论心理教育研究的社会意义

心理教育是一种针对人类心理机能进行的特殊教育活动,目标是全面提高人类的心理机能,开发人类心理潜能,促进心理全面发展,维护人类心理健康,从而为促进社会发展服务。本文以心理教育研究与社会发展的关系为中心,分别阐述了心理教育研究的兴起、心理教育研究的社会意义、心理教育研究的未来发展等三个问题。     

心理矫治:中国监狱的一把利剑

在新的历史时期,心理矫治方法在中国监狱得到了普遍应用。这是因为,导致犯罪的心理原因较突出,罪犯是心理问题的高发人群,需要开展心理矫治,以提高改造质量。心理矫治通过运用心理科学知识、技术和方法,在心理评估的基础上,善用罪犯寻求改变的心理,通过心理卫生教育、心理咨询、心理治疗等措施,帮助其调节不良情绪,改变不良的认知方式,改善或消除异常心理,达到完善其人格(个性)的一种活动。     

视域融合:心理教育中的价值中立与价值蕴涵

我国心理教育的理论建构存在两种不同的研究视域:心理学的研究视域与教育学的研究视域,其中的一个争论焦点在于对"价值中立"的不同看法。心理教育作为一门以提升心理机能为目标的学科,价值干预是其功能发挥的重要途径,心理教育的理论基础、目标、作用机制和运作过程等不同侧面都有价值干预蕴涵其中。通过对心理教育中价值问题的研究,可以弥合心理教育领域理论研究的分歧,使心理教育的实践成为充满价值意义的活动。     

上海市梅园小学心理健康教育常规工作简介

1."育心育人"健康教育开设心理健康教育课是我校进行心理健康教育的主渠道。在四年级每班每周开设一节心理辅导课,在五年级每班每两周开设一节心理辅导课,并将其列入课表。心理辅导活动课以解决学生成长中的问题为主线确立活动目标,以学生的心理需要和年龄特点组织活动内容,以学生活动为主,注重学生的心理感受和内心体验,激发学生积极参与活动、体验和分享,有效促进了学生的健康成长。     

西方心理表象技术研究的昨天、今天与明天

心理表象技术是指以呈现和操控心理表象为方式,达成心身健康目的的心理技术。研究梳理西方心理表象技术研究的历史,整理出十种比较体系化、有应用价值的心理表象技术;概要介绍了该技术在医疗护理、临床心理、教育、体育、社会工作方面所取得的成效,及其有效的技术操作机制。最后,在新近的相关实验结论基础上,笔者提出"心理表象环境论"作为其有效机制的理论解释框架。     

心理生理学在教育工作中的应用

近年来,一些心理与教育专家尝试将心理生理学的成果引入教育传播领域,从心理生理的角度研究教育传播的现象与规律,获得了一些有益的结论,使人耳目一新。这是一种新的探索和尝试,尽管现在研究还很不成熟,但它给传统的教育研究带来新意,随着研究的深入,它的意义必将被越来越多的人们所认识。对学生来说,教育传播过程是一个学习过程,     

对于开展大学生心理沙龙的初步探索

本文对心理沙龙开展的方式,游戏活动和情境表演的作用,沙龙的效果等做了初步探讨,以期为心理沙龙的进一步开展和研究提供一些有益的参考。     

艾伟的阅读心理研究

艾伟是中国现代著名教育心理学家,对中国科学教育心理学体系的构建与发展做出了重要贡献．本文通过大量的史料分析,发现其运用最新的测验、实验与统计技术在阅读心理领域所进行的系统研究,不仅内容丰富,涵括默读心理、阅读兴趣及辞句学习,而且为当时中小学国文教学改革进程的科学化提供了实验支持。     

脑成像在心理学研究领域的价值

现在普遍使用的脑成像技术给心理学研究增加了新的数据和资料。和任何新的方法一样,我们需要决定如何以适当的方式应用这项技术。这项技术如何以现有的方法所不能的方式帮助回答理论问题？这项技术最好是作为因变量还是作为预测变量来使用？它如何与其它感兴趣的心理变量相关？这种新的成像技术有助于我们了解大脑的运作及其与心理学的关系。研究人员需要弄清楚如何利用这项技术提供的信息加深对心理现象的理解。     

中小学生的心理特点与教育教学措施

本文根据笔者多年的中小学教学和管理的实践,分析了小学生和初中生的心理发展特点,并针对这些特点提出了小学要加强一年级和毕业学年的教育教学,使他们顺利过渡到初中的学习;在初中,要特别加强初一年级的教学,使学生适应新的学习变化,从而为今后的发展奠定基础。     

