共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Peter Brian Barry 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(1):5-21
Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally
responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth
of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed
to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers
sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons
into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being
evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents. 相似文献
2.
Philip Kremer 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(4):345-367
In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth “its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept
under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the
language.” To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a
model is Thomason: they argue that a model is Thomason when there is no vicious reference in it. We extend their investigation,
considering notions of nonpathologicality and senses of “no vicious reference” generated both by revision theories of truth
and by fixed-point theories of truth. We show that some of the fixed-point theories have an advantage analogous to that which
Gupta and Belnap claim for their approach, and that at least one revision theory does not. This calls into question the claim
that the revision theories have a distinctive advantage in this regard. 相似文献
3.
Gordon Tait 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(3):239-254
This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and
the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides 12 familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological
and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested
that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments
if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic. 相似文献
4.
Gilead Bar-Elli 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):165-184
That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which
analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification,
respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists.
Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which
is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction
for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched. 相似文献
5.
Wang-Yen Lee 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(2):299-313
Pragmatic Scientific Realism (PSR) urges us to take up the realist aim or the goal of truth although we have good reason to
think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. While Newton-Smith thinks that pursuing what we know we cannot
achieve is clearly irrational, Rescher disagrees and contends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmatic
grounds—if in pursuing the unreachable goal one can get indirect benefits. I have blocked this attempt at providing a pragmatic
justification for the realist aim of PSR on precisely the same pragmatic grounds—since there is a competing alternative to
PSR, and the alternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PSR can offer while being less risky than it is, prudential
reasoning favours the alternative to PSR. This undermines the pragmatic case for the realist aim of science since the instrumentalist
alternative does not aim at the truth. 相似文献
6.
Krist Vaesen 《Synthese》2011,181(3):515-529
The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing
that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p. Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual
knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing
to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism
is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore
should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived),
the most salient feature explaining S’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S, that is, it might be a feature of S’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S, and hence, CTK is false. 相似文献
7.
Melvin Fitting 《Studia Logica》2009,91(3):335-366
This is a largely expository paper in which the following simple idea is pursued. Take the truth value of a formula to be
the set of agents that accept the formula as true. This means we work with an arbitrary (finite) Boolean algebra as the truth
value space. When this is properly formalized, complete modal tableau systems exist, and there are natural versions of bisimulations
that behave well from an algebraic point of view. There remain significant problems concerning the proper formalization, in
this context, of natural language statements, particularly those involving negative knowledge and common knowledge. A case
study is presented which brings these problems to the fore. None of the basic material presented here is new to this paper—all
has appeared in several papers over many years, by the present author and by others. Much of the development in the literature
is more general than here—we have confined things to the Boolean case for simplicity and clarity. Most proofs are omitted,
but several of the examples are new. The main virtue of the present paper is its coherent presentation of a systematic point
of view—identify the truth value of a formula with the set of those who say the formula is true. 相似文献
8.
In the tripartite model of working memory (WM) it is postulated that a unique part system—the visuo-spatial sketchpad (VSSP)—processes
non-verbal content. Due to behavioral and neurophysiological findings, the VSSP was later subdivided into visual object and
visual spatial processing, the former representing objects’ appearance and the latter spatial information. This distinction
is well supported. However, a challenge to this model is the question how spatial information from non-visual sensory modalities,
for example the auditory one, is processed. Only a few studies so far have directly compared visual and auditory spatial WM.
They suggest that the distinction of two processing domains—one for object and one for spatial information—also holds true
for auditory WM, but that only a part of the processes is modality specific. We propose that processing in the object domain
(the item’s appearance) is modality specific, while spatial WM as well as object-location binding relies on modality general
processes. 相似文献
9.
John Nolt 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(3):203-237
Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions
of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if
it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique
of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic
logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth”
defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent upon one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also
upon one’s standards of warrant. 相似文献
10.
Cezary Cieśliński 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(3):325-337
By a classical result of Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan, pathological satisfaction classes can be constructed for countable,
recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic. In this paper we consider the question of whether the pathology can be eliminated;
we ask in effect what generalities involving the notion of truth can be obtained in a deflationary truth theory (a theory
of truth which is conservative over its base). It is shown that the answer depends on the notion of pathology we adopt. It
turns out in particular that a certain natural closure condition imposed on a satisfaction class—namely, closure of truth
under sentential proofs—generates a nonconservative extension of a syntactic base theory (Peano arithmetic). 相似文献
11.
Wenfang Wang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(3):492-500
Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Classical dialetheism holds further the view that the law of excluded
middle is indeed a logical law. Most famous dialetheists, such as G. Priest and J. Beall, are classical dialetheists; they
take classical dialