Criminal defenses and pleas in mitigation based on amnesia

Criminal defendants often claim to suffer from amnesia in connection with the events that are the basis of the criminal charges made against them. These claims present difficult problems of proof. Moreover, there are various defenses and opportunities to make pleas in mitigation which present a number of contexts in which evidence of amnesia can be introduced into the criminal trial. This article will examine the significance of amnesia in relation to: (1) a defense based on lack of mens rea; (2) a defense based on diminished capacity; (3) the insanity defense; (4) lack of fitness to stand trial; and (5) sentencing and the death penalty.     

Bad or Mad? Personality disorders and legal responsibility-the German situation

Criminal offenders have a high rate of personality disorders (PDS), especially Antisocial Personality Disorders and psychopathy, but criminal acts are not necessarily the result of PD. Findings from psychiatric research suggest that the development of PD is influenced by genetic factors, that can result in deviant traits in temper, emotionality and cognitive style. There is general agreement that those peculiarities and vulnerabilities find their expression and structure only under a complex interplay of stimulating or impairing environmental influences. Do these genetic factors-or other factors-diminish a person's criminal responsibility? There is no difficulty in diagnosing PDs, but the challenging questions arise in forensic assessments of defendants for criminal responsibility who have a PD. This article discusses the German legal situation and special problems created by the term of "diminished" criminal responsibility. In contrast to the Anglo-American legal situation, the German criminal law obliges the court to order an indeterminate forensic - psychiatric confinement, in addition to punishment, if the offender had acted under diminished criminal responsibility and is now still considered to be dangerous. The convicted offender remains under the control of the criminal court during psychiatric hospitalization. The change from handling the personality disordered offender as a criminal to handling him as someone with a mental disorder creates a social option for extended state interventions, including indeterminate hospitalization.     

The guilty mind and criminal sentencing: integrating legal and empirical inquiry as illustrated by capital sentencing

We articulate an interpretation of mens rea that is broader than the traditional special sense but narrower than the traditional general sense. Mens rea in this intermediate sense addresses the guilty mind required by the sentencing criteria for specific criminal sentences for particular offenses. We advance an analytic structure for the integration of legal and empirical inquiry regarding standards of culpability that establish eligibility for capital punishment under contemporary United States legal doctrine. This structure addresses legal standards of culpability directly as well as indirectly in the form of evolving standards of decency. The general form of this analysis should be applicable more generally to sentencing provisions that address culpability as a sentencing consideration for other criminal sentences.     

How type of excuse defense, mock juror age, and defendant age affect mock jurors' decisions

The authors investigated the effects of mock juror age (younger vs. older), defendant age (22 vs. 65), and type of excuse defense used by defendants (a highly self-inflicted condition, Cocaine Dependency Disorder, vs. a less self-inflicted condition, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) on mock juror decisions. Ninety-six younger and 96 older adults read a scenario and answered a questionnaire. Results indicated that the defendant using the highly self-inflicted excuse was more likely to receive a guilty verdict and a longer sentence than was the defendant using the less self-inflicted excuse. Older jurors were more certain of their verdicts and saw the defendant as more responsible for his condition than did younger jurors. Defendant age did not affect juror decisions. In addition, excuse type and juror age affected the jurors' perceptions of the victim's responsibility for the attack. The authors discuss the potential influence of juror age on perceptions of defendant responsibility.     

Factors associated with experts' opinions regarding criminal responsibility in The Netherlands

In many jurisdictions, offenders need to have freely chosen to commit their crimes in order to be punishable. A mental defect or disorder may be a reason for diminished or total absence of criminal responsibility and may remove culpability. This study aims to provide an empirically based understanding of the factors on which experts base their judgements concerning criminal responsibility. Clinical, demographic and crime related variables, as well as MMPI-2 profiles, were collected from final reports concerning defendants of serious crime submitted to the observation clinic of the Dutch Ministry of Justice for a criminal responsibility assessment. Criminal responsibility was expressed along a five-point scale corresponding to the Dutch legal practice. Results showed that several variables contributed independently to experts' opinions regarding criminal responsibility: diagnosis (Axis I and II), cultural background, type of weapon used in committing the crime, and whether the defendant committed the crime alone or with others. In contract to jurisdictions involving a sane/insane dichotomy, the Dutch five-point scale of criminal responsibility revealed that Axis II personality disorders turned out to be mostly associated with a diminished responsibility. MMPI-2 scores also turned out to have a small contribution to experts' opinions on criminal responsibility, independently of mere diagnostic variables. These results suggest that experts base their judgements not only on the presence or absence of mental disorders, but also on cultural and crime related characteristics, as well as dimensional information about the defendant's personality and symptomatology.     