Goal-directed access to mental objects in working memory: The role of task-specific feature retrieval

In the present study, we examined the hypothesis of task-specific access to mental objects from verbal working memory. It is currently assumed that a mental object is brought into the focus of attention in working memory by a process of object selection, which provides this object for any upcoming mental operation (Oberauer, 2002). We argue that this view must be extended, since the selection of information for processing is always guided by current intentions and task goals. In our experiments, it was required that two kinds of comparison tasks be executed on digits selected from a set of three digits held in working memory. The tasks differed in regard to the object features the comparison was based on. Access to a new mental object (object switch) took consistently longer on the semantic comparison task than on the recognition task. This difference is not attributable to object selection difficulty and cannot be fully accounted for by task difficulty or differences in rehearsal processes. The results support our assumptions that (1) mental objects are selected for a given specific task and, so, are accessed with their specific task-relevant object features; (2) verbal mental objects outside the focus of attention are usually not maintained at a full feature level but are refreshed phonologically by subvocal rehearsal; and (3) if more than phonological information is required, access to mental objects involves feature retrieval processes in addition to object selection.     

Similarity judgments of same-category object representations: Effects of physical size,manipulability, and word frequency

ABSTRACT

Studies of object similarity have focused on the relationship between different physical objects and their mental representations or between instances of the same physical object and its mental representation. The present study is the first to investigate the structure of within-category psychological space. We provided evidence that large objects and frequently mentioned objects are perceived as less similar to each other compared to small objects or less frequently mentioned objects. Further, similarity judgments were higher for manipulable objects compared to non-manipulable objects. The relevance of these data to the isomorphism between physical and psychological spaces is also discussed.     

Forms, uses and functions of children's favourite objects

In this study, the notion of a favourite object is used as a heuristic concept for things that children are occupied with and absorbed by. According to earlier studies, favourite objects can be grouped into four categories: forerunners of transitional objects, primary and secondary transitional objects, and favourite toys. This initial classification was compared to results of cluster analyses of characteristics of favourite objects among 32 preschool and 30 primary school children, corroborating the initial classification and specifying the typology. The distribution of types of objects was different for the two groups of children, but was not dependent on age within groups or, for the preschool children, on mental development. These results indicate that changes of favourite objects with mental maturation are slow.
The softness of the material of primary and secondary transitional objects and the preference for objects that could be kept close to the body suggest that the comforting character of these favourite objects has its root in the child's self-soothing actions with the object.     

How 9-month-old crawling infants profit from visual-manual rotations in a mental rotation task

Studies show that visual-manual object exploration influences spatial cognition, and specifically mental rotation performance in infancy. The current work with 9-month-old infants investigated which specific exploration procedures (related to crawling experience) support mental rotation performance. In two studies, we examined the effects of two different exploration procedures, manual rotation (Study 1) and haptic scanning (Study 2), on subsequent mental rotation performance. To this end, we constrained infants’ exploration possibilities to only one of the respective procedures, and then tested mental rotation performance using a live experimental set-up based on the task used by Moore and Johnson (2008). Results show that, after manual rotation experience with a target object, crawling infants were able to distinguish between exploration objects and their mirror objects, while non-crawling infants were not (Study 1). Infants who were given prior experience with objects through haptic scans (Study 2) did not discriminate between objects, regardless of their crawling experience. Results indicated that a combination of manual rotations and crawling experience are valuable for building up the internal spatial representation of an object.     

Different Roots of Human Intentionality in Mammalian Mentality

Five mental components of human intentionality are distinguished and related to different properties of mammalian orientation. It is proposed that, in the course of evolution, these old properties became integrated and thereby allowed for the development of a new quality: human orientation. The existence of more than 4,000 mammal species with their various forms and levels of mental organization, offering a panorama of different combinations of differently developed components of mentality, provide ample opportunities for comparative studies. The difficulties in assessing specific types are outlined, drawing on over 40 years of observation. Based on this knowledge, an argument is made for the importance of staying in contact with the empirical objects and of considering their ontological status when rising the standards of precision of formal analysis. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The time to name disoriented natural objects

A series of experiments revealed systematic effects of orientation on the time required to identify line drawings of natural objects. Naming time increases as patterns are rotated further from the upright. With practice, however, the effect of orientation is reduced considerably. Furthermore, the reduced orientation effect with practice on a set of objects does not transfer to a new set of objects, suggesting that the acquired ability to reduce the orientation effect is specific to particular patterns. Finally, for departures in orientation from the upright between 0° and 120°, the magnitude of the orientation effect on identification for patterns seen for the first time is equivalent to that found in a mental rotation task using the same patterns (making left/right decisions about rotated patterns). This final result suggests that novel depictions of a known class of objects may be identified by a process of mental rotation.     

