A Reconsideration of Indirect Duties Regarding Non-Human Organisms

According to indirect duty views, human beings lack direct moral duties to non-human organisms, but our direct duties to ourselves and other humans give rise to indirect duties regarding non-humans. On the orthodox interpretation of Kant’s account of indirect duties, one should abstain from treating organisms in ways that render one more likely to violate direct duties to humans. This indirect duty view is subject to several damaging objections, such as that it misidentifies the moral reasons we have to treat non-humans in certain ways and that it sanctions only weak obligations vis-à-vis organisms. I develop an alternative indirect duty view: given a direct duty to oneself to cultivate virtuous dispositions, one has an indirect duty to abstain from treating organisms in ways that erode one’s virtues or develop vices. I argue that this indirect duty view strictly proscribes knowingly causing unnecessary harm to organisms, and I show that it is not subject to the damaging objections directed against the indirect duty view attributed to Kant by the orthodox interpretation. This suggests that indirect duty views are more worthy of consideration than is often supposed.     

Evolutionary Ethics and the Status of Non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT If we accept that the behaviour of humans and other animals is very substantially channelled by evolutionary constraints, it might appear that there can be no place for animals within the protection of a human system of morality.
However, the nature of plausible evolutionary constraints on the cognition of social animals, including humans, suggests that this is not so. It is likely that the most important element in our morality is the capacity to imagine the feelings of other individuals, and this capacity is so important for our ability to understand and predict their behaviour that it would be likely to be preserved by evolution even if moral behaviour had no survival value in its own right. We also use this kind of imaginative sympathy to understand and predict the behaviour of other animals, and it is this which provides the main reason for the inclusion of such animals within a human moral system. The primitive elements of morality have a survival value that is probably common to many other social species of animals. Since one of our reasons for putting a special value on human life is the human capacity for moral behaviour, we ought also to view members of these species as being of special significance.     

Harm in the Wild: Facing Non-Human Suffering in Nature

The paper is concerned with whether the reductio of the natural-harm-argument can be avoided by disvaluing non-human suffering and death. According to the natural-harm-argument, alleviating the suffering of non-human animals is not a moral obligation for human beings because such an obligation would also morally prescribe human intervention in nature for the protection of non-human animal interests which, it claims, is absurd. It is possible to avoid the reductio by formulating the moral obligation to alleviate non-human suffering and death with two constraints: The first concerns the practicability of intervention and establishes a moral obligation to intervene only in cases where this is humanly possible. The other constraint acknowledges that lack of competence in humans can risk producing more harm than good by intervening. A third way of avoiding the problematic version of the natural-harm-argument considers whether human and non-human suffering and death are sufficiently different to allow different types of responses. I argue that the attempt to avoid the reductio of the natural-harm-argument by disvaluing non-human death can only work with an anthropocentric bias, which accords to non-human suffering and death a fundamentally different value and that it fails to dismiss the moral obligation created by the harm that non-human animals face in the wild.     

Germline Manipulation and Our Future Worlds

Two genetic technologies capable of making heritable changes to the human genome have revived interest in, and in some quarters a very familiar panic concerning, so-called germline interventions. These technologies are: most recently the use of CRISPR/Cas9 to edit genes in non-viable IVF zygotes and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy (MRT) the use of which was approved in principle in a landmark vote earlier this year by the United Kingdom Parliament. The possibility of using either of these techniques in humans has encountered the most violent hostility and suspicion. However it is important to be aware that much of this hostility dates back to the fears associated with In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) and other reproductive technologies and by cloning; fears which were baseless at the time concerning both IVF and cloning the use of both of which have proved to be highly beneficial to humanity and which have been effectively regulated and controlled. This paper argues that CRISPR should by pursued through researh until it is safe enough for use in humans but there is no reason to suppose at this stage that such use will be unsafe or unethical (Collins 2015).     

Therapeutic Interventions

This article has two aims. One is addressed to practitioners, to say to them that too big a distinction is being drawn between interpretations and other interventions, and in particular that the term directive is being wrongly used. This militates against important moves toward the integration of different therapies. The other is addressed to researchers, to say to them that their research will be inadequate to the extent that they ignore many of the interventions used in therapy. Both of these aims are eventually served by the provision of a list of interventions running the whole continuum from non-directive to more directive. By looking at this list, we can become more aware of the range of what is possible in psychotherapy, and also of where the standard types of interpretations come in the scheme of things. It seems as though the wide range of interventions available in psychotherapy represents one of the ways in which it differs from counseling.     

The Ethics of Germline Gene Editing

Germline Gene Editing (GGE) has enormous potential both as a research tool and a therapeutic intervention. While other types of gene editing are relatively uncontroversial, GGE has been strongly resisted. In this article, we analyse the ethical arguments for and against pursuing GGE by allowing and funding its development. We argue there is a strong case for pursuing GGE for the prevention of disease. We then examine objections that have been raised against pursuing GGE and argue that these fail. We conclude that the moral case in favour of pursuing GGE is stronger than the case against. This suggests that pursuing GGE is morally permissible and indeed morally desirable.     

On Deconstructive Interventions

Deconstructive interventions challenge the group, thought, and language itself. They are common and frequent. When we say, “stay in the room,” redirect attention to a disregarded or unnoticed interaction, symbolic or real, play with words and metaphors, or even raise a quizzical eyebrow, we are making a deconstructive intervention.

I distinguish among three types of deconstruction and show their relevance to our work via clinical anecdotes. Transformative deconstructions seek to dismantle one set of conventions to supplement or supplant with another to create new meaning. Reflective deconstructions mine for and analyze alternative meanings of any set of communicative conventions. Diversity deconstructions direct attention to social and political meanings—and consequences–of specific narratives, based on power relations and status, as pertaining to gender, sexual orientation, age, race, or ethnicity.     

Modern Family Interventions

In this modern era, the family, and each member therein, is subjected to new socio-environmental pressures. This article advocates that family interventions must be consonant with the modern era, considers the critical components of contemporary mental health services, and offers ten guidelines for the family therapist's adoption and adaptation of clinical practices that will be appropriate for the modern era.     

Nonbinary-Affirming Psychological Interventions

Nonbinary individuals experience unique stressors and stigma compared to binary transgender individuals. Given the many social systems that operate on a binary gender system, nonbinary individuals frequently experience microaggressions, discrimination, and harassment and suffer from high rates of negative mental health outcomes as a result. The unique stressors that nonbinary individuals face warrant specific clinical considerations for working with this population. Yet, limited published clinical guidance exists on working with nonbinary clients. This article uses minority stress theory to understand the unique stressors and mental health risks that nonbinary individuals face, a cultural competency framework to describe affirming practices, and ecological theory to contextualize how mental health providers can intervene and support nonbinary individuals. Concrete micro-, mezzo-, and macro-level interventions are provided for clinicians to enact to support the well-being of nonbinary clients including affirming the client’s experience of gender, taking a stance of openness and flexibility, and advocating for inclusive policies and practices.     

Precis: Enactivist Interventions

Philosophical Studies -