Can defendants with mental retardation successfully fake their performance on a test of competence to stand trial?

The purpose of this study was to determine whether criminal defendants with mental retardation can feign poor performance on a test of competence to stand trial. Four groups of adjudicated criminal defendants were given a test of competence to stand trial. In the experimental condition, defendants with mental retardation (MR) and mentally typical defendants (non-MR) were given instructions to fake their performance on the test. In the control, MR defendants and non-MR defendants took the test under standard conditions. The results indicated that both the MR and non-MR fakers scored significantly lower than the MR and non-MR controls. There was no significant difference in the scores of the MR and non-MR fakers. The results suggest that defendants with mental retardation may be able to successfully fake their performance in certain circumstances. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Voluntary intoxication and criminal responsibility.

This paper reviews the law related to voluntary intoxication and criminal responsibility in the 50 United States, the District of Columbia, the US Virgin islands, and Puerto Rico. Statutory and case law citations are provided which govern the use of intoxication evidence in each jurisdiction to negate mens rea (i.e., to establish diminished capacity), to support an insanity defense, and to mitigate criminal sentencing. Factors that courts typically focus on when deciding whether to admit this evidence in a particular case are discussed, and these factors are related to clinically relevant criteria.     

Effects of Considering Who and Why the Defendant Attacked1

Some people who are accused of a crime admit to the act, but provide an excuse. The effects of an excuse's self‐inflictedness level (high, moderate, or low) and the type of victim attacked (one partially responsible for the defendant's excusing condition, or innocent victim) were investigated. After a pretest (N= 26) to choose stimuli, participants (N= 220) read a scenario in which a male attacks another and then, once on trial, gives an excuse for his act. Those giving highly vs. less self‐inflicted excuses were more likely to receive a guilty verdict, received higher guilt level ratings, and tended to receive longer sentences; those who hurt an innocent vs. a partially responsible victim were more likely to be found guilty. In addition, the defendant's sentence was influenced by both the type of victim and the self‐inflictedness level of the excuse. The influence of perceived responsibility for an act on jurors' decisions is discussed     

Mental health criminal defenses in persons with neuropsychiatric disorders

Persons with neuropsychiatric disorders present specific and unique challenges for forensic experts and defense attorneys in the criminal justice system. This article reviews two potential criminal defenses: legal insanity and the various legal standards or tests of criminal responsibility that are used in jurisdictions throughout the United States (i.e., the M’Naghten standard and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code), and the partial legal defense of diminished capacity (lacking the mental state necessary to be found guilty of a specific intent crime). The process of evaluating criminal responsibility or diminished capacity is also presented with a specific emphasis on common issues that arise in evaluating defendants with Intellectual Developmental Disorder (Intellectual Disability), Parasomnias, Seizure Disorders, and Neurocognitive Disorders.     

Pathological gambling as an insanity defense

Recognition of pathological gambling as a diagnostic and clinical entity has been paralleled by its use as an insanity defense by gamblers engaged in criminal behavior. The societal ramifications of exculpation for crimes committed by volitionally impaired defendants require a critical analysis of the relationship between mental illness and criminal acts. Following a summary of current knowledge about pathological gambling as a clinical disorder, case law relevant to its use as an insanity defense is reviewed. It is argued that pathological gambling is not a serious mental illness for the purposes of the criminal law and that it bears no causal relationship to criminal activity. Legal and societal interests dictate that pathological gambling be excluded as a potential insanity defense.     

