Is death row obsolete? A decade of mainstreaming death-sentenced inmates in Missouri

Death-sentenced inmates in Missouri have been integrated or "mainstreamed" into the general population of the Potosi Correctional Center since 1991. By comparing the rate of violent misconduct among these mainstreamed death-sentenced inmates with that of the life-without-parole and parole eligible inmates under fully integrated conditions of confinement, this study provides the first empirical (statistical) evaluation of this innovative alternative to segregated death row confinement. The mainstreamed death-sentenced inmates committed no inmate or staff homicides, or attempted homicides. Comparison of their rates of institutional violence revealed frequencies that were similar to those of life-without-parole inmates, and well below those of fellow inmates who were sentenced to parole eligible terms. These findings cast serious doubt on the security-driven assumptions that have typified the segregation of death-sentenced inmates and have dictated highly restrictive confinement policies for this group. A conclusion that death-sentenced inmates can be safely integrated into a general prison population has significant implications for allocation of scarce fiscal resources and correctional staff, as well as for inmate mental health, particularly given the extended tenure that death-sentenced inmates typically serve between sentencing and relief/execution.     

Did Tom Kuhn actually Meet Tom Bayes?

Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.

Crib death: a biobehavioral phenomenon?

In developed countries, more children under 1 year of age die of crib death (sudden infant death syndrome, SIDS) than of all other causes combined. Researchers and clinicians have proposed many possible causes of SIDS, but the abrupt, unexpected death of some babies remains mysterious and frightening. Although infant behavior may explain some of these deaths, scant attention has addressed behavioral characteristics of babies who die without medical explanation. Any explanation of SIDS must account for the fact that most SIDS deaths occur at 2 to 5 months of age, acknowledging that a protective mechanism appears to spare babies before 2 months but then disappears. The respiratory occlusion reflex serves as an initial defense against smothering and can provide such an explanation. Infantile reflexes wane, after providing opportunities for learned responses to be acquired. During this well-documented neurobehavioral transition from subcortical to cortically mediated responding, some babies, viable for the first 2 months, may become especially vulnerable if they fail to acquire sufficiently strong defensive behaviors needed to prevent occlusion after the waning of the life-preserving reflex. Recent success of back-to-sleep directives, urging that babies sleep on their backs to avoid smothering, supports this hypothesis.     

Is death really the worm at the core? Converging evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility

According to terror management theory, if the cultural worldview protects people from thoughts about death, then weakening this structure should increase death-thought accessibility (DTA). Five studies tested this DTA hypothesis. Study 1 showed that threatening Canadian participants' cultural values (vs. those of another culture) increased DTA on a word-fragment completion task. Study 2 showed that when participants could dismiss the threat, DTA remained low. Study 3 replicated the results of Study 1, but DTA was measured using a lexical decision task. Response latencies to death, negative, and neutral content were measured. Worldview threat increased DTA relative to accessibility for negative and neutral content. Study 4 showed that the DTA effect emerged independently of the arousal of anger or anxiety. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that participants with a pro-creation (vs. pro-evolution) worldview had higher DTA after reading an anti-creation article. Discussion focused on theoretical implications and directions for further research.     

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.     

Glimpses of utopia near death? a rejoinder

Five scholars have offered comments, suggestions, and criticisms of my paper Near-Death Experiences and Pursuit of the Ideal Society. In this rejoinder, I reply to those comments and elaborate on aspects of my earlier paper. I discuss issues of methodology, epistemology, validity, logic, and other social considerations with respect to the plausibility of viewing some near-death imagery as utopian. I conclude with some reflections on the social character and study of the near-death experience.     

Is identity non-contingent?

I present a novel argument against the non-contingency of identity. I first argue that the necessity of distinctness is intimately connected with numerous paradoxes of recombination. In particular, I argue that those who reject the necessity of distinctness have natural solutions to various paradoxes of recombination which have plagued the metaphysics of modality. Moreover, I argue that adding the necessity of distinctness to modest, paradox-free assumptions is sufficient to reinstate the paradoxes. Given that identity is non-contingent only if distinctness is necessary, I suggest this constitutes new evidence against the non-contingency of identity.     

What Is Ineffable?

In this essay, I argue, via a revision of Freud's notions of primary and secondary process, that experiences of resonant form lie at the root of many serious ineffability claims. I suggest further that Western European culture's resistance to the perception of resonant form underlies some of its present crises.     

Is Divorce Promise-Breaking?

Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: “I promise to love, honour, and cherish ....” But this poses a problem. Divorce is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections, a ‘hard-line’ response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the ‘hardship’ response—the hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisors in far too many cases. I resolve the triad by considering the content of the vows. Vows concerning love are not promises at all. We cannot promise to do acts the performance of which is outside our control, and love involves states of mind outside our control. Vows concerning spousal roles are complicated by diverse social understandings of marriage and the centrality of emotion to the roles.     

Is Science Neurotic?

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition from which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B but represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C and, as a result, fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic." Natural science is neurotic in this sense insofar as its basic aim is represented as improving knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science itself does not suffer significantly from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences and academic inquiry more generally. freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far-reaching beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.