Sensitizing Questions: A Method to Facilitate Analyzing the Meaning of an Utterance

Much social science research entails interpreting the meaning of utterances, that is, phrases spoken, written or gestured. But how should researchers interpret the meaning of such utterances? A recent surge of research, informed by dialogism, emphasizes the contextual, social and unfinished nature of meaning. The present article operationalizes dialogism theory into six ‘sensitizing questions’ which can guide analysis. The questions are: (1) What is the context? (2) What is the speaker doing? (3) Who is being addressed? (4) Who is doing the talking? (5) What future is constituted? (6) What are the responses? Each question (and 16 sub-questions) is illustrated by analyzing the potential meanings of a single utterance. The article is a contribution to the development of new forms of ‘method’ for interpretative qualitative research. These methods aid the ‘human instrument’ to become a sensitive, theoretically-informed, and accountable analyst.     

Theology and Religious Studies in the University: ‘Some Ambiguities ’ Revisited

What is the relationship between religious studies and theology? Do both have a place within the university? This paper will argue that no clear distinction can be drawn between religious studies and theology on the level of the methods they employ. Each is multidisciplinary and each is able to address questions of religious truth. They can be distinguished only by asking ‘What is the question which each is attempting to answer? ’ Religious studies addresses the question of the meaning and truth of any religion. Theology is interested in the question of the meaning and truth of one particular faith. By adopting the language of one particular faith, the theologian is able to explore particular religious questions in some depth.     

Spatial ability at different times of day

Three groups of approx. 30 Ss in each group of recruits drawn from the same sample were required to complete a test of spatial ability at three different times of day (morning 9.30; afternoon 13.30 and early evening 17.30). In accordance with predictions the morning group obtained a higher score than either the midday or evening group. Results are discussed in terms of chronobiological theories.     

'Thank Goodness That's Over': The Evolutionary Story

If, as the new tenseless theory of time maintains, there are no tensed facts, then why do our emotional lives seem to suggest that there are? This question originates with Prior’s ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’ problem, and still presents a significant challenge to the new B–theory of time. We argue that this challenge has more dimensions to it than has been appreciated by those involved in the debate so far. We present an analysis of the challenge, showing the different questions that a B–theorist must answer in order to meet it. The debate has focused on the question of what is the object of my relief when an unpleasant experience is past. We outline the prevailing response to this question. The additional, and neglected, questions are, firstly –‘Why does the same event elicit different emotional responses from us depending on whether it is in the past, present, or future?’ And secondly –‘Why do we care more about proximate future pain than about distant future pain?’ We give B–theory answers to these questions, which appeal to evolutionary considerations.     

Exploring the Time Preferences by Procrastinators: Night or Day,Which is the One?

In study 1, trait procrastinators compared to nonprocrastinators claimed they were ‘night persons’, individuals who are most alert and active in the late afternoon and evening hours. However, there were no significant individual differences in time preference for a set of social and individual activities considered pleasurable. In study 2, participants kept daily records for six straight days of when they had engaged in activities. Proneness toward behavioral (but not decisional) procrastination was significantly related to number of activities performed in the evening. Together, these studies suggest that procrastinators may be ‘late starters’ who prefer to engage in daily activities later in the day than early in the morning. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

The philosopher and the Fly Bottle

Wittgenstein said that what he does in philosophy is ‘to show the fly out of the fly bottle’ (Philosophical Investigations¶309). He is, himself, both the fly, his alter-ego, and the philosopher who turns the fly around. This is a transformation in his vision of and perspective on those matters which tempted him, through the questions it posed for him, into the bottle, there to be trapped – trapped into a form of scepticism, realism, or one of its many reductionist satellites, for instance. The transformation which releases him into the open takes philosophical work which unearths unspoken assumptions and subjects them to criticism. As for the movement into and out of the bottle, this is the philosophical journey in the course of which the philosopher comes to a new understanding of the matters he questioned in a way that led him into the bottle. To come to such a better understanding, therefore, the philosopher has to have the courage of his temptations and not be afraid to give up what he holds on to. What he learns in coming out of the bottle belongs to the work that frees him from the compelling pictures that held him captive within the space of opposed theories held together by common assumptions. It cannot be acquired or conveyed independently of such work. It is in this sense that philosophy is a struggle with difficulties which each philosopher has to face and work through himself. The difficulties are not in him, but they are his– they are difficulties for him. He has to work on them. That is why, while he can learn from others, he cannot borrow from them, build on or go on from what they have established. In the first section of the paper I put on some flesh on this. But what I provide is still a thumb-nail sketch. The question ‘what is philosophy?’ is itself a philosophical question, like any other, and can only be ‘answered’ like them. It is only that with which we are familiar – in our mastery of the language we speak or in our experience of life –that can raise philosophical questions for us. Thus contrast ‘what is knowledge?’, ‘what is thinking?’ with ‘what is cancer?’, ‘what is osmosis?’. The question ‘what is philosophy?’ similarly can only be asked by a philosopher, someone who has asked and struggled with its questions. Otherwise it is a request for information to which the full answer is: you have to study philosophy if you really want to find out. It follows that what I say about the way philosophical questions are to be answered applies equally to the question about the nature of philosophy. Hence I can do no other than provide a thumb-nail sketch for those who have themselves struggled with philosophical questions. As for what I provide in the following three sections, they are no more than illustrations of a way of working on those sample questions – questions on which hopefully the reader will have thought himself. I am able to offer such illustrations only because I have myself been caught up by these questions and have worked on them and discussed them more fully elsewhere (see Bibliography).     

The logic of Simpson’s paradox

There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson’s paradox. (i) Why or in what sense is Simpson’s paradox a paradox? (ii) What is the proper analysis of the paradox? (iii) How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a “formal” answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson’s paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl’s causal (and questionable) account of the first two questions. We argue that the “how to proceed question?” does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth’s account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the “how to proceed question” needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson’s paradox “paradoxical.”     

The verdictive organization of desire

Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. The paper argues that one’s judgment about one wants most will sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants, and so making itself true.     

Editorial

Abstract

After outlining its geographical horizons, this article goes on to survey the history of Islam, in Europe and the different profiles of the Muslim communities today in western Europe, the USA and the Balkans. It suggests that there are usually four phases in the development of these communities. The three main Western approaches to managing diversity are outlined, alongside the three most common models for the relationship between religion and the state. The politics of identity is discussed, addressing the question, ‘How can religious diversity be reconciled with shared citizenship?’, along with the crisis of leadership among Muslims in the West and the radicalisation of some Muslims. Muslim attitudes towards Christianity are described, as are church responses at both national and international level. Finally two further questions are addressed: ‘Can the churches act as an antidote to religious nationalism?’ and ‘Can Christians and Muslims together shape civic space for the common good?’     

Young Children's Reports of When Events Occurred: Do Event Type and Assessment Method Matter?

Studying young children's reporting about when various events occurred informs about the development of episodic memory and metacognition. In two experiments, 55 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two activity sessions, a week apart. During the activity sessions, they learned novel animal facts and body movements, and they coloured animal pictures and posed for body movement photos. Immediately after the second activity session, children were interviewed about when they experienced the various events. Overall, children were as accurate about learning events as physical events, but they were more accurate when asked temporal distance (e.g. ‘Which did you learn a longer time ago, “X” or “Y”?’) than temporal location questions (e.g. ‘Which did you learn before today, “X” or “Y”?’). The results suggest that young children's apparent difficulty recognizing new learning is not due to a rapid ‘remember‐to‐know shift’. Rather, the way we ask young children about when they experienced various events determines their accuracy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beliefs and Experiences of Bereaved Teenagers: some spiritual and moral issues

When people die it is quite common for the bereaved to think about where they have gone and to maintain links with them in some way. Traditional Christian beliefs about ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’ may be revised and other ideas about spiritual continuity are often explored. This article will discuss responses from 94 11‐17‐year‐olds (38 males/56 females) regarding circumstances of and reasons given for a death; explanations and support; religious affiliation and belief in God; answers to the question ‘Why do people die?’ and ‘What happens after death?'; experiences of having a sense of the presence of the deceased; and personal qualities, attitudes towards other people and views of life. It will conclude by reassessing some of the moral and spiritual issues raised.     

Which studies test whether self‐enhancement is pancultural? Reply to Sedikides,Gaertner, and Vevea, 2007

What types of studies test the question of pancultural self‐enhancement? Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2007) have identified inclusion criteria that largely limit the question to studies of the better‐than‐average effect (i.e. 27 out of 29 effects that they include as ‘validated’ and ‘relevant’). In contrast, other effects which they labelled as ‘unvalidated’ or ‘irrelevant’ used methods other than the better‐than‐average effect (i.e. 24 out of 24 effects). Because Sedikides et al. are drawing conclusions about pancultural self‐enhancement and not the pancultural better‐than‐average effect, these excluded studies are relevant to the hypothesis under question. Ignoring the findings from other methods is highly problematic, in particular because these other methods yield results that conflict with those from the better‐than‐average effect. An analysis of effects from all studies reveals no support for pancultural self‐enhancement.     

