The Others: Finding and Counting America's Invisible Churches

The 2010 U. S. Religious Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Survey (RCMS) is the most comprehensive picture of U.S. religious life, county by county. How thorough is the RCMS in covering local religious groups? To answer this question, three county snapshots were performed with collected data compared to the RCMS 2010 reported numbers. Data suggest that there has been an underreport by as much as 25 percent of the number of local congregations in these counties. New and emerging religious movements and denominations as well as ethnic congregations comprise much of this percentage, making it more imperative for scholars to develop methodologies and frameworks in order to capture these “others” and invisible churches in America.     

Reasons,Motivations, and Obligations

I argue against Reasons Internalism, the view that possession of a normative reason for the performance of an action entails that one can be motivated to perform that action, and Motivational Existence Internalism, the view that if one is obligated to perform an action, then one can be motivated to perform that action. My thesis is that these positions cannot accommodate the fact that reasonable moral agents are frequently motivated to act only because they believe their contemplated actions to be morally obligatory. The failure to accommodate this fact is reason to reject these two types of internalism about reasons.     

Helping Others Shows Differential Benefits on Health and Well-being for Male and Female Teens

Objectives Adults who engage in altruistic social interest behaviors experience better mental health and have lower mortality rates than non-altruistic adults. The present study investigated the relationship between altruism and health and well-being in teens, and demographic and lifestyle variables. Methods A cross-sectional survey was implemented with a national sample of teens recruited through the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). Measures included the PedsQL, the Ryff Psychological Well-Being Scale, and a new self-report scale of Altruism (subscales: Receiving/ Providing Emotional Support, Family Helping Behavior, General Helping Behavior, and Helping Orientation). Results Data were collected from 457 teens (M age = 15.6, sd 1.2). Psychometric analyses revealed that a five-factor model fit the altruism data well. Multivariate regression revealed no association between providing emotional support and psychosocial health. There were, however, many associations between altruism and well-being, and differential associations by gender. Family helping was the most salient aspect of altruism for males, showing associations with positive social relations, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. For females, General Helping Behavior was associated with positive social relations, and Helping Orientation was associated with better purpose in life. Family Helping was associated with better physical health in females, but not for males. The only correlates of altruism were higher age, more physical activity, and engaging in positive religious coping. Conclusions Altruism is positively associated with health for females and with well-being for both males and females. Different gender-specific interventions to guide teens in doing more altruistic activities may have to be designed to capitalize on these different associations.

Care Ethics and Obligations to Future Generations

A dominant area of inquiry within intergenerational ethics concerns how goods (and bads) ought to be justly distributed between noncontemporaries. Contractualist theories of justice that have broached these discussions have often centered on the concepts of mutual advantage and (indirect) reciprocal cooperation between rational, self‐interested beings. However, another prominent reason that many in the present feel that they have obligations toward future generations is not due to self‐interested reciprocity, but simply because they care about what happens to them. Care ethics promises to be conceptually well‐suited for articulating this latter reason: given that future generations are in a perpetual condition of dependency on present‐day people's actions, this is precisely the kind of relational structure that care theorists should be interested in morally evaluating. Unfortunately, the care literature has been largely silent on intergenerational ethics. This article aims to advance this literature, offering the blueprints of what a care ethic concerning future generations—a “future care ethic”—should look like. The resultant ethic defends a sufficientarian theory of obligation: people in the present ought to ensure the conditions needed to encourage and sustain a world that enables good caring relations to flourish.     

Collective Obligations: Their Existence,Their Explanatory Power,and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals

In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of (moral) obligation: those which have individuals as their subject, and those which have groups of individuals as their subject. I use the name collective obligations to refer to obligations of the second sort. I argue that there are collective obligations, in this sense; that such obligations can give rise to and explain obligations which fall on individuals; that because of these facts collective obligations are not simply reducible to individual obligations; and that collective obligations supervene on individual obligations, without being reducible to them. The sort of supervenience I have in mind here is what is sometimes called ‘global supervenience’. In other words, there cannot be two worlds which differ in respect of the collective obligations which exist in them without also differing in respect of the individual obligations which exist in them.     

Globalization and the Soul—According to Teilhard, Friedman, and Others

Thomas L. Friedman's recent book on globalization, The Lexus and the Olive Tree , sees a religious value in globalization: "globalization emerges from below … from people's very souls and from their deepest aspirations" (1999, 338). Pierre Teilhard de Chardin made similar claims in 1920, calling globalization the "deep-rooted religious movement of our age" (Teilhard 1979, 211). He came to this awareness through his experience in World War I. There he began connecting globalization to its roots in evolution and to the mystics' desire for the "All," a desire he saw animating the work of believing and unbelieving scientists. He found confirmation of his ideas in the letters of Saint Paul, who told of God eventually filling all things. Teilhard used the vocabulary of mysticism to describe global developments in technology, industry, politics, and the environment, and the ardor of his texts has led to their being widely used for secular gatherings on global subjects.     

Moral Individualism,Moral Relationalism,and Obligations to Non‐human Animals

Moral individualists like Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer argue that our moral obligations to animals, both human and non‐human, are grounded in the morally salient capacities of those animals. By contrast, what might be called moral relationalists argue that our obligations to non‐human animals are grounded in our relationship to them. Moral relationalists are of various kinds, from relationalists regarding assistance to animals, such as Clare Palmer and Elizabeth Anderson, to relationalists grounded in a Wittgensteinian view of human practice, such as Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. This article argues that there are, in fact, two distinct types of moral reasons, those based on salient capacities and those based on relationships. Neither type of reason is reducible to the other, and there is no third type to which to reduce them both. Any attempt at reduction would run counter to deep intuitions about our moral relation to non‐human animals as well as to other humans. Among the implications of this is that certain kinds of arguments, such as the argument from marginal cases, seem to be incomplete precisely because they do not capture the complexity of our moral relations to non‐human animals.     

Luck,the Range of Obligations,and Frankfurt Examples

Abstract

The following two principles are invoked to argue, first, for the view that it is often a matter of luck (or beyond our control) to avoid performing many garden-variety sorts of acts in everyday life that are seemingly obligatory for us. It is impossible for one to perform an action that is morally obligatory for one unless one could have done otherwise; and it is impossible for one to perform an action without having some pro-attitude to perform it. Next, the view is defended that if our being able to do otherwise is frequently a matter of luck, then the range of obligations for each of us is narrower—perhaps far narrower—than we may have hitherto believed.