Memory conformity affects inaccurate memories more than accurate memories

After controlling for initial confidence, inaccurate memories were shown to be more easily distorted than accurate memories. In two experiments groups of participants viewed 50 stimuli and were then presented with these stimuli plus 50 fillers. During this test phase participants reported their confidence that each stimulus was originally shown. This was followed by computer-generated responses from a bogus participant. After being exposed to this response participants again rated the confidence of their memory. The computer-generated responses systematically distorted participants' responses. Memory distortion depended on initial memory confidence, with uncertain memories being more malleable than confident memories. This effect was moderated by whether the participant's memory was initially accurate or inaccurate. Inaccurate memories were more malleable than accurate memories. The data were consistent with a model describing two types of memory (i.e., recollective and non-recollective memories), which differ in how susceptible these memories are to memory distortion.     

Memory conformity affects inaccurate memories more than accurate memories

After controlling for initial confidence, inaccurate memories were shown to be more easily distorted than accurate memories. In two experiments groups of participants viewed 50 stimuli and were then presented with these stimuli plus 50 fillers. During this test phase participants reported their confidence that each stimulus was originally shown. This was followed by computer-generated responses from a bogus participant. After being exposed to this response participants again rated the confidence of their memory. The computer-generated responses systematically distorted participants’ responses. Memory distortion depended on initial memory confidence, with uncertain memories being more malleable than confident memories. This effect was moderated by whether the participant's memory was initially accurate or inaccurate. Inaccurate memories were more malleable than accurate memories. The data were consistent with a model describing two types of memory (i.e., recollective and non-recollective memories), which differ in how susceptible these memories are to memory distortion.     

Accurate, inaccurate and omitted details in collective emotional memories: The case of Itzhak Rabin's assassination

Collective memory of the assassination of the former Israeli Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin, was originally examined by asking 61 Israeli students, about two weeks after the assassination (T1) and about 11 months later (T2) to fill out an open-ended questionnaire about the assassination. About 13 years later (T3) a new sample of 80 students also filled out the memory questionnaire. In T2 and T3 the participants also self-assessed various emotional and cognitive variables about their memories. All answers were segmented and categorised into accurate and inaccurate memories. Data analyses showed that the amounts of accurate memories decreased from T1 to T2 by 18 per cent, and from T2 to T3 by an additional 16 per cent, and were positively correlated in T2 with national importance and emotional reaction, and in T3 with self-assessed ability to remember events and amounts of visual representations. Content analysis of the most frequently memorised accurate, inaccurate and omitted memories showed that they displayed differential qualitative characteristics and that the most prevalent accurate narrative has varied over time. It appears that the collective memories of Rabin's assassination showed episodic features similar to those shown by eyewitnesses exposed to emotion-arousing events only once. The data suggest a distinction between episodic "collective memories" and semantic "collective knowledge".     

Collaboration reduces the frequency of false memories in older and younger adults

Older (mean age = 74.23) and younger (mean age = 33.50) participants recalled items from 6 briefly exposed household scenes either alone or with their spouses. Collaborative recall was compared with the pooled, nonredundant recall of spouses remembering alone (nominal groups). The authors examined hits, self-generated false memories, and false memories produced by another person's (actually a computer program's) misleading recollections. Older adults reported fewer hits and more self-generated false memories than younger adults. Relative to nominal groups, older and younger collaborating groups reported fewer hits and fewer self-generated false memories. Collaboration also reduced older people's computer-initiated false memories. The memory conversations in the collaborative groups were analyzed for evidence that collaboration inhibits the production of errors and/or promotes quality control processes that detect and eliminate errors. Only older adults inhibited the production of wrong answers, but both age groups eliminated errors during their discussions. The partners played an important role in helping rememberers discard false memories in older and younger couples. The results support the use of collaboration to reduce false recall in both younger and older adults.     

Comparison of neural activity that leads to true memories,false memories,and forgetting: An fMRI study of the misinformation effect

False memories can occur when people are exposed to misinformation about a past event. Of interest here are the neural mechanisms of this type of memory failure. In the present study, participants viewed photographic vignettes of common activities during an original event phase (OEP), while we monitored their brain activity using fMRI. Later, in a misinformation phase, participants viewed sentences describing the studied photographs, some of which contained information conflicting with that depicted in the photographs. One day later, participants returned for a surprise item memory recognition test for the content of the photographs. Results showed reliable creation of false memories, in that participants reported information that had been presented in the verbal misinformation but not in the photographs. Several regions were more active during the OEP for later accurate memory than for forgetting, but they were also more active for later false memories, indicating that false memories in this paradigm are not simply caused by failure to encode the original event. There was greater activation in the ventral visual stream for subsequent true memories than for subsequent false memories, however, suggesting that differences in encoding may contribute to later susceptibility to misinformation.     

