Changing fit and fat bias using an implicit retraining task

Objective: To change implicit and explicit bias so that active obese people are regarded as more fit and normal weight sedentary people as less fit.

Design: Study one created a questionnaire that measured perceptions of active obese persons and sedentary normal weight persons on fitness-related items. Study two used a modified visual probe task to retrain perceptions regarding active obese persons and sedentary normal weight persons.

Main outcome measures: Self-reported explicit bias was measured with a questionnaire and implicit bias was measured with response times collected during a visual probe task.

Results: The questionnaire reliably measured ‘fitness and fatness’ perceptions. In study two, pairing images of active obese persons with positive activity-related words resulted in active obese persons being explicitly rated more fit; pairing images of normal weight sedentary persons with negative words associated with sedentary lifestyles increased endorsement of normal weight people as unfit. There were no changes in implicit bias.

Conclusions: Bias regarding how body weight is thought of relative to fitness can be altered by pairing images of obese persons being active with words such as ‘health’ and ‘fit’. This is evidence that representations of persons of all body weight should be used when promoting physical activity.     

Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content

Abstract

According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non‐conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowell’s position, Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of body schema and Gibson’s notion of affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content, and that at least some affordances, the so‐called ‘conditional affordances’, are essentially related to the body schema. This means that the perceptual content depends upon the nature of the body schema. Since the body schema does not pertain to the domain that our conceptual faculties operate upon, it is argued that this kind of perceptual content cannot be conceptual. At least some of that content is representational, yet it cannot feature as non‐demonstrative conceptual content. It is argued that if it features as demonstrative conceptual content, it has to be captured by private concepts. Since McDowell’s theory does not allow for the existence of a private language, it is concluded that at least some representational perceptual content is non‐conceptual.     

Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action

Abstract

In this paper, I am concerned with persons’ capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching ‘We’‐intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe’s action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency.     

Situated anticipation

In cognitive science, long-term anticipation, such as when planning to do something next year, is typically seen as a form of ‘higher’ cognition, requiring a different account than the more basic activities that can be understood in terms of responsiveness to ‘affordances,’ i.e. to possibilities for action. Starting from architects that anticipate the possibility to make an architectural installation over the course of many months, in this paper we develop a process-based account of affordances that includes long-term anticipation within its scope. We present a framework in which situations and their affordances unfold, and can be thought of as continuing a history of practices into a current situational activity. In this activity affordances invite skilled participants to act further. Via these invitations one situation develops into the other; an unfolding process that sets up the conditions for its own continuation. Central to our process account of affordances is the idea that engaged individuals can be responsive to the direction of the process to which their actions contribute. Anticipation, at any temporal scale, is then part and parcel of keeping attuned to the movement of the unfolding situations to which an individual contributes. We concretize our account by returning to the example of anticipation observed in architectural practice. This account of anticipation opens the door to considering a wide array of human activities traditionally characterized as ‘higher’ cognition in terms of engaging with affordances.

     

Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding

In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of social understanding that it is intended to explain. The social capacity in question that is presupposed by these accounts is then analyzed in the second section via a discussion and further development of Searle’s ‘sense of us’ and ‘sense of the other’ as a precondition for social cognition and joint action. After a critical discussion of Schmid’s recent proposal to analyze this in terms of plural pre-reflective selfawareness, we develop an alternative account. Starting from the idea that infants distinguish in perception between physical objects and other agents we distinguish between affordances and social affordances and cash out the notion of a social affordance in terms of “interaction-oriented representations”, parallel to the analysis of object affordances in terms of “action-oriented representations”. By characterizing their respective features we demonstrate how this approach can solve the problem formulated in the first part.     

What’s Inside Your Head Once You’ve Figured Out What Your Head’s Inside Of

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neuroscience. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contribute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.     

A method of ‘things’: a relational theory of objects as persons in lived religious practice

ABSTRACT

Material expressions of religion are some of the most visible ways in which the lived realities of religions can be examined and understood. Religious materiality not only mediates between a continuum of still productive dualisms that exist between ‘official’ and ‘lived’ religion, but is also capable of inspiring relational methodological approaches. Based on a small-scale study of Marian statue devotion in Spain, the article asserts that ‘personhood’ as an approach is an appropriate conceptual and methodological tool with which to frame theoretically, address, and approach practically the religious objects that researchers encounter in the field. Such approaches are considered here as ‘relational’, as lived religion is best understood through the intimate relationships and negotiations that take place not only between religious group or community members, but also between human persons and other than human persons such as religious statues. Acknowledging that researchers and the objects being researched can bring each other into varying forms of personhood carries the possibility of expanding the ‘participant observer’ paradigm, thus expressing lines of possibilities for understanding the volatile relational phenomena that take place in the religious ‘worlds’ of others.     