Justification,excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt

The law requires criminal guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There are two different approaches to construing this legal rule. On an epistemic approach, the rule is construed in terms of justified belief or knowledge; on a probabilistic approach, the rule is construed in terms of satisfying a probabilistic threshold. An epistemic construction of the rule has this advantage over a probabilistic construction: the former can while the latter cannot excuse the state from blame for a false conviction. This claim rests on an understanding of legal rules, legal justification for a finding of guilt and the central purpose of a criminal trial.     

Correspondence and metaphysics: Andrew Newman's The Correspondence Theory of Truth

ABSTRACT

The article begins by contrasting medical and moral views of addiction and how such views influence responsibility and policy analysis. It suggests that since addiction always involves action and action can always be morally evaluated, we must independently decide whether addicts do not meet responsibility criteria rather than begging the question and deciding by the label of ‘disease’ or ‘moral weakness’. It then turns to the criteria for criminal responsibility and shows that the criteria for criminal responsibility, like the criteria for addiction, are all folk psychological. Therefore, any scientific information about addiction must be ‘translated’ into the law's folk psychological criteria. Distractions about responsibility are then quickly canvassed. Then it addresses the direct relation between addiction and criminal responsibility. It argues that most addicts retain sufficient rational and control capacities at the relevant times to be held responsible, especially for crimes that are not part of the definition of addiction itself. It suggests that there is good reason to excuse or mitigate addicts for the crimes of purchase and possession for personal use. It concludes by briefly considering what contemporary science can contribute to our understanding of addiction and agency.     

Inarticulate Forgiveness

Influentially, Pamela Hieronymi has argued that any account of forgiveness must be both articulate and uncompromising. It must articulate the change in judgment that results in the forgiver's loss of resentment without excusing or justifying the misdeed, and without comprising a commitment to the transgressor's responsibility, the wrongness of the action, and the transgressed person's self‐worth. Non‐articulate accounts of forgiveness, which rely on indirect strategies for reducing resentment (for example, reflecting on the transgressor's bad childhood), are said to fail to explain forgiveness. This paper argues that the articulateness condition is not a necessary condition for forgiveness. It responds to numerous objections advanced against non‐articulate accounts, including the claim that the resentment‐mitigating practices they involve amount to excusing. Appealing to P. F. Strawson's distinction between objective and participant attitudes, it argues that forgivers can take transgressors to be detrimentally causally shaped by their past while holding them to be morally responsible.     

Let's Not Do Responsibility Skepticism

I argue for three conclusions. First, responsibility skeptics are committed to the position that the criminal justice system should adopt a universal nonresponsibility excuse. Second, a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some of our most deeply held values, further dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater number of innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. Third, while Saul Smilansky's ‘illusionist’ response to responsibility skeptics – that even if responsibility skepticism is correct, society should maintain a responsibility-realist/retributivist criminal justice system – is generally compelling, it would not work if a majority of society were to convert, theoretically and psychologically, to responsibility skepticism. In this (highly improbable) scenario, and only in this (highly improbable) scenario, the criminal justice system would need to be reformed in such a way that it aligned with the majority's responsibility-skeptical beliefs and attitudes.     

The relationship between criminal charges, diagnoses, and psycholegal opinions among federal pretrial defendants

This study analyzed data from 1710 criminal defendants referred by federal courts throughout the United States. We examined 12 categories of criminal charges with respect to diagnosed psychopathology and opinions related to competence to stand trial (CST) and criminal responsibility (CR) at the time of the alleged offense. Overall, 18% of the present sample were found to be incompetent to stand trial, while 12% were found to be not criminally responsible or 'insane.' In this study, crimes were associated with rates of psychopathology and rates of opinions regarding CST and CR. The findings of this study suggest that individuals who are charged with different crimes have different mental states and psychopathology and are therefore found to have differential rates of competence and sanity.     

