RELIGIOUS ETHICS AND EMPIRICAL ETHICS

In recent decades, cognitive and behavioral scientists have learned a great deal about how people think and behave. On the most general level, there is a basic consensus that many judgments, including ethical judgments, are made by intuitive, even unconscious, impulses. This basic insight has opened the door to a wide variety of more particular studies that investigate how judgments are influenced by group identity, self‐conception, emotions, perceptions of risk, and many other factors. When these forms of research engage ethical issues, they are sometimes called empirical ethics. This essay argues that the field of religious ethics would benefit from a more robust engagement with empirical ethics than it has thus far undertaken. In doing so, it offers a brief account of how issues of moral psychology and moral anthropology have been treated in religious ethics, and it highlights ways that the scientific findings challenge some prevailing norms in religious ethics. It ends by suggesting avenues by which religious ethics research could productively engage empirical ethics.     

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN VIRTUE ETHICS AND CARE ETHICS

A dialogue between virtue and care ethics is formed as a step towards meeting Pellegrino's challenge to create a more comprehensive moral philosophy. It is also a dialogue between nursing and medicine since each practice draws on the Greek Virtue Tradition and the Judeo-Christian Tradition of care differently. In the Greek Virtue Tradition, the point of scrutiny lies in the inner character of the actor, whereas in the Judeo-Christian Tradition the focus is relational, i.e. how virtues are lived out in specific relationships, particularly unequal relationships where vulnerability of one of the members is an issue. In a care ethic relational qualities such as attunement rather than inner qualities are the point of scrutiny. A dialogue between these two traditions makes it possible to consider the relational virtues and skills of openness and responsiveness that are required for a respectful meeting of the other.     

ETHICS CONCERNING LEISURE

In the United States, non-work, or non-productive activity can produce ego anxiety within a person who considers work as the primary index of self-worth. This anxiety can become extreme when a person retires or is forced into unemployment. One cause of this anxiety is society's standards concerning acceptable activity; particularly the work-oriented attiude formulated in the “Protestant Ethic.” However, the “Protestant Ethic” is neither Protestant nor religious. Rather, it is a set of national mores, which justify our work-oriented economy in religious terms. Situational ethics, which reflect both sound counseling practice and contemporary theology, can be formulated concerning the problem of leisure. And, we propose a guideline for such an ethic.     

ETHICS AND SOCIOBIOLOGY

Abstract. Sociobiologists make large claims for their subject. Knowing about the genetic underpinnings of human society will, they claim, enable us to understand all of human behavior and even to solve the ancient philosophical questions of how we ought to live. This essay assesses the significance of sociobiology for ethics. It argues that sociobiologists have misunderstood the relevance of facts to values and that their larger ambitions for their subject are bound to remain unfulfilled. Nevertheless, philosophers are wrong to ignore sociobiology. To give a genetic account of the existence of a widely held value does not justify that value, but it does say something of relevance to the ethical issues. The problem is to work out just what difference such an explanation makes.     

ETHICS OF BEWILDERMENT

An ethics of bewilderment, which differs dramatically from the more familiar ethics of ease, is best understood through poetic presentations. Using examples drawn from Chinese and Western sources—notably Du Fu and Dante—this inquiry treats bewilderment as both an emotion and a virtue. Both these forms of bewilderment involve an acknowledgment of how minimal is the ethical confidence we have, given the feelings we have and the judgments we must make, but they also extend in productive ways the implications of that acknowledgment.     

"NOT ETHICS, NOT ETHICS ALONE, BUT THE HOLY"

While much has been written about Levinas's conception of ethics, very little has been said about the connection between ethics and holiness in his work. Yet, throughout much of his corpus, Levinas consistently links the two. The first part of my article addresses the important distinction that Levinas establishes between the sacred (le sacré) and holiness (la sainteté). According to Levinas, several influential thinkers conflate these two categories. Holiness, Levinas suggests, represents a kind of antidote to the sacred. The second part examines the various ways that holiness is manifest in ethicality. The key, I suggest, for properly understanding the link between ethical regard and sanctification revolves around an appreciation of Levinas's frequent appeal to the notion of straightforwardness (droiture). For Levinas, the complex relations that bind the self, Other, and God, involve essential conditions of rectitude and uprightness.