Intermingling and confusion

Abstract

An understanding of Descartes’ concept of ‘confusion’ is important both for making sense of his epistemological enterprise and for grasping his doctrine of the union of mind and body. An analysis of Descartes’ notion of confusion is offered which is grounded in the (more or less controversial) theses that confused thoughts are thoughts, that confusion is confusion by a thinker of one thought with another, and that confusion both can and should be avoided or ‘undone’. This analysis takes its rise from his contrast between ‘confused’ and ‘distinct’ : it exhibits confusion as a failure to distinguish between meanings of systematically ambiguous expressions. This failure is sometimes due to ‘bad intellectual habits’ which in his view ought to be broken, sometimes to ‘nature’ (where the confusion is in general beneficial to our welfare). Paradigmatically these are expressions which refer ambiguously to substances (i.e. mind and body) which are ‘really distinct’. Moreover, his ‘disambiguations’ indicate a central but neglected aspect of his aim in philosophizing: he can be seen as engaged in a moral project of ‘philosophical therapy’.     

Irrationality and egoism in Hegel’s account of right

ABSTRACT

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.     

Benefits of belonging: Experimental manipulation of social inclusion to enhance psychological and physiological health parameters

Objective: Acute changes in social belonging are important triggers for alterations in health and well-being, yet research has emphasised the negative effects of ‘exclusion’ at the expense of evaluating the potentially positive effects of ‘inclusion’. This study examined the impact of acute belonging on physiological and psychological outcomes.

Design and main outcome measures: A healthy population (N?=?138) were randomly allocated to ‘included’ or ‘excluded’ conditions. Condition-dependent differences in pre/during-task heart rate and pre/post-task self-reports of negative/positive mood, and social self-esteem, were assessed.

Results: Included participants showed decreased heart rate and negative mood, and increased social self-esteem. No inclusion-related change in positive mood was shown. An increase in heart rate was observed in excluded participants though no changes in negative/positive mood or social self-esteem were shown. Shifts in social self-esteem acted as a mechanism through which inclusion/exclusion impacted upon negative and positive mood alterations. Results remained significant in presence of covariates (sex, global self-esteem, rumination and social anxiety).

Conclusion: Findings suggest that acting to enhance belonging through ‘inclusion’ resulted in adaptive physiological and psychological outcomes. Neutral and potentially protective responses were observed in the immediate aftermath of ‘exclusion’. Self-esteem served as one route through which these effects were transmitted.     

Kant’s “I think” and the agential approach to self-knowledge

ABSTRACT

This paper relates Kant’s account of pure apperception to the agential approach to self-knowledge. It argues that his famous claim ‘The I think must be able to accompany all of my representations’ (B131) does not concern the possibility of self-ascribing beliefs. Kant does advance this claim in the service of identifying an a priori warrant we have as psychological persons, that is, subjects of acts of thinking that are imputable to us. But this warrant is not one to self-knowledge that we have as critical reasoners. It is, rather, an a priori warrant we have, as thinkers, to prescribe to given representations their conformity to principles of thinking inherent in our capacity of understanding itself.     

Properties of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Abstract

While it is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different ‘kinds of being’ and identifies various ‘structures’ that compose them, there has been little discussion about what these kinds and structures of being are. This paper defends the ‘Property Thesis’, the position that kinds of being (and their structures) are properties of the entities that have them. I give two arguments for this thesis. The first is grounded in the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of being as ‘characteristics’ and ‘determinations’, which are just two different words for ‘properties’, in the broadest senses of these terms. The second argument is based on the fact that kinds and structures of being play three roles that properties are supposed to play: they account for similarities between things, they are what predicates express, and they are what abstract nouns refer to.     

How Personality and Reward Relate to Automobile Drivers' Judgments of Affordances Using Their Own Vehicles

Abstract

Researchers have long recognized the importance of psychological processes in motor vehicle safety, but ecological theory-based research on factors that might contribute to motor vehicle crashes has lagged. This study was designed to test factors that might influence motor vehicle drivers' judgments of passability and fit-ability affordances. In particular, the authors tested personality and behavioral reinforcement as factors that might influence automobile drivers' judgments of affordances in three tasks set at various π-numbers: driving forward through a gap, driving backward through a gap, and fitting into a parallel-parking spot. Results across two studies suggest that personality does not relate to judgment of driving environment affordances, but institution of a behavioral reward system causes drivers to judge affordances in different ways. Implications for future research and for automobile safety intervention are discussed.     

Ridwan’s conversion: kandoeri giving,moral personhood,and the re-imagining of communal difference in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

This article brings religious conversion and religious giving under one analytic lens in examining how ‘Ridwan’, a Chinese–Indonesian convert to Islam from the Indonesian province of Aceh, describes the process through which he became a Muslim. Ridwan frames his account of conversion in terms of religious giving, with special reference to Acehnese ritual feasts known as kandoeri. He draws attention to the way kandoeri giving constitutes a mode of relationality, in which careful attention to difference is the basis for reciprocity. His approach rests on what the anthropological theorist of The Gift, Marcel Mauss, identified as ‘moral persons’, a category that contrasts with liberal ideas of the self and identity. It reflects an awareness of the dual nature of exchange partners, who are always potentially both enemy and friend. This subtly challenges prevailing Indonesian understandings of intercommunal, especially interreligious, relations as well as common perceptions of Chinese–Indonesian religiosity and belonging.     