Insanity and responsibility

This paper attempts to set forth, in the context of Anglo‐U.S. criminal law, the meaning of the concept of insanity, its necessary relation to absence of responsibility, and its bearing on some relevant psychiatric concepts and legal controversies. Irrationality is a distinctive and necessary (but not sufficient) condition for insanity. Irrationality consists in failure even to grasp the relevance of what is ‘essentially’ relevant. To that extent there obviously can be no responsibility. A mental makeup which renders one (who would not normally be so) substantially incapable of rational conduct constitutes insanity, and in that respect renders the person non‐responsible. Much more broadly and roughly speaking, the mind that is ill is the mind that is irrational (and hence in that respect non‐responsible).     

The role of competency to stand trial in mental health courts

Concerns have been raised in the literature about the competency to stand trial and competency to make treatment decisions of defendants referred to mental health courts. However, there is little information reported about the evaluation and prevalence of incompetence, characteristics of incompetent mental health court defendants, and disposition of mentally ill defendants too disturbed to be diverted from the criminal justice system through mental health courts. This study reports on the 85 potential mental health court defendants referred for trial competency evaluations during the first three years of operation of the Akron Ohio Mental Health Court. Of the 80 defendants who could be located for evaluation, 77.5% were found incompetent, and 53% of the incompetent defendants were not restored to competence even after an average of 49 days of treatment in a state psychiatric hospital. The implications of these findings in terms of the diversion potential of mental health courts for the severely mentally ill are discussed.     

Voluntariness, intention, and the defence of mental disorder: toward a rational approach

This article addresses how mental disorder may be used in common law countries to negate the requirements of voluntariness and intention in serious criminal offences as well as to provide the basis for current versions of the insanity defence. The notion that mental disorder can cause conduct to become completely involuntary or unintentional is questionable, given current thinking in the behavioral sciences. This article argues that different forms of mental disorder should be subsumed within a separate defence of mental disorder. Providing that a range of dispositional options is available, the law in this complex area would be simplified and brought into line with current psychological notions of goal-directed behavior.     

The concept of free will: philosophy, neuroscience and the law

Various philosophical definitions of free will are first considered. The compatibilist definition, which says simply that acts are freely willed if they are not subject to constraints, is identified as much used in the legal system and essentially impervious to scientific investigation. A middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, which requires that freely willed acts be consciously initiated, is shown to be relevant to the idea of mens rea and in the author's view not actually incompatible in principle with a fully scientific worldview. Only the strong libertarian definition, which requires that freely willed acts have no physical antecedents whatsoever, makes the existence of free will very hard to swallow scientifically. However, with regard to the middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, three different lines of scientific experimental evidence are then described, which suggest that, in fact, consciousness is not the real cause of much of what is generally considered as voluntary behavior. Many voluntary actions are initiated preconsciously, with consciousness kept informed only after the neural events leading to the act have begun. It is suggested that a reasonable way of integrating these experimental findings with the idea that persons do have a somewhat more than compatibilist version of free will is to acknowledge explicitly that a person is a mixture of conscious and unconscious components. In this scenario, the mind in mens rea would have to be judged guilty if it contained either conscious or unconscious intentions to perform the guilty act.     

The Impact of the Guilty but Mentally III Verdict on Juror Decisions: An Empirical Analysis

The present study attempted to determine the impact of alternative verdict choices on the decisions of mock jurors. Subjects used in this study as mock jurors were all college undergraduates. They were shown one of two versions of a videotaped simulated murder trial. Both films presented a defendant who appeared to be suffering emotional difficulties, but in one film the defendant had clearly committed the act while in the other film the defendant's actions were less certain. Subjects than gave their individual verdicts and, after deliberation with other subjects, a total jury verdict. The verdicts available to the subjects varied across three conditions such that the subjects in one condition were only allowed to find the defendant to be innocent or guilty. In another condition the subjects could find the defendant innocent, guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). In the third condition the subjects were allowed to choose between innocent, guilty, NGRI, and guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). The results indicated that the addition of the "mental health" verdicts had a significant impact on the decisions of the jurors. In particular, it appears that only defendants who would otherwise have been found innocent were likely to be found NGRI. This study also indicated that the GBMI verdict is very attractive to mock jurors. Indeed, even innocent defendants were found to be GBMI, a form of guilt, when this alternative was made available. These findings raise potentially important constitutional and practical issues for the trial of emotionally disturbed criminal defendants.