Killing, letting die, and simple conflicts

Proponents of the moral equivalence of killing and letting die argue that in cases of simple conflict, where one agent must either perform a positive act and kill one person, or not perform that act and allow another person to die, the agent's alternatives are clearly morally equivalent. Malm rejects this view in a three part essay. He argues that in cases of simple conflict, the acts of killing and letting die are morally different, and that killing is not in itself worse than letting die. Malm considers and rejects the suggestion that the agent should decide randomly between the two alternatives. He concludes that while simple conflict cases require us to recognize a morally significant difference between killing and letting die, they do not require us to recognize a morally significant difference between acting and refraining.     

Puzzling cases about killing and letting die.

Discussions of euthanasia often appeal to the distinction between killing people and letting them die. Favor asks whether this distinction is morally important--in particular, whether killing is worse than merely letting someone die, even when the motivations and consequences are the same. She explores our moral intuitions via a discussion of various subtly different hypothetical examples.     

Killing, wrongness, and equality

This paper examines accounts of the moral wrongness of killing persons in addition to determining what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the morality of killing persons about the (in)equality of persons, and vice versa. I will argue that a plausible way of thinking about the moral wrongness of killing implies that the permissibility of killing innocent, nonthreatening persons depends on a person’s age. I address objections to this conclusion and discuss some potential implications of the view.     

Abortion,Killing, and Maternal Moral Authority

A threat to women is obscured when we treat “abortion‐as‐evacuation'’ as equivalent to “abortion‐as‐killing.'’ This holds only if evacuating a fetus kills it. As technology advances, the equivalence will fail. Any feminist account of abortion that relies on the equivalence leaves moral room for women to be required to give up their fetuses to others when it fails. So an account of the justification of abortion‐as‐killing is needed that does not depend on the equivalence.     

Epicurus,Death, and the Wrongness of Killing

This article questions the assumption, held by several philosophers, that the Epicurean argument for death's being “nothing to us” must be fallacious since its acceptance would undermine the principle that killing is (in general) wrong. Two possible strategies are considered, which the Epicurean-sympathizer might deploy in order to show that the non-badness of death (for the person who dies) is compatible with killing's being wrong. One of these is unsuccessful; the other is more promising. It involves arguing that the wrongness of killing is a “basic moral certainty” and hence requires no underpinning by the judgement that death is bad. Problems for this proposal, and possible responses to those problems, are considered. Though the strategy is not decisive, it is deemed to be one that the Epicurean could plausibly adopt.     

Killing, Letting Die, and the Morality of Abortion

abstract   David Boonin, in his A Defense of Abortion, argues that abortions that involve killing the foetus are morally permissible, even if granting for the sake of argument that the foetus has a right to life. His primary argument is an argument by analogy to a 'trolley case'. I offer two lines of counterargument to his argument by analogy. First, I argue that Boonin's analogy between his trolley case and a normal unwanted pregnancy does not hold. I revise his trolley case in light of my objections. Second, I argue that Boonin's arguments for the permissibility of killing, when applied to this revised trolley case — and by extension, typical unwanted pregnancies — do not succeed in justifying killing.     

Terrorism,War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

Letting and making death happen,withholding and withdrawing life-support: Morally irrelevant distinctions

The author argues that there is no morally relevant distinction between letting and making death happen, and between withholding and withdrawing life-support. There is a discussion of possible adverse consequences in believing that there are moral distinctions. And then he shows that acknowledging the absence of such a distinction does not necessarily imply any endorsement of active euthanasia.