Psychics,aliens, or experience? Using the Anomalistic Belief Scale to examine the relationship between type of belief and probabilistic reasoning

A growing body of research has shown people who hold anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs may differ from nonbelievers in their propensity to make probabilistic reasoning errors. The current study explored the relationship between these beliefs and performance through the development of a new measure of anomalistic belief, called the Anomalistic Belief Scale (ABS). One key feature of the ABS is that it includes a balance of both experiential and theoretical belief items. Another aim of the study was to use the ABS to investigate the relationship between belief and probabilistic reasoning errors on conjunction fallacy tasks. As expected, results showed there was a relationship between anomalistic belief and propensity to commit the conjunction fallacy. Importantly, regression analyses on the factors that make up the ABS showed that the relationship between anomalistic belief and probabilistic reasoning occurred only for beliefs about having experienced anomalistic phenomena, and not for theoretical anomalistic beliefs.     

迷信心理研究述评

迷信在西方心理学界一直是一个比较热门的研究课题,而国内心理研究者对这方面的研究还没有给予足够的重视。文章从迷信的定义、理论以及影响因素三个方面对迷信心理研究做了阐述,并总结了目前迷信心理研究的不足：首先,到目前为止迷信的定义还没有得到统一。其次,迷信心理理论研究还有待进一步完善。再次,对迷信心理的影响因素研究结果存在较大的争论,迷信心理测量工具的信效度以及文化适用性有待进一步检验。迷信心理研究今后应在迷信内涵、测量工具以及实证研究方面进行深入探索     

3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies

An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad.     

基础概率在贝叶斯推理中的作用

针对贝叶斯推理研究中基础概率忽略现象的争论,直接操纵基础概率水平,考察被试在贝叶斯推理时是否加工了基础概率信息。结果表明,低基础概率组后验概率估计显著低,无基础概率组后验概率估计反应时显著短于有基础概率组。被试在各种条件下估计的正确率都较低,说明对基础概率在贝叶斯推理中的作用考虑不充分。     

The blaze of her splendors: Suggestions about revitalizing fallacy theory

Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make fallacy theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies.     

Erosion of Belief and Disbelief: Effects of Religiosity and Negative Affect on Beliefs in the Paranormal and Supernatural

Abstract

The authors investigated the effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural among 94 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes at a small, private U.S. university. They hypothesized that religiosity would predict differential beliefs in the supernatural versus the paranormal but that negative affect would attenuate these beliefs. In addition, the authors predicted that belief in the supernatural and negative affect would interact to predict belief in the paranormal. Overall, the results were consistent with predictions. The religious participants were skeptical of paranormal phenomena but were accepting of supernatural phenomena. In addition, increased reports of negative affect over the preceding year appeared to attenuate belief in the supernatural for the religious participants. By contrast, for the nonreligious participants, increased belief in both the supernatural and paranormal was predicted when reports of negative affect were high. Finally, the interaction of supernatural belief and negative affect significantly predicted belief in the paranormal.     

大学生迷信心理的形成及其影响因素

在全面总结近三十年来国内外相关研究成果的基础上,对大学生迷信心理的形成及其影响因素做了深入探讨。文章首先梳理了迷信的概念;其次从观察学习、归因和自我认同三个方面反思了大学生迷信心理形成的心理机制;并从性别、人格控制点、自尊和自我效能、认知风格和受暗示性、不确定性情境、压力情境等方面分析了大学生迷信心理的影响因素;最后指出了以往研究中存在的局限,并对未来的相关研究做出了展望     

Phenomenological Argumentative Structure

The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions – they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure – for legitimacy, and because these tests affect people's lives. This paper attempts to construct an adequate and appropriate representation of such structure, that is, the logical structure that an argument is perceived to have by mature reasoners, albeit ones who are untrained in logic.     

Reasoning about complex probabilistic concepts in childhood

The competencies of children, particularly their understanding of the more complex probabilistic concepts, have not been thoroughly investigated. In the present study participants were required to choose the more likely of two events, a single event, and a joint event (conjunctive or disjunctive). It was predicted that the operation of the representativeness heuristic would result in erroneous judgements when children compared an unlikely component event with a likely-unlikely conjunction (the conjunction fallacy) and when a likely component event was compared to a likely-unlikely disjunction. The results supported the first prediction with both older children aged between 9 and 10 years and younger children aged between 4 and 5 committing the conjunction fallacy. However, the second prediction was not confirmed. It is proposed that the basis of representativeness judgements may differ between the conjunctive and disjunctive cases with absolute frequency information possibly playing a differential role.