Choice among bets and revision of opinion

Ss estimated subjective probability (SP) on the basis of a sample in a hypothesis testing situation by choosing the subjectively optimal bet cat of a list and by stating verbal odds. In the choice among bets situation SP was inferred on the assumption of subjectively expected value maximization. Both estimates of SP were conservative compared with the theoretical prediction and did not differ significantly. This suggests that (a) utility had no distorting effect on the choice of the bet and (b) conservatism is not specifically bound to the use of special number scales or response sets.     

The effects of discussion on group and individual choices among bets

The effects of discussion on subsequent group and individual choices are studied in a situation where subjects choose between a sure gain of varying amount and five probability levels associated with larger gains of expected value equal to that of the sure gain. At the end of the experiment, a single bet, chosen at random, is played for money. Before discussion, subjects have to guess the percentage of similar, more risky and more cautious choices made by their peers for each of the six bets. As predicted by a majority-rule decision-making model significant risky shifts were observed for relatively low values of sure gain. For higher values, however, groups tended to be more cautious than individuals. The final private choices of individuals were significantly more risky than their initial decisions. Most individuals apparently thought they were at least as risky as most others. This finding was due, however, primarily to the responses of subjects who chose the highest risk-level (the ceiling effect) and, secondly, to the consistent tendency of most individuals to guess that others make the same choices as they themselves. It is concluded that majority influence seems a satisfactory explanation of group risky shifts observed in the present study, but it cannot account for modifications of group and individual choices in all risk-taking situations.     

On choosing between bets

Most attempts to account for the way persons choose between bets emphasize the use which is made of information about their basic attributes, i.e. the gains and losses which might be incurred and their respective probabilities. In experimental investigations of betting behaviour this is usually the only information which the subjects are given (e.g. Edwards, 1955; Hurst and Siegel, 1956). Everyday observation suggests, however, that if given the opportunity subjects will also use information about the outcome of bets. In the experiments to be reported, experimental subjects were told what gains had accrued from three bets in the past, the purpose being to see how this information affected their betting.     

Adoption vs. parenting decisions among pregnant adolescents

The choice of adoption is rare among pregnant adolescents. This exploratory study used regression analyses to ascertain which demographic, social, and intervention variables were related to this decision. The adolescents with mothers who favored adoption and/or had few parenting peer models were more likely to choose adoption. Age, knowledge of peers who had chosen adoption, grades in school, level of involvement in a comprehensive adolescent pregnancy program, and participation in individual therapy or Decision-Making Group were not significantly related to the decision. Decision-Making Group is a once-a-week therapy session that focuses on adoption vs. parenting decisions for pregnant adolescents. Eighty-seven percent of the adolescents who participated in these sessions found them helpful. The policy implications for adolescent pregnancy programs are explored.     

Cognitive orientation and the prediction of decisions in a medical examination context

From the theory of cognitive orientation (Kreitler and Kreitler 1976, 1982) we derived that scores of cognitive orientation would predict the decision of women to go or not to go to a medical examination for cancer. We tested three alternative methods in addition to the standard method recommended by Kreitler and Kreitler. These four methods represent different assumptions which one can derive from the theory. On the basis of 25 interviews we developed the preliminary questionnaire of beliefs associated with the examination for early detection of cancer. The data of Study 1(N = 72) were used for item analysis as well as testing retest reliability and predicting decisions. In Study 2 (N = 142) the results could be replicated. The Likert-scales for assessing the four components of cognitive orientation proved to be highly retest reliable. Predictions of decisions could be made nearly equally well by each of the four methods derived from the theory of cognitive orientation.     

The cheating and intention of a partner as determinants of evaluative decisions among juvenile offenders

Male juvenile offenders were asked to evaluate the work of an experimental partner (confederate) who completed a work task four times. The work partner cheated on two trials and did not cheat on two trials while working for a charity (one cheat and one noncheat trial) or for selfish gain (one cheat and one noncheat trial). It was found that subjects rated the work done on cheating trials lower than work done on noncheating trials. In addition, subjects shared less reward money on cheating trials relative to noncheating trials. However, the intentions of the confederate, defined as the reward recipient, failed to affect subjects' judgments. These results were described as supporting previous studies which have indicated that delinquents fail to take account of others' intentions when making moral judgments.     

The prediction of condom use intention among South African university students

A questionnaire was administered to 294 sexually active, unmarried undergraduate students to investigate the role of social norms in the prediction of the intention to use condoms. Components of social cognitive theory and the theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour were integrated with those of the Health Belief Model to predict future intention to use condoms with a new partner. Logistic regression analyses of selected risky sexual behaviours on the intention to use condoms showed that, among males, attitudes towards using condoms and the Health Belief Model component of perceived barriers predicted the intention to use condoms. The Health Belief Model component of perceived benefits could not be interpreted. Attitudes, subjective norms and perceived self-efficacy were associated with female students' intention to use condoms. Implications for strategies of HIV/AIDS prevention are discussed.     

