. Finally, it is shown that at least two important constraints on any theory of disability emerge from the preceding discussion.     

Social Categorization in Intergroup Contexts: Three Kinds of Self‐Categorization

In reviewing self‐categorization theory and the literature upon which it is based, we conclude that individuals' attempts to form social categories could lead to three kinds of self‐categorization. We label them intergroup categorization, ingroup categorization, and outgroup categorization. We review literature supporting these three types and argue that they can help to explain and organize the existing evidence. Moreover, we conclude that distinguishing these three kinds of self‐categorization lead to novel predictions regarding social identity, social cognition, and groups. We offer some of those predictions by discussing their potential causes (building from optimal distinctiveness and security seeking literatures) and implications (on topics including prototype complexity, self‐stereotyping, stereotype formation, intergroup behavior, dual identity, conformity, and the psychological implications of perceiving uncategorized collections of people). This paper offers a platform from which to build theoretical and empirical advances in social identity, social cognition, and intergroup relations.     

Proper names and how they are learned

Abstract

Proper names function in our conceptual lives as means for denoting individuals in kinds. Kinds are denoted by common names, more precisely count nouns, and so there are important interrelations between proper names and common nouns. All of this shows up in the way we interpret proper names and employ them in everyday inferences. For example, an airline may count three passengers in relation to a single person Jane, if Jane takes three trips with the airline. Each of the three passengers is Jane, but there is only one Jane. To handle such operations we propose a theory of proper names as part of the theory of kinds. This enables us to specify certain resources (some of them unlearned) that are necessary for the learning of proper names and also a theory of how they are learned. We review the experimental literature on the learning of proper names from the standpoint of the theory. We do not extend the theory to cover recognition or recall.     

They’ve lost control: reflections on skill

In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of control for precisely the same reason: each reduce control to a passive, mechanistic, automatic process, which then prevents them from producing a substantive account of how controlled processes can be characterized by seemingly intelligent features and integrated with personal-level states. I will end by introducing three different kinds of control, which are constitutive of skilled action: strategic control, selective, top–down, automatic attention, and motor control. It will become clear that Dreyfus cannot account for any of these three kinds of control while Stanley has difficulty tackling the two latter kinds.