Does Roush show that evidence should be probable?

This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush’s (Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence and science, 2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of ‘evidence’ but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient but not necessary for Roush’s own two criteria of evidence to be met. With respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover, we argue that attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments with Bayesianism fail. For leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if either one of Roush’s two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable, suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal—but only for a grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence.     

How should careproviders respond to patients' requests that may be refused?

Some requests made to careproviders by patients may be of great personal importance to patients. Careproviders may assign proportionally greater weight to these exceptional requests, and may choose to take exceptional measures to assist. A strong trust relationship may be formed with patients as a result.     

How much “effort” should be devoted to memory?

We focus on the issue of whether cognitive effort is causally related to memory. We begin with a discussion of the concept of cognitive effort as derived from capacity models of attention. We then suggest that the theoretical analysis of memory may involve concepts from different levels of psychological analysis, and we draw a distinction between concepts that represent boundary conditions and sufficient cause. When applied to memory phenomena, attentional concepts serve only as a boundary--or limiting--function in memory theory. In contrast, concepts that represent memorial processes serve as a sufficient cause function. In some instances, cognitive effort appears to have been used as a sufficient cause concept, resulting in some confusion. A review of the literature reveals a haphazard correlation between indexes of cognitive effort and of memory performance. Alternatively, the application of cognitive effort or capacity to the memory performance of certain populations (clinical, children, and elderly) illustrates a potentially more appropriate use of the concept.     

What care should be covered?

The answer to the question of what health care services should be covered by a managed care plan is straightforward; the plan should cover whatever the consumer is willing to pay for. From the plan's perspective, the consumer is the payer, that is, the employer who negotiates the plan; not the individual patient whose personal preferences and interests may be quite different. Since managed care organizations contract with payers to arrange for health care services within a defined set of benefits, there is a broader question as well: Within the benefits chosen by the payer, what actually is covered? Criteria for determining "medical necessity," which managed care plans frequently use as the basis for coverage, are discussed.     

How should “acceptance of responsibility” be addressed in sexual offending treatment programs?

Sexual offenders in treatment programs are usually expected to take responsibility for their offending—which we define, on the basis of a literature review, as giving a detailed and precise disclosure of events which avoids external attributions of cause and matches the official/victim's account of the offense. However, research has not established that a failure to take responsibility for offending is a risk factor for future recidivism. In this paper, we critically review and evaluate the literature on taking responsibility for offending, to determine the rationale for the popularity of this treatment target. We consider the reasons why sex offenders fail to take responsibility for their offending and examine some potential problems with focusing on this goal in treatment programs. We also describe alternative treatment strategies for taking responsibility and conclude that there is less need for offenders to take responsibility for their past offending than there is for them to take responsibility for their future actions.     

Dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists (nor should they be)

Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who hold the first view also hold the second. In fact, many philosophers just assume that substance dualists ought to, or perhaps even have to, accept anti-criterialism. But I aim to show that this assumption is baseless. Substance dualism doesn’t entail, suggest, support, or in any way motivate anti-criterialism, and anti-criterialism confers no benefit on dualism. Substance dualists have no special reason—and, indeed, no good reason at all—to accept anti-criterialism. Or so I shall argue. My aim isn’t to defend substance dualism, nor is it to attack anti-criterialism. My aim is to show that, contrary to a long-standing trend, dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists. Nor, as it will turn out, should they be.     

Evolutionary possibilities: Can a society be constrained so that “the good” self-organizes?

Can a human society be constrained in such a way that self-organization will thereafter tend to produce outcomes that advance the goals of the society? Such a society would be self-organizing in the sense that individuals who pursue only their own interests would none-the-less act in the interests of the society as a whole, irrespective of any intention to do so. The paper sketches an agent-based model that identifies the conditions that must be met if such a self-organizing society is to emerge. The model draws heavily on an understanding of how self-organizing societies have emerged repeatedly during the evolution of life on Earth. The model demonstrates that the key enabling requirement for a self-organizing society is ‘consequence-capture’. Broadly this means that all agents in the society must capture sufficient of the beneficial (and harmful) consequences of their actions for the goals of the society. ‘Consequence-capture’ can be organized in a society by appropriate management (systems of evolvable constraints) that suppresses free riders and supports pro-social actions. In human societies these constraints include institutions such as systems of governance and social norms. If a self-organizing society is to emerge, consequence-capture must apply to all agents in the society, including those involved in the establishment and adaptation of institutions. If this is achieved, the result will be a fully self-organizing society in which the interests of all agents (including individuals, firms, multi-national corporations, political organizations, institutions and governments) are aligned with the interests of the society as a whole.     

Do apes know that they could be wrong?

