Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest

I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument is based on the observation that even when a blameworthy wrongdoer could have responded to moral considerations, this is often not relevant to her blameworthiness. Finally, I argue against the view that because blame communicates moral demands, only agents who can be reached by such communication are properly blamed. I contend that a person victimized by a wrongdoer with an impaired capacity for moral understanding may protest her victimization in a way that counts as a form of moral blame even though it does not primarily express a moral demand or attempt to initiate moral dialogue.     

Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.     

Is Negligence a First Cousin to Intentionality? Lay Conceptions of Negligence and Its Relationship to Intentionality

In three studies, we examined lay conceptions of negligence and how they are used when making judgments about actors' intentions, negligence, and blame. Study 1 examined the extent to which participants agreed about what constitutes negligence and accidents. After finding a high level of agreement between participants, Study 2 explored the features that defined participants' folk understanding of negligence. Additionally, we examined if definitions of negligence overlapped with key features of definitions of intentionality proposed in the literature. Study 2 suggested there were some key overlapping features and differences between negligence and intentionality. Finally, Study 3 examined how two key features of intentionality and negligence (knowledge and awareness) were related to attributions of negligence, accidental causation, blame, and desire to punish. The findings suggested that knowledge and awareness are positively related to judgments of negligence, blame, and desire to punish. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subjective probabilities and moral judgments

The two experiments reported here examined the relationship between subjective probability estimates and moral judgments (credit and blame assignment, trait attributions, and behavior evaluations). Subjects read about situations that varied in outcome valence (moral or immoral); in addition, the nature of situational demands (Experiment 1) or behavior frequency (Experiment 2) was varied. In the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to judgments of immoral behaviors (but not moral behaviors), whereas the situational demands only had an impact on judgments of moral behaviors. Experiment 2 included a wider range of behavioral situations, and the probability estimates and moral judgments were assessed independently. In contrast to the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to trait and behavior ratings of both moral and immoral acts. Consistent with the first experiment, however, subjective probabilities predicted blame but not credit. Across both studies, the prior expectancies were more strongly related to evaluations of immoral acts than moral acts. Implications for understanding the determinants of judgments of moral and immoral acts are discussed.     

A Theory of Blame

We introduce a theory of blame in five parts. Part 1 addresses what blame is: a unique moral judgment that is both cognitive and social, regulates social behavior, fundamentally relies on social cognition, and requires warrant. Using these properties, we distinguish blame from such phenomena as anger, event evaluation, and wrongness judgments. Part 2 offers the heart of the theory: the Path Model of Blame, which identifies the conceptual structure in which blame judgments are embedded and the information processing that generates such judgments. After reviewing evidence for the Path Model, we contrast it with alternative models of blame and moral judgment (Part 3) and use it to account for a number of challenging findings in the literature (Part 4). Part 5 moves from blame as a cognitive judgment to blame as a social act. We situate social blame in the larger family of moral criticism, highlight its communicative nature, and discuss the darker sides of moral criticism. Finally, we show how the Path Model of Blame can bring order to numerous tools of blame management, including denial, justification, and excuse.     

Sexual jealousy in young women and men: Aggressive responsiveness to partner and rival

Two studies compared judgments about aggressive components of jealous reactions to the partner and to the rival, specifically, emotional (anger), cognitive (blame), and behavioral components. The first study randomly assigned 172 young women and men to two questionnaires on jealous reactions to mild (flirting) and serious (cheating) transgressions. One questionnaire assessed standards for appropriate behavior and perceptions of how people usually react. The second questionnaire asked people to report how they had reacted or, if not experienced with a sexual transgression, how they would react. The second study asked 113 people to imagine a situation in which they knew their partner had been sexually unfaithful. There were three major findings that were interpreted in the context of courtship, a time when attention is focused on the qualities of one's potential long-term partner. First, the jealous individual's anger and blame were focused more on the partner than the rival. Second, mean anger and blame scores given the partner were well matched. In contrast, the rival received more anger and blame than deemed appropriate and considerably more anger than blame. These data suggest that, in the context of courtship, a rival is not simply a competitor. Third, men were more inclined to think about aggressive action against the rival but women were more emotionally and behaviorally reactive to the rival. The latter result implies that, in the context of competition for an established romantic partner, a rival is more salient for women than for men. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.     

Will you confess to what I did? Close relationships and in-group membership facilitate voluntary blame-taking

To learn more about why people falsely confess without external pressure, we examined voluntary blame-taking in three experiments. Drawing from theories of prosocial behavior and social identity, we investigated whether participants' blame-taking is influenced by (a) their relationship with the guilty person (Experiment 1) and (b) the group membership of the person asking to take the blame (Experiments 2a and 2b). In Experiment 1, participants (N = 130) considered whether they would take the blame for a small traffic violation for their best friend and a stranger in a vignette-scenario. As expected, intended blame-taking rates were higher for their best friend (60.8%) than for a stranger (8.5%). Reported reasons for taking the blame included reciprocity and empathy. In Experiments 2a and 2b (Ns = 60; 89), we tested actual blame-taking behavior in two field experiments, using a new experimental paradigm. An experimenter approached participants and asked them to commit insurance fraud for a broken camera. Participants who shared the same group as the person in need were more willing to take the blame (47%-48%) than participants who were from a different group (21%-23%). The most frequently listed reason for taking the blame was empathy. Implications for the occurrence of voluntary blame-taking behavior to protect someone else are discussed.     