Faith and the practising analyst

Abstract: In this brief essay, I reflect on three questions: What is ‘faith’ in a modern and post‐modern cultural context? Do I, a Jungian analyst, have ‘faith’ or do I not? Does having ‘faith’ or not make a difference in the practice of analysis? I make reference to Jung's understanding of ‘faith’ and his frequent disclaimers about making metaphysical claims. I conclude that a post‐credal ‘faith’ is possible for contemporary Jungian analysts, that I do have such a faith personally, and that in my experience this makes a significant difference in analytic practice at least with some patients. Traditional faith statements must be translated into depth psychological terms, however, in order for them to be applicable in post‐modern, multicultural contexts.     

Planning over the day span: memory for the content of plans

The purpose of this study was to clarify the effect of the time of day on memory for the content of plans, and to examine the influence of knowledge of daily activities on it. Twenty‐four undergraduates participated as subjects in the experiment. Participants were told to memorize 24 plans of one day (e.g. ‘13:00’, ‘making a telephone call’), and were then asked to recall them in the test phase. Furthermore, we tried to explore their knowledge of everyday activities using a questionnaire. The result showed that plans of night, morning, and evening were recalled better than that of afternoon. This result was explained by the notion that knowledge of one's personal daily activities might affect memory of plans. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An epistemic solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction

Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between ‘grue’ and ‘green’?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate ‘grue’ not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of ‘lawlikeness’, ‘confirmation’, and ‘projectibility’ have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by the available background information. In order to defend this thesis, I discuss an example that is less strange than the grue example. From the general conclusions of this discussion, it follows that ‘grue’ is not projectible in the actual epistemic situation, but it is projectible in certain counterfactual epistemic situations.     

What Is Trans Philosophy?

In this article, I explore the question “What is trans philosophy?” by viewing trans philosophy as a contribution to the field of trans studies. This requires positioning the question vis à vis Judith Butler’s notion of philosophy’s Other (that is, the philosophical work done outside of the boundaries of professional philosophy), as trans studies has largely grown from this Other. It also requires taking seriously Susan Stryker’s distinction between the mere study of trans phenomena and trans studies as the coming to academic voice of trans people. Finally, it requires thinking about the types of questions that emerge when philosophy is placed within a multidisciplinary context: (1) What does philosophy have to offer? (2) Given that philosophy typically does not use data, what grounds philosophical claims about the world? (3) What is the relation between philosophy and “the literature”? In attempting to answer these questions, I examine the notion of philosophical perplexity and the relation of philosophy to “the everyday.” Rather than guiding us to perplexity, I argue, trans philosophy attempts to illuminate trans experiences in an everyday that is confusing and hostile. Alternative socialities are required, I argue, in order to make trans philosophy possible.     

An inquiry into the process of temporal orientation.

A recent study (Koriat and Fischhoff 1974) in which subjects were asked to respond to the question ‘What day is today?’ revealed ease of day retrieval to be a curvilinear function of the day of the week, with greatest difficulty being encountered in midweek. Data suggested a twostage model for the day retrieval process, with the weekend serving as a facilitating ‘landmark.’ It was unclear whether these results were due to the day on which the subject was questioned or to the day label which he was requested to produce, the two being completely confounded. In the present experiment, subjects at each of the six working days of two weeks were presented with questions of the form ‘Is today …?’ until 12 correct RT's were obtained for each Actual Day—Proposed Day combination. Major results include significant quadratic effects for Actual Day, Proposed Day and Actual Day—Proposed Day temporal distance; greater latencies for acceptance (‘yes, today is…’) than rejection responses; and details of the weekend effect. The nature of temporal orientation and the role of landmarks are discussed as well as the specifics of the day label retrieval and day label evaluation processes.     

Why is Law a Normative Discipline? on Hans Kelsen’s ‘Normology’

What does it mean to claim of law that it is a normative discipline? Can the answer be so simple that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of study and the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from this? What, in any case, is a ‘normative discipline’? The essay attempts to address these questions by analysing Hans Kelsen’s ‘normological’ theory of law through his work on sovereignty and especially by focusing on the normative character of Kelsen’s epistemological claims regarding law. A theoretical critique of Kelsen is offered through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of logic as a normative discipline.