When confronted with uncertain or incomplete information in decision-making situations, monkeys and apes opt for either escaping the situation or seeking additional information. These responses have been interpreted as evidence of metacognitive abilities. However, this interpretation has been challenged. On the one hand, studies using the information-seeking paradigm have been criticized because subjects may simply engage in a search for information routine (e.g., search until spot the reward) without any metacognitive involvement. On the other hand, studies using the escape response paradigm have been criticized because subjects may not recognize their own state of uncertainty but have learned to use the escape response in the presence of certain stimuli configurations that create uncertainty. The current study attempted to address these two criticisms by presenting great apes (seven gorillas, eight chimpanzees, four bonobos, seven orangutans) with a seeking information task whose basic procedure consisted of presenting two hollow tubes, baiting one of them and letting subjects choose. Conditions varied depending on whether subjects had visual access to the baiting, the cost associated with seeking information, the time interval between baiting and choosing, the food quality and the additional information offered regarding the food’s location. Although subjects showed a high retrieval accuracy when they had witnessed the baiting, they were more likely to check inside the tube before choosing when high stakes were involved (Experiment 3) or after a longer period of time had elapsed between the baiting and the retrieval of the reward (Experiment 2). In contrast, providing subjects with indirect auditory information about the food’s location or increasing the cost of checking reduced checking before choosing (Experiment 1). Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects knew that they could be wrong when choosing.     

Can applied ethics be effective in health care and should it strive to be?

Drawing upon his work in medical centers, Caplan explores the question of how well ethicists function in hospitals. He asks if their use of the "engineering model" of applied ethics, which emphasizes conceptual clarification, mastery of ethical theory, and impartiality, has made any difference in the way medicine is practiced. Noting that ethicists have been more effective in influencing heatlh policy at the national than at the institutional level, Caplan concludes that they have been less successful in teaching medical ethics, working with health personnel, and helping to formulate hospital policies. He attributes their difficulties primarily to the inadequacies of the engineering model of applied ethics for solving problems in a clinical setting. Caplan cautions ethicists to be aware both of the limitations of the engineering model and of the motives of health personnel in asking for help which may have little to do with resolving moral dilemmas.     

Simulated work experience: how realistic should it be?

One hundred 10th grade non-college-bound students were randomly assigned to receive two alternative types of materials: (a) experimental—an Electronic Technician Kit which required students to use an actual ammeter in solving problems representative of that occupation; and (b) control—a kit virtually identical with the experimental treatment except that no meter was provided. The experimental subjects reported more enjoyment, wanted more information about an electronic technician career, wrote more questions about careers, and signed up to take more additional career kits than did the control subjects. However, the number of measured exploratory activities during the week after the treatments was too small to test for statistical significance.     

Do children realize that pretend emotions might be unreal?

This research is aimed at comparing children's understanding of the distinction between external and internal emotion in deception and pretend play situations. A total of 337 children from 4 to 12 years of age participated in the study. Previous research suggests that in deception situations this understanding is very rudimentary at the age of 4 years, whereas 6-year-olds can articulate it in words. In the present work the children were asked to make this distinction in pretend play or deception tasks. The results show that in pretend play situations children start making this distinction at the age of 6 years, and their performance is better when the simulated emotion is negative rather than positive. These findings suggest that 4-year-olds are not aware that the emotions expressed in pretend play situations might be different from internal emotions.     

The distinctive “should” of assertability

Recent work has assumed that the normativity associated with assertion differs from the normativity of morality, practical rationality, etiquette, and legality. That is, whether an assertion “should” be made is not merely a function of these other familiar sorts of normativity and is especially connected to truth. Some researchers have challenged this assumption of distinctive normativity. In this paper I report two experiments that test the assumption. Participants read a brief story, judged whether an assertion should be made, and rated several other qualities of the assertion, including its truth value, morality, rationality, etiquette, legality, and folly. Of these qualities, truth value most strongly predicted assertability. The findings support the assumption of distinctive normativity and provide further evidence that the norm of our social practice of assertion is factive (i.e., it makes truth essential to assertability).     

Community psychology: should there be a European perspective?

In this era of globalisation community psychologists have to examine how globalisation patterns interact with local cultural norms, to find tools to promote a sense of community that fits a particular context. We cannot therefore acritically adopt for many European contexts, community psychology concepts and intervention strategies geared to USA values. The paper argues for the need to develop a European perspective in Community Psychology, built more on the European tradition of political concern for promoting social capital, besides an individual's freedom and autonomy. The paper attempts to identity some of the main differences that have emerged in the last decades between USA and European approaches to community psychology. It also describes two empowering tools, which integrate traditional and post modern views of science: community profiling and multidimensional organisational analysis, that have been used by European community psychologists to rebuild social capital in organisations and local communities. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is merit,that it can be transferred?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - A concept of merit is used for spiritual accounting in many religious traditions, seemingly a substantial point of connection between religion and...