Is death row obsolete? A decade of mainstreaming death-sentenced inmates in Missouri

Death-sentenced inmates in Missouri have been integrated or "mainstreamed" into the general population of the Potosi Correctional Center since 1991. By comparing the rate of violent misconduct among these mainstreamed death-sentenced inmates with that of the life-without-parole and parole eligible inmates under fully integrated conditions of confinement, this study provides the first empirical (statistical) evaluation of this innovative alternative to segregated death row confinement. The mainstreamed death-sentenced inmates committed no inmate or staff homicides, or attempted homicides. Comparison of their rates of institutional violence revealed frequencies that were similar to those of life-without-parole inmates, and well below those of fellow inmates who were sentenced to parole eligible terms. These findings cast serious doubt on the security-driven assumptions that have typified the segregation of death-sentenced inmates and have dictated highly restrictive confinement policies for this group. A conclusion that death-sentenced inmates can be safely integrated into a general prison population has significant implications for allocation of scarce fiscal resources and correctional staff, as well as for inmate mental health, particularly given the extended tenure that death-sentenced inmates typically serve between sentencing and relief/execution.     

Did Tom Kuhn actually Meet Tom Bayes?

Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.

Is death really the worm at the core? Converging evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility

According to terror management theory, if the cultural worldview protects people from thoughts about death, then weakening this structure should increase death-thought accessibility (DTA). Five studies tested this DTA hypothesis. Study 1 showed that threatening Canadian participants' cultural values (vs. those of another culture) increased DTA on a word-fragment completion task. Study 2 showed that when participants could dismiss the threat, DTA remained low. Study 3 replicated the results of Study 1, but DTA was measured using a lexical decision task. Response latencies to death, negative, and neutral content were measured. Worldview threat increased DTA relative to accessibility for negative and neutral content. Study 4 showed that the DTA effect emerged independently of the arousal of anger or anxiety. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that participants with a pro-creation (vs. pro-evolution) worldview had higher DTA after reading an anti-creation article. Discussion focused on theoretical implications and directions for further research.     

Crib death: a biobehavioral phenomenon?

In developed countries, more children under 1 year of age die of crib death (sudden infant death syndrome, SIDS) than of all other causes combined. Researchers and clinicians have proposed many possible causes of SIDS, but the abrupt, unexpected death of some babies remains mysterious and frightening. Although infant behavior may explain some of these deaths, scant attention has addressed behavioral characteristics of babies who die without medical explanation. Any explanation of SIDS must account for the fact that most SIDS deaths occur at 2 to 5 months of age, acknowledging that a protective mechanism appears to spare babies before 2 months but then disappears. The respiratory occlusion reflex serves as an initial defense against smothering and can provide such an explanation. Infantile reflexes wane, after providing opportunities for learned responses to be acquired. During this well-documented neurobehavioral transition from subcortical to cortically mediated responding, some babies, viable for the first 2 months, may become especially vulnerable if they fail to acquire sufficiently strong defensive behaviors needed to prevent occlusion after the waning of the life-preserving reflex. Recent success of back-to-sleep directives, urging that babies sleep on their backs to avoid smothering, supports this hypothesis.     

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.     

Are semantic errors actually semantic?: Evidence from alzheimer's disease

Patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) produce a high rate of semantic errors when naming to confrontation. This is considered to be one of the many consequences of their semantic memory deficit. However, it has been shown, in aphasic patients with focal lesions, that semantic errors could arise from impairment to any one of the levels in the naming process. To check this hypothesis in AD, we assessed in 15 patients the capacity to name and access semantic knowledge (by multiple-choice probe questions) about 14 objects presented successively in the visual, tactile, auditory, and verbal modalities. In the visual naming task, 33 errors were recorded: 26 (78.8%) were semantic and 7 (21.2%) were unrelated errors. Of the 26 semantic errors, 8 were related to a deficit of the semantic knowledge related to the item and 17 to a deficit in the retrieval of the phonological form of the word. One was associated with a deficit of access to semantic knowledge in the visual modality. The 7 unrelated errors were associated with a loss of semantic knowledge for 4 and deficit of access to the phonological form for 3. In conclusion, this study shows that semantic errors do not systematically reflect a deficit of semantic knowledge in Alzheimer's disease. It also seems that unrelated errors are more frequently related to semantic deficits than semantic errors in this population.     

Glimpses of utopia near death? a rejoinder

Five scholars have offered comments, suggestions, and criticisms of my paper Near-Death Experiences and Pursuit of the Ideal Society. In this rejoinder, I reply to those comments and elaborate on aspects of my earlier paper. I discuss issues of methodology, epistemology, validity, logic, and other social considerations with respect to the plausibility of viewing some near-death imagery as utopian. I conclude with some reflections on the social character and study of the near-death experience.     

What Is Terrorism?

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non-violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.     

Is understanding reducible?

ABSTRACT

Despite playing an important role in epistemology, philosophy of science, and more recently in moral philosophy and aesthetics, the nature of understanding is still much contested. One attractive framework attempts to reduce understanding to other familiar epistemic states. This paper explores and develops a methodology for testing such reductionist theories before offering a counterexample to a recently defended variant on which understanding reduces to what an agent knows.     

Is Imagination Introspective?

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience.