Field Theory in Psychoanalysis,Part 2: Bionian Field Theory and Contemporary Interpersonal/Relational Psychoanalysis

This article is the second part of an examination of field theory in psychoanalysis. In this article, contemporary Bionian field theory, primarily the work of Antonino Ferro, is compared with contemporary interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis.     

Field Conditions: Discussion of Donnel B. Stern's Field Theory in Psychoanalysis

In this discussion we applaud Donnel B. Stern for undertaking his rigorous comparison of the “field” concept in interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis (IRP) and Bionian field theory (BFT). Stern offers a balanced presentation of similarities and differences between these two conceptual models, but we focus primarily on certain differences, starting with what we perceive as differing notions of the nature, purpose, and clinical function of the field itself. We distinguish the interactional view of an essentially relational model of the field in IRP (where the clinical aim is to enlarge the domain of the interpersonal dialogue and the capacity for mutual recognition) from the BFT model of a field viewed in terms of emergent phenomena, realized in multiple modalities of experience (here the clinical aim is to expand the scope of contact with unconscious life and to facilitate the capacity to transform emotional, psycho-sensory and proto-emotional experience). We also take up the differing relationships to external reality and authority within these two models, with special reference to the role of the frame in the function of the field.     

Field Theory in Psychoanalysis,Part I: Harry Stack Sullivan and Madeleine and Willy Baranger

This is the first of two articles comparing conceptions of the field in interpersonal/relational psychoanalysis (IRP) and Bionian field theory (BFT). This article compares the thinking of the originators of IRP and BFT, Harry Stack Sullivan and Madeleine and Willy Baranger.     

Field of Vision: Radical Uncertainty and the Analyst's Conduct: Commentary on Paper by Donnel B. Stern

There is a relationship between biography and theory. The analyst's ideas or formulations about his patients—theories really—must be determined, to some degree, by the certain and uncertain impact of his own history. Harry Stack Sullivan brought psychoanalysis squarely into the ambit of the relational/historical world by insisting that the mind is thoroughly and inherently social. In doing so, he staked a claim for the link between history, that is, social experience, and personhood. Our personalities and our theories are social-historical constructions. In relation to this, some differences between the interpersonal/relational and Bionian concepts of field theory are provided. One important difference pertains to the role of the analyst's conduct. Two meanings of conduct—to behave or to organize behavior—are at the center of what distinguishes the interpersonal/relational view of the analyst's position in the field from the Bionian view. For the relational analyst, action in the analytic field, including enactment, is conduct, and conduct is always bidirectional. The analyst, then, is a medium to alter, to reconstruct the self. He does not provide experience, he is experience. The form of an analytic exchange gives shape to the field and its content.     

The Coparticipant Field: Commentary on a Paper by Juan Tubert-Oklander

Psychoanalytic field theory is integral to relational praxis. In his study of the analytic field and its interpersonal complexities and relational intricacies, Tubert-Oklander emphasizes its clinical promise. Tubert-Oklander's field orientation, however, is a conservative and limited one. This commentary proposes a new, more radical coparticipant theory of analytic praxis.

As a unique form of clinical participation, coparticipant inquiry is marked by an emphasis on patients' and analysts' relational mutuality, coequal analytic authority, and dyadic uniqueness. Coparticipant inquiry represents both a one-person and two-person psychology—an integral of classical individualism and the social emphasis of the interpersonal/relational viewpoint. Coparticipant analysis calls for a new, multidimensional concept of the self that reconciles the seeming paradox that we are simultaneously communal and individual beings—from birth embedded in a series of social field, yet always uniquely individual. This psychoanalytic dialectic between personal, nonrelational selfic “I” processes and an interpersonal “me” pattern brings into relational play such concepts as will, self-determination, and agency. Coparticipation promotesatechnically freer, more self-expressive, and spontaneous inquiryandemphasizesthecurativeimmediacyofnewrelationalexperience.

I have believed for a long time that human

nature is a reciprocity of what is inside the skin

and what is outside; that it is definitely not

“rolled up inside us” but our way of being one

with our fellows and our world. I call this field

theory.

—Gardner Murphy     

Living Entities that Join and Separate Us: A Discussion of “Trump Cards and Klein Bottles: On the Collective of the Individual”

González’s paper (this issue) strives to deepen the field of psychoanalytic thinking and the growing body of theory bridging psyche and society, by reaching to group theory and fashioning an unconscious internal structure for the social links alive within us. His paper represents an incredibly ambitious, rich, and highly complex synthesis of aspects of classical theory, object relations, relational, neo-Kleinian, Winnicottian, intersectional, feminist, multiple group, link, and critical social psychoanalytic theories. In my discussion I will position González’s ideas within the matrix of the Bionian psychic apparatus and field theories; followed by a response to his personal and clinical examples of the collective in the individual in the aftermath of the Trump election, and the challenges before us.     