The role of observer attitudes in judgments of blame in cases of wife assault

This study examines the importance of observer characteristics in determining blame in cases of wife assault. Four independent variables (observer's attitudes toward sex roles, observer sex and age, and victim behavior) were assessed for their influence on the blaming judgments of 128 participants. Subjects completed a questionnaire that contained demographic items and six wife assault vignettes that varied in level of victim provocation (low or high). Questions about blame of the husband and wife followed each vignette. An attitudes toward women scale (AWS-B) was then administered. The main hypothesis, that subjects with traditional attitudes would blame the victim more and the perpetrator less for the assault than their egalitarian counterparts, was supported, as was the prediction of an interaction between provocation and AWS-B. The results are discussed in light of the role of observer attitudes in attribution models.     

Effects of social influences and waiting on time judgment

Utilizing social judgment theory, the relationships of three social cues to time judgment under low physical temporal-cue conditions were explored. These social influences were as follows: being free to interact with another person, being told by the experimenter to expect to wait a specified period of time, and seeing another person's time judgment. 72 college students, randomly assigned to conditions of free social interaction (alone-interactive) and of waiting expectancy (expected-unexpected), made time estimates after 4 min., 7 sec. Each person under interactive conditions made another judgment after seeing a partner's judgment. Mean estimation was lower alone than under interactive conditions and lower under expected than unexpected waiting conditions. Under interactive conditions, correlations were positive between the individual's first and second judgments, between the partners' second judgments, and between the individual's second and the partner's first judgments. Social cues may influence time judgment.     

Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems

In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can’t be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen’s modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) “manipulation arguments,” involving cases in which an agent is manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist’s favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise.     

Effects of classroom context on university students’ judgments about cheating: mediating and moderating processes

Hypothetical vignettes were used to examine the effects of classroom context variables (pedagogical quality and classroom goal structure) on undergraduate (study 1) and graduate (study 2) students’ judgments about cheating. Consistent with attribution theory and previous findings, poor (versus good) pedagogy and performance (versus mastery) goals structures resulted in more teacher blame and less student blame for cheating, and cheating was rated as more acceptable and more likely in these situations. Participants’ own prior cheating history but not their experience as a classroom teacher also affected these judgments. Relations between classroom context variables and assigned blame for cheating were mediated by students’ assessments of the fairness of the classroom situation.     

Cognitive processes involved in blame and blame-like judgments and in forgiveness and forgiveness-like judgments

Experiment 1 compared the cognitive processes involved in blame and forgiveness judgments under identical experimental conditions. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with 4 judgment scales: willingness to prosecute, willingness to avenge, resentment level, and willingness to make up. Participants were presented with 32 scenarios in which a doctor made a medical error. These situations contained 5 items: the degree of proximity with the doctor (e.g., a family doctor known since childhood), the degree of negligence, the severity of consequences, apologies or contrition, and cancellation of consequences. Functional cognitive analysis grouped judgments into 2 categories: blame-like judgments (blame, prosecution, and revenge) and forgiveness-like judgments (resentment, forgiveness, and reconciliation). Blame-like judgments were characterized by additive integration rules, with negligence followed by apologies as the 2 main cues. Forgiveness-like judgments were characterized by an interactive integration rule, with apologies followed by negligence as the 2 main cues.     

Equipment malfunctions and attribution of causality

The purpose of this study was to test whether individuals would be more likely to attribute the cause for the malfunction of a new piece of equipment as a manufacturing problem in the equipment or as an inability on their part to properly work with the equipment. The subjects were 600 residents of Florida, selected by a stratified random sample and interviewed in a statewide telephone survey. Subjects were more likely to attribute the cause to themselves rather than the machine. Overall, 71% attributed the cause to themselves, while only 24% said the machine was at fault. There was also an interaction effect in terms of income, with middle-income users more likely to blame the machine and upper-income users more likely to blame themselves. Further, there was also a significant relationship between attribution of cause and age, with older respondents being more likely to attribute cause to themselves. These results imply that attribution may differ when the potential object of attribution is a machine rather than another person.     

Asymmetry in judgments of moral blame and praise: the role of perceived metadesires

Abstract - An important consideration in judging the blameworthiness (or praiseworthiness) of an action is whether the agent had sufficient control over it. In three experiments, we investigated judgments of moral blame and praise elicited when individuals were presented with vignettes describing actions that were performed either carefully and deliberately or impulsively and uncontrollably. Experiment 1 uncovered an asymmetry between judgments of positive versus negative actions—negative impulsive actions elicited a discounting of moral blame, but positive impulsive actions did not elicit a discounting of moral praise. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that this asymmetry arises because individuals judge agents on the basis of their metadesires (the degree to which the agents embrace or reject the impulses leading to their actions). Individuals assume that an agent would embrace an uncontrollable positive impulse, and reject an uncontrollable negative impulse.     

Direct and indirect freedom in addiction: Folk free will and blame judgments are sensitive to the choice history of drug users

People view addiction as a source of diminished free will and moral responsibility. Yet, people are also sensitive to the personal histories of moral actors, including, perhaps, the way by which people became addicted. Across two studies (N = 806), we compare people’s moral intuitions about cases in which the actor becomes addicted by force or by choice. We find that perceptions of reduced free will partially mediate an association between choice (vs. no choice) in addiction and moral blame for a bad act (Study 1). We replicate this pattern and show that blame judgments are stronger when the bad act is related (vs. unrelated) to obtaining the addictive substance (Study 2). Our work is novel in demonstrating that lay people evince relatively nuanced intuitions about the role of free will in addiction and morality—they track direct and indirect paths to choices when making free will and blame judgments.