Place your bets: psychophysiological correlates of decision-making under risk

Emotions and their psychophysiological correlates are thought to play an important role in decision-making under risk. We used a novel gambling task to measure psychophysiological responses during selection of explicitly presented risky options and feedback processing. Active-choice trials, in which the participant had to select the size of bet, were compared to fixed-bet, no-choice trials. We further tested how the chances of winning and bet size affected choice behavior and psychophysiological arousal. Individual differences in impulsive and risk-taking traits were assessed. The behavioral results showed sensitivity to the choice requirement and to the chances of winning: Participants were faster to make a response on no-choice trials and when the chances of winning were high. In active-choice trials, electrodermal activity (EDA) increased with bet size during both selection and processing of losses. Cardiac responses were sensitive to choice uncertainty: Stronger selection-related heart rate (HR) decelerations were observed in trials with lower chances of winning, particularly on active-choice trials. Finally, betting behavior and psychophysiological responsiveness were moderately correlated with self-reported impulsivity-related traits. In conclusion, we demonstrate that psychophysiological arousal covaries with risk-sensitive decision-making outside of a learning context. Our results further highlight the differential sensitivities of EDA and HR to psychological features of the decision scenario.     

Copying without rewards: socially influenced foraging decisions among brown capuchin monkeys

An individual’s foraging activity can be influenced by the choices made by nearby conspecifics. The interest shown in the location and characteristics of a feeding patch may depend on the feeding success of a conspecific there, a process that needs to be distinguished from choices guided by rewards to the observer itself. We investigated how rewards for both self and others influence the foraging choices of captive capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Thirteen adult capuchins observed familiar female conspecific models explore one of three opaque boxes under three conditions. In the first, there were no rewards available to either monkey; in the second, rewards were available to the model only; and in the third, both monkeys could retrieve a reward. Under all conditions, subjects more often explored the same box as the model than was expected by chance. Thus, without ever receiving a reward themselves or without seeing another receive rewards, subjects’ searches were directed at the box explored by another monkey. The tendency to match the model’s choice increased if the subject was rewarded. We compared these results to control conditions in which the model was either absent, or present but not allowed to demonstrate. Subjects’ located the reward less often in control conditions, than in the experimental conditions. We conclude that extrinsic rewards, while helpful, are not required for partners to influence the foraging choices of capuchins, and that the unrewarded copying of foraging choices demonstrated here may provide the basis for additional social influences on learning. This contribution is part of the Special Issue “A Socioecological Perspective on Primate Cognition” (Cunningham and Janson 2007)     

Derivation and prediction of temperamental types among preschoolers.

The number and nature of temperamental types in 488 children aged 3 years 6 months was examined on the basis of a broad set of temperamental characteristics, including positive and negative emotionality and the attentional and behavioral control domains. Configural frequency analysis methods showed clear support for two temperament types: controlled-nonexpressive and noncontrolled-expressive. These types showed meaningful differences against external criteria related to a wide range of problem behaviors from the emotional, social, and attentional domains. The reports of problem behaviors were obtained contemporaneously from fathers and caregivers. These findings replicated a year later when children were aged 4 years 6 months. Furthermore, the findings showed that infant and toddler-age temperamental characteristics differentiated these preschool-aged types. The authors discuss the implications of the results for a categorical view of temperament-personality.     

The role of explanation in categorization decisions

Research into the role of explanation on the categorization process has yielded conflicting conclusions. Some theorists stress the importance of explanation, arguing that explanations provide a causal structure necessary to the categorization process. Others discount its significance, arguing that explanation is neither necessary nor sufficient for categorization. Experimentally, explanation has shown modest success in accounting for some categories but not others. Across three experiments, we test whether the central features of a category are the ones that capture the most explanatory structure. The objectives of the current study are threefold: to determine the importance of explanation in natural kind and artifact categorization; to understand the implications of feature correlations as they relate to explanation; and to further delineate the benefit of explanation outside of a functional role. Experiment 1 demonstrates that explanation plays a more dominant role in artifact versus natural kind categorization. Experiment 2 provides evidence that correlated features are neither necessary nor sufficient for categorization. Moreover, it demonstrates that, in the absence of correlation, people still rely on explanation for artifacts but not for natural kinds. Experiment 3 tests to what extent functional information underlies explanation in artifact categorization. We demonstrate that functional relations are not necessary for explanatory‐based categorization. Our results, coupled with previous evidence, suggest a dichotomous role for explanation‐based categorization. On the one hand, explanation is virtually ignored when categorizing biological kinds; on the other, explanation fosters artifact categorization. Implications for categorization and category‐specific disorder are considered.     

The role of impulses in shaping decisions

This paper explores the extent to which decision behavior is shaped by short‐lived reactions to the outcome of the most recent decision. We inspected repeated decision‐making behavior in two versions of each of two decision‐making tasks, an individual task and a strategic one. By regressing behavior onto the outcomes of recent decisions, we found that the upcoming decision was well predicted by the most recent outcome alone, with the tendency to repeat a previous action being affected both by its actual outcome and by the outcomes of actions not taken. Because the goodness of predictions based on the most recent outcome did not diminish as participants gained experience with the task, we conclude that repeated decisions are continuously affected by impulsive reactions. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The cognitive structure of choice dilemma decisions

We tried to find out why Ss chose a specific risk level. We, therefore, constructed a questionnaire with 30 statements about aspects of the contents of the choice dilemmas. A factor analysis of the 30 statements over ten choice dilemmas and 61 field-officers led to a structure of four cognitive elements. With these four factors as predictors we could explain a main part of the variance of the individual risk level of each choice dilemma. This regression analysis was done with normal product-moment-correlations and with scalar-products. Both analyses show great similarity, although it seemed to be better to use scalar-products because one can use the information of the means. The four cognitive elements could be interpreted as: (1) Decision-making strategy; (2) Responsibility for others; (3) Reputation; (4) Socially valued riskiness.