A Discussion of “Field Theory and the Dream Sense: Continuing the Comparison of Interpersonal/Relational Theory and Bionian Field Theory”

My discussion of Dr. Stern’s comparative paper (this issue) of Relational and Bionian perspectives focuses primarily on the difficulties in comparing two psychoanalytic clinical approaches. Each theory has its underlying assumptions, vocabulary, and sometimes idiosyncratic usages of the same term. Furthermore, when one individual trained in a particular perspective attempts to compare two theories, one of which he or she is steeped in, the comparison is always challenging. It is nearly impossible to ignore our own psychoanalytic training history which surely affects one’s views since we are often speaking different languages.     

Analysts in Search of an Author: Voltaire or Artemisia Gentileschi? Commentary on “Field Theory in Psychoanalysis,Part 2: Bionian Field Theory and Contemporary Interpersonal/Relational Psychoanalysis” by Donnel B. Stern

The authors comment on Stern's characterization of differences between interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis and Bionian field theory. The critical points on which a consensus is not, for the time being, readily possible concern the relationship between the external and internal worlds and the various conceptions of unconscious experience. They believe that, before forging a link with the external world (whose role we would be foolish to deny), it is clinically more useful to apprehend this internal world as rigorously and over as wide a range as possible—which they do by radically transforming the external world into a dream of the field. Conversely, in their view we may be reassured but partly misled by the concept of a dialectic between the external and internal worlds that fails to take account of the utter pervasiveness of the unconscious and the fact that it speaks even when seemingly silent—not only negatively in micro- and macroenactments but also positively in waking dream thought, which is an expression of its poetic activity that unceasingly confers meaning on experience.     

THE SECOND SPHERE AND THE STORY OF NO STORY

The author discusses Roy Schafer's ideas of the second self and second reality, as well as his consistent theme of storyteller and story. The latter theme is also explored in the context of more recent psychoanalytic influences, such as Bionian thought, trauma theory, the French approach, and the interpersonal perspective. To illustrate the idea of the nonstory in today's clinical encounters, the author presents two clinical vignettes.     

Field Theory: Commentary on Paper by Donnel B. Stern

Stern offers a compelling introduction to a comparative theory of the field in his examination of its origins in the work of Harry Stack Sullivan and of Madeleine and Willy Baranger. Although he notes that Sullivan and the Barangers developed their field concepts separately, I suggest that there is a common context, and I detail this in regard to the early history of the concept, particularly in regard to Merleau-Ponty. Stern describes well the points of common use of the field concept and highlights differences that are the defining line between relational thinking and other orientations. In his view, the Barangers do not adequately take into account the analyst's inevitable participation and do not in the end step out of framing the unconscious as an internal process. I question this reading and ask how we might benefit from an “epistemological pluralism” that would invite working from diverse perspectives.     

The Interpersonal Field: Its Place in American Psychoanalysis

Today the concept of the interpersonal field, while seldom credited to those who created it, is widely used in psychoanalysis. After reviewing how the concept of the field defines interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis, I take up the rejection of the idea in American mainstream psychoanalysis in the decades just after it was proposed by Sullivan and Fromm, why that rejection took place, and how the entire discipline of psychoanalysis in North America might have fared if the idea had been widely recognized earlier than it was.     

The Dream Sense,Emergent Clinical Process,and the Question of Symmetry: Reply to Brown and Colombo

In recent years I have become interested in Bion and neo-Bionian field theory, but the origin of my interest in dreaming does not lie in scholarly or clinical sources. The source of the idea of the dream sense is my own experience. After addressing that point, I reject what appears to be Colombo’s impression (this issue) that detailed inquiry is necessarily the basis of interpersonal and relational clinical practice, and then take issue with Brown’s understanding of expressive participation in relational thinking (this issue). Responding to Brown’s wish that I offer more detail about my own clinical process, I present an overview of my understanding of the way I work. I conclude by addressing the understandings offered by the discussants of symmetry in the analytic relationship, and offering more details of my own.     

The Whole and the Parts: Working in the Analytic Field

Field concepts have been imported from physics into psychology and philosophy, in the work of writers such as Kurt Lewin and Maurice Merleu-Ponty. In psychoanalysis, they are found in the work of Harry Stack Sullivan, Enrique Pichon-Rivière, and Willy and Madeleine Baranger. They are essential for relational analysis, where everything than happens in the analytic situation is considered to depend on both parties of the analytic relationship. The analytic situation is understood as a two-person setup, in which neither party can be conceived without the other, because they are inescapably bound and complementary. This is called a “dynamic field,” and it corresponds to an experiential configuration that changes and evolves in time. Insight is better understood as a restructuring of the field, a gradual development of both parties' understanding of their shared unconscious situation. In this paper I discuss the main ideas posed by the Barangers, as well as my own, and present a clinical vignette to illustrate the phenomenology of the field.     