Affordances,context and sociality

Affordances, i.e. the opportunity of actions offered by the environment, are one of the central research topics for the theoretical perspectives that view cognition as emerging from the interaction between the environment and the body. Being at the bridge between perception and action, affordances help to question a dichotomous view of perception and action. While Gibson’s view of affordances is mainly externalist, many contemporary approaches define affordances (and micro-affordances) as the product of long-term visuomotor associations in the brain. These studies have emphasized the fact that affordances are activated automatically, independently from the context and the previous intention to act: for example, affordances related to objects’ size would emerge even if the task does not require focusing on size. This emphasis on the automaticity of affordances has led to overlook their flexibility and contextual-dependency. In this contribution I will outline and discuss recent perspectives and evidence that reveal the flexibility and context-dependency of affordances, clarifying how they are modulated by the physical, cultural and social context. I will focus specifically on social affordances, i.e. on how perception of affordances might be influenced by the presence of multiple actors having different goals.

     

Perceptually Equivalent Judgments Made Visually and via Haptic Sensory-Substitution Devices

ABSTRACT

According to the ecological theory of perception–action, perception is primarily of affordances, which are directly perceivable opportunities for behavior. The current study evaluated participants’ ability to use vision and haptic sensory-substitution devices to support perceptual judgments of affordances involving the task of passing through apertures. Sighted participants made perceptual judgments about whether they could walk through apertures of various widths and their level of confidence in each judgment, using unrestricted vision and, when blindfolded, using two haptic sensory-substitution instruments: a cane-like wooden rod and the Enactive Torch, a device that converts distance information into vibrotactile stimuli. The boundary between aperture widths that were judged as pass-through-able versus non-pass-through-able was statistically equivalent across sensory modalities. However, participants were not as confident in their judgments using the rod or Enactive Torch as they were using vision. Additionally, participants’ judgments with the haptic instruments were significantly more accurate than with vision. The results underscore the need to assess sensory-substitution devices in the context of functional behaviors.     

Nietzsche and the Empirical: through the eyes of the term ‘Empfindung’

Abstract

This paper examines Nietzsche’s attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of Empfindung (sensation, perception, feeling). In Section 1, five distinctive features of his use of ‘Empfmdung’ are described in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19^th Century physiology. All five features, I argue, point to Nietzsche’s philosophical concern to stake out the limits of ‘Empfmdung’ as an aspect of human finitude. In Section 2, my attention turns from the term ‘Empfmdung’ to Nietzsche’s actual argumentation. The bewildering variety of perspectives and arguments concerning ‘Empfmdung’ in his writings are broken down into three basic types of argument or discourse with radically different, incompatible presuppositions: a critical, epistemological discourse serving anti-metaphysical ends; a quasi-scientific discourse serving critical-epistemological ends; and a quasi-ontological discourse of life that looks to explain the results of Nietzsche’s critical epistemology. The value of this ‘contradictory’ practice, I contend, is twofold: Nietzsche makes epistemology fruitful for the philosophical problem of life; at the same time he offers a performative critique of epistemology by the manner in which he exceeds it.     

Some Issues with ‘Some Issues in Human Sexuality’

Abstract

In December 2003 the House of Bishops' Group on Issues in Human Sexuality published their ‘discussion document’, Some Issues in Human Sexuality: A Guide to the Debate (London: Church House Publishing, 2003). The document is a guide to the theological debate on questions that have arisen in response to the 1991 House of Bishops report, Issues in Human Sexuality (see p. ix). This article is a contribution to the discussion. I first question whether the document is a ‘guide’ and whether the quarrels between Anglicans are best designated a ‘debate’. Then within the limits of a single article I illustrate from the first three chapters grave problems of omission, of biblical interpretation, and of ethical development.     

What if Wittgenstein could speak Japanese?

ABSTRACT

Wittgenstein’s criticism of the notion of ‘private language’ is related to the putative centrality of “being“ and the ‘subject-predicate’ distinction . However, his efforts would prove to be more fruitful if he could use data from Japanese language. There is a list of Japanese terms to translate ‘being’: sonzai, de-aru, ga-aru, and iru. Among all of their variants, the only subject-predicate-form-related expression is the combination of the ‘Y ga Z aru’-part of ‘X wa Y ga Z aru.’ Hence, Japanese subject-predicate-form-related expressions are not as fundamental as their western counterparts. Insofar as ‘pain’ is concerned, in Japanese, there are two series of expressions on pain: in the first one, the notion of pain is deobjectied and hence immune to subject-predicate logic, while in the second one, it is barely objectified in a limited sense. Hence, a Japanese speaker could avoid the fallacy of attributing subjective sensations to a particular person.