Mental rotation is not easily cognitively penetrable

When participants take part in mental imagery experiments, are they using their “tacit knowledge” of perception to mimic what they believe should occur in the corresponding perceptual task? Two experiments were conducted to examine whether such an account can be applied to mental imagery in general. These experiments both examined tasks that required participants to “mentally rotate” stimuli. In Experiment 1, instructions led participants to believe that they could reorient shapes in one step or avoid reorienting the shapes altogether. Regardless of instruction type, response times increased linearly with increasing rotation angles. In Experiment 2, participants first observed novel objects rotating at different speeds, and then performed a mental rotation task with those objects. The speed of perceptually demonstrated rotation did not affect the speed of mental rotation. We argue that tacit knowledge cannot explain mental imagery results in general, and that in particular the mental rotation effect reflects the nature of the underlying internal representation and processes that transform it, rather than participants’ pre-existing knowledge.     

Modeling Children's Understanding of Quantitative Relations in Texts: A Developmental Perspective

This article describes developmental models of word problem solving that are grounded in the notion of general developmental constraints of the mind. These models were constructed based on the assumption that differences in children's word problem-solving performance are due, at least in part, to developmental differences in their conceptual structures in the quantitative domain. Three levels of knowledge were identified and modeled. The simplest model represents quantitative relations as an ordered array of mental objects. The next level of the model represents numbers as objects of manipulations open two mental number lines that are coordinated in a tentative fashion. The most complex model represents numerical operations as objects of manipulations on two mental number lines that are well-coordinated with explicit, functional rules. These models were implemented as production systems. The accuracy of the predictions resulting from the simulations of the models was tested in an empirical study. Global tests of the models found a good fit of the data to the models. The results wee consistent with the theoretical analysis that the three levels of knowledge were internally coherent and qualitatively different from each other, and that the models could predict children's performance differences to a satisfactory degree.     

Mental imagery and the third dimension

What sort of medium underlies imagery for three-dimensional scenes? In the present investigation, the time subjects took to scan between objects in a mental image was used to infer the sorts of geometric information that images preserve. Subjects studied an open box in which five objects were suspended, and learned to imagine this display with their eyes closed. In the first experiment, subjects scanned by tracking an imaginary point moving in a straight line between the imagined objects. Scanning times increased linearly with increasing distance between objects in three dimensions. Therefore metric 3-D information must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 2-D "snapshots." In a second experiment, subjects scanned across the image by "sighting" objects through an imaginary rifle sight. Here scanning times were found to increase linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they appeared from the original viewing angle. Therefore metric 2-D distance information in the original perspective view must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 3-D "scale-models" that are assessed from any and all directions at once. In a third experiment, subjects mentally rotated the display 90 degrees and scanned between objects as they appeared in this new perspective view by tracking an imaginary rifle signt, as before. Scanning times increased linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they would appear from the new relative viewing perspective. Therefore images can display metric 2-D distance information in a perspective view never actually experiences, so mental images cannot simply be "snapshot plus scale model" pairs. These results can be explained by a model in which the three-dimensional structure of objects is encoded in long-term memory in 3-D object-centered coordinate systems. When these objects are imagined, this information is then mapped onto a single 2-D "surface display" in which the perspective properties specific to a given viewing angle can be depicted. In a set of perceptual control experiments, subjects scanned a visible display by (a) simply moving their eyes from one object to another, (b) sweeping an imaginary rifle sight over the display, or (c) tracking an imaginary point moving from one object to another. Eye-movement times varied linearly with 2-D interobject distance, as did time to scan with an imaginary rifle sight; time to tract a point varied independently with the 3-D and 2-D interobject distances. These results are compared with the analogous image scanning results to argue that imagery and perception share some representational structures but that mental image scanning is a process distinct from eye movements or eye-movement commands.     

Are things that are hard to physically move also hard to imagine moving?

Are objects that are more difficult to physically manipulate also more difficult to mentally manipulate? In our study, participants interacted with wooden objects modeled after the figures from Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) classic mental rotation experiment. One pair of objects was easy to physically rotate while another pair was difficult. They then completed a standard mental rotation task on images of these objects. Participants were slower to mentally rotate objects that were harder to physically rotate when they engaged in motor imagery. Further, this cost accrued with increasing angles of rotation. We verified this was the result of motor imagery by showing that the costs can be eliminated by using a strictly visual imagery strategy (imagining the objects moving on their own). These results reveal a striking constraint imposed by our real-world motor experiences on mental imagery, and also demonstrate a way that we can overcome such constraints.