Emotions and interpersonal relationships: toward a person-centered conceptualization of emotions and coping

ABSTRACT This essay describes my theory of emotions. I make a case for studying discrete emotions in the context of four processes that represent the central features of my theoretical system: appraising, coping, flow of actions and reactions, and relational meaning. I explain why coping is a key feature of the emotion process, and I discuss issues related to the measurement of coping and the importance of understanding coping processes in the context of personality and situational demands. I make the argument that emotions are best studied as narratives, and I offer one such narrative in the form of a case study to demonstrate how emotions can best be understood in the context of an interpersonal relationship and by considering individual differences, interpersonal transactions, and relational meaning. I conclude this essay with a caution that field specialization may interfere with our understanding of emotions and other psychological phenomena, and I underscore the virtues of ipsative-normative research designs as a way to move closer to a person-centered personality psychology.     

Intersubjectivity Theory and the Dilemma of Intersubjective Motivation

This paper explores the topic of intersubjective motivation, understood as the process of being motivated by the subjectivity of other subjects. The author outlines a general conception of intersubjective motivation, arguing for the importance of that conception in advancing the relational project within psychoanalysis. The author reviews a handful of relational and intersubjective approaches, identifying and evaluating strategies that might be employed to explain the phenomenon of intersubjective motivation. Using Jessica Benjamin's theory of intersubjectivity as a starting point, the author proposes an original model of the intrapsychic conditions for intersubjective motivation identified as the intersubjective relational configuration. The clinical implications of these ideas are traced out, and an argument is made for the development of a comprehensive psychoanalytic theory of motivation, one that includes intrapsychic as well as intersubjective elements.     

Relational Turbulence Theory: Explaining Variation in Subjective Experiences and Communication Within Romantic Relationships

This essay extends the relational turbulence model as a framework for understanding communication in romantic relationships. Following the relational turbulence model, relational turbulence theory identifies relational uncertainty and interdependence as parameters that shape subjective experiences, but the theory clarifies the theoretical processes underlying their distinctive effects. In addition, relational turbulence theory articulates causal processes linking cognitive appraisals and emotions to communication. Relational turbulence theory also describes how episodes characterized by biased appraisals, intense emotions, and volatile communication coalesce into global evaluations of relationships as turbulent. In turn, the theory addresses the effect of relational turbulence on personal, relational, and social outcomes. Finally, the theory explains how communication can contribute to the development of both turbulence and resilience in romantic relationships.     

Social relationships: the nature and function of relational schemas

This paper reviews developments in the field of close relationships from an interdependence theory perspective. It concludes that focusing on the relational, dyadic aspects of relationships has led to a much better understanding of social cognition and of interpersonal processes. In this vein, the nature and function of relational schemas seems a particularly promising new direction for research. It encompasses recent work on self‐in‐relation‐to‐other schema structure, the organization of schemas in cognitive networks, motivated construal in service of a need for felt security, and the dynamics of attachment and dependency regulation. Despite some impressive advances in research on close relationships, however, a more social psychological emphasis on the causal influence of features of social situations on cognition and behavior is important for the future health of the field. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Problem of Thinking in Black and White: Race in the South African Clinical Dyad

Race, as it presents itself within the clinical dyad as an aspect of the relationship between therapist and patient, has scarcely been written about from an experience-near perspective within the South African context. This paper focuses on the difficulty of speaking and writing about race. It contends that race as a construct and as an aspect of subjectivity has the potential to interrupt the therapist’s capacity to think, in Bionian terms, and to prevent entry into the reverie that is crucial to the creation of an analytic third. Written through a relational psychoanalytic lens and drawing on the concepts of the normative unconscious and the anti-analytic third, the paper refers to clinical vignettes to illustrate the collapse in thinking and the progression to beginning to think, anew, about the race-nuanced, intersubjective space between patient and therapist.     

Unformulated experience,dissociation, and Nachträglichkeit

The paper is divided into two parts. The first part is an interpersonal/relational psychoanalytic account of some relationships between dissociation, time, and unformulated experience. Trauma, and the dissociation to which trauma leads, freezes time, which makes it impossible to formulate certain kinds of new experience. Instead, potential new meanings remain unformulated. The route of clinical access to frozen time is the interpersonal field: to thaw time and allow new experience, the ways in which the interpersonal field is itself frozen need to be addressed. A clinical illustration of these ideas is offered. The second part of the paper presents and explores a point of confluence between the views in Part 1 and certain aspects of French psychoanalysis, with particular reference to the concept of Nachträglichkeit in the work of Jean Laplanche and Haydée Faimberg.