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for positive,negative, and neutral events

We investigated memory qualities for positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical events. Participants recalled two personal experiences of each type and then rated their memories on several characteristics (e.g. sensorial and contextual details). They also reported whether they ‘see’ the events in their memories from their own perspective (‘field’ memories) or whether they ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would (‘observer’ memories). Positive memories contained more sensorial (visual, smell, taste) and contextual (location, time) details than both negative and neutral events, whereas negative and neutral memories did not differ on most dimensions. Positive and negative events were more often recollected with a field perspective than neutral events. Finally, participants were classified in four groups according to the repressive coping style framework. Emotional memories of repressors were not less detailed than those of the other groups. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Judgement of confidence in childhood memories

Memory judgement processes, based on the characteristics and associations of retrieved memories such as sensory details and supporting memories, are considered as important as retrieval in several autobiographical memory models. Judgement processes have received less research attention than memory characteristics themselves. The present studies examined memory judgement using qualitative analysis of the reasons participants gave for confidence in retrieved childhood memories. For memories they were confident of, participants cited memory phenomenology, especially sensory and affective details, much more frequently than consistency with other autobiographical knowledge. For memories they were not confident of, participants reported lack of consistency with autobiographical knowledge or with others' memories more often than memory phenomenology as reasons for their uncertainty. Participants' comments also revealed several metacognitive beliefs about the relationship between memory characteristics and accuracy. These data are consistent with two‐process models of memory judgement associated with true versus false memories. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Involuntary autobiographical memories in dysphoric mood: a laboratory study

The frequency and characteristics of involuntary autobiographical memories were compared in 25 stable dysphoric and 28 non-dysphoric participants, using a new laboratory-based task (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Participants detected infrequent target stimuli (vertical lines) in a simple vigilance task and recorded any involuntary autobiographical memories that came to mind, mostly in response to irrelevant words presented on the screen. Dysphoric participants reported involuntary memories as frequently and as quickly as non-dysphoric participants and their memories were not repetitive intrusive memories of negative or traumatic events. Additional content analysis showed that dysphoric participants did not recall more memories of objectively negative events (e.g., accidents, illnesses, deaths) than non-dysphoric participants. However, significant group differences emerged in terms of a mood congruency effect whereby dysphoric participants rated their memories as more negative than non-dysphoric participants. Moreover, the proportion of negatively rated involuntary memories was related to lower mood ratings at the end of the session in the dysphoric but not in the non-dysphoric group. Finally, groups did not differ on several memory characteristics such as vividness, specificity (high in both groups) and rates of rehearsal (low in both groups). Theoretical and practical implications of these findings for research on depression and autobiographical memory are discussed.     

Comparing recollective experience in true and false autobiographical memories

This study investigated whether true autobiographical memories are qualitatively distinct from false autobiographical memories using a variation of the interview method originally reported by E. F. Loftus and J. Pickrell (1995). Participants recalled events provided by parents on 3 separate occasions and were asked to imagine true and false unremembered events. True memories were rated by both participants and observers as more rich in recollective experience and were rated by participants as more important, more emotionally intense, as having clearer imagery, and as less typical than false memories. Rehearsal frequency was used as a covariate, eliminating these effects. Imagery in true memories was most often viewed from the field perspective, whereas imagery in false memories was most often viewed from the observer perspective. More information was communicated in true memories, and true memories contained more information concerning the consequences of described events. Results suggest repeated remembering can make false memories more rich in recollective experience and more like true memories. Differences between true and false memories suggest some potentially distinct characteristics of false memories and provide insight into the process of false memory creation.     

Involuntary autobiographical memories in dysphoric mood: A laboratory study

The frequency and characteristics of involuntary autobiographical memories were compared in 25 stable dysphoric and 28 non-dysphoric participants, using a new laboratory-based task (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Participants detected infrequent target stimuli (vertical lines) in a simple vigilance task and recorded any involuntary autobiographical memories that came to mind, mostly in response to irrelevant words presented on the screen. Dysphoric participants reported involuntary memories as frequently and as quickly as non-dysphoric participants and their memories were not repetitive intrusive memories of negative or traumatic events. Additional content analysis showed that dysphoric participants did not recall more memories of objectively negative events (e.g., accidents, illnesses, deaths) than non-dysphoric participants. However, significant group differences emerged in terms of a mood congruency effect whereby dysphoric participants rated their memories as more negative than non-dysphoric participants. Moreover, the proportion of negatively rated involuntary memories was related to lower mood ratings at the end of the session in the dysphoric but not in the non-dysphoric group. Finally, groups did not differ on several memory characteristics such as vividness, specificity (high in both groups) and rates of rehearsal (low in both groups). Theoretical and practical implications of these findings for research on depression and autobiographical memory are discussed.     

Emotional content of true and false memories

Many people believe that emotional memories (including those that arise in therapy) are particularly likely to represent true events because of their emotional content. But is emotional content a reliable indicator of memory accuracy? The current research assessed the emotional content of participants’ pre-existing (true) and manipulated (false) memories for childhood events. False memories for one of three emotional childhood events were planted using a suggestive manipulation and then compared, along several subjective dimensions, with other participants’ true memories. On most emotional dimensions (e.g., how emotional was this event for you?), true and false memories were indistinguishable. On a few measures (e.g., intensity of feelings at the time of the event), true memories were more emotional than false memories in the aggregate, yet true and false memories were equally likely to be rated as uniformly emotional. These results suggest that even substantial emotional content may not reliably indicate memory accuracy.     

Priming involuntary autobiographical memories

Involuntary autobiographical memories occur frequently in daily life and are usually triggered by cues in one's environment. This study investigated the possibility that priming plays a role in the production of involuntary memories. In Study 1, participants recorded their involuntary memories in a diary for 14 days and then completed a questionnaire assessing their cognitive activity during the recording period. Participants indicating frequent thought about significant others on the questionnaire showed significantly more involuntary memories related to such individuals than a control group. In Studies 2 and 3, participants recorded their involuntary memories in diaries for 14 days and were primed with recall sessions in the laboratory during that period (recalling episodes from high school, Study 1, the past year, or ages 13-16, Studies 2 & 3). The results of both studies showed significant priming effects in the involuntary memories of participants for all of the periods primed. The possibility that priming plays a significant role in the daily production of involuntary memories is discussed.     

Interpreting the good life: growth memories in the lives of mature, happy people

In 2 studies, the authors examined autobiographical memories for the presence of 2 growth orientations that were expected to correspond differentially to maturity and well-being, which are considered to be key facets of "the good life" by L. A. King (2001). Mature participants emphasized integrative memories (conceptual integration and learning), whereas happy participants emphasized intrinsic memories (humanistic concerns). Both kinds of growth memories correlated more strongly with eudaimonic than with hedonic measures of well-being. Growth memories were largely independent of Big Five traits in relation to maturity and well-being. Finally, older participants were more likely than younger participants to have greater maturity (marginally) and well-being, but this was in part explained by older participants' greater tendency to have growth memories. The discussion considers the role of growth memories in the intentional cultivation of the good life.     

Me Too!: Social modelling influences on early autobiographical memories

To investigate the malleability of early memories, 200 participants were asked to describe their earliest memories. Before doing so, approximately half were exposed to confederates who described very early memories such as their first steps or a second birthday party, while others were asked only to think about their earliest memories for two minutes before beginning writing. Participants who were exposed to confederate very early memories produced memories that were nearly a year younger on average than the memories reported by controls (2.99 years vs. 3.96 years). Additionally, when participants in the memory discussion condition were asked about an early event that a confederate had recounted they were more confident than controls that they could recall the event in their own lives. These results indicate that autobiographical memories for early events are quite susceptible to social influence and that simply hearing the very early memories of others can alter autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting confidence in flashbulb memories

Years after a shocking news event many people confidently report details of their flashbulb memories (e.g., what they were doing). People's confidence is a defining feature of their flashbulb memories, but it is not well understood. We tested a model that predicted confidence in flashbulb memories. In particular we examined whether people's social bond with the target of a news event predicts confidence. At a first session shortly after the death of Michael Jackson participants reported their sense of attachment to Michael Jackson, as well as their flashbulb memories and emotional and other reactions to Jackson's death. At a second session approximately 18 months later they reported their flashbulb memories and confidence in those memories. Results supported our proposed model. A stronger sense of attachment to Jackson was related to reports of more initial surprise, emotion, and rehearsal during the first session. Participants' bond with Michael Jackson predicted their confidence but not the consistency of their flashbulb memories 18 months later. We also examined whether participants' initial forecasts regarding the persistence of their flashbulb memories predicted the durability of their memories. Participants' initial forecasts were more strongly related to participants' subsequent confidence than to the actual consistency of their memories.     

Autobiographical memories for places

The purpose of the present exploratory study was to investigate operations and contents of a naturally occurring reminiscence for physical places in 26 Swedish participants. Using Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) model of autobiographical memory as a framework, two main questions were examined. First, in what sense are physical places ingredients of our selves-that is, of our self-knowledge-and, if so, how are they and their characteristics organised in the autobiographical knowledge base? Second, what form do personal memories for places take and what kinds of meanings and emotional contents do we bind to this type of reminiscence? The results showed that the Swedish participants' most important places in their lives were mainly childhood- and cottage-related rural types of milieus, and mostly categorised as summarised events; that is, frequently revisited. The personal recollections of the place-related event-specific knowledge were mostly of the generic imagery type, comprising semantic, perceptual, and emotional contents related to the "self", "others", and the "environment". The memories mainly reflected on the participants' growth period and feelings of activation and pleasantness. This was more pronounced in older (M = 59) than in younger (M = 35) participants. All this indicates that physical places can serve as thematic pathways guiding reminiscence and self-knowing consciousness as we recollect details of perceptual, semantic, and emotional characters of periods in our lives.     

Priming voluntary autobiographical memories: Implications for the organisation of autobiographical memory and voluntary recall processes

The goal of this study was to show that voluntary autobiographical memories could be primed by the prior activation of autobiographical memories. Three experiments demonstrated voluntary memory priming with three different approaches. In Experiment 1 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their elementary school years. In a subsequent memory task primed participants were asked to recall memories from any time period, and they produced significantly more memories from their elementary school years than unprimed participants. In Experiment 2 primed participants were asked to recall what they were doing when they had heard various news events occurring between 1998 and 2005. Subsequently these participants produced significantly more memories from this time period than unprimed participants. In Experiment 3 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their teenage years. Subsequently these participants were able to recall more memories from ages 13–15 than unprimed participants, where both had only 1 second to produce a memory. We argue that the results support the notion that episodic memories can activate one another and that some of them are organised according to lifetime periods. We further argue that the results have implications for the reminiscence bump and voluntary recall of the past.     

Assessing the accuracy of conflicting autobiographical memories

We examined criteria that rememberers and neutral audiences use to validate conflicting memories. In Experiment 1, rememberers described an incident that they recalled differently from someone else from their own and the other person’s perspective. Rememberers and audiences then evaluated the accuracy of statements in both accounts, explained their accuracy ratings, and appraised the qualities of the memories. In Experiment 2, dyads who possessed conflicting memories of a shared past episode evaluated each other’s recollections. In both studies, rememberers rated their own recollections as more accurate than other people’s and based their judgments primarily on the internal coherence of the memories. Rememberers used consensus more frequently and sensory detail less often to evaluate other people’s memories than their own. Audiences (Experiment 1) reported examining the consistency between the accounts and their own experiences; they also used consensus and normative behavior to a greater extent than rememberers. In both studies, rememberers judged their own accounts to be more detailed and coherent. Their ratings of detail and coherence predicted their ratings of accuracy.     

A comparison of Chinese and American memories for public events

Memory for public events was compared across Chinese and U.S. participants to explore competing explanations for cultural differences in flashbulb memories. Participant recall of the canonical features of events was more detailed and more likely to include a specific time in the United States than in the Chinese reports. Vividness was positively correlated with the flashbulb memory scores only in the U.S. sample. In both cultures, emotion, national importance, and thinking about the event predicted vividness and recall of memory details. Chinese participants reported primarily disasters and social events, and their memories were more likely to include international events than U.S. participants. The U.S. participants recalled primarily political events and terrorism. These results suggest that culture has important influences on the quantity, level of detail, completeness, and vividness of autobiographical memories as well as on the types of events triggering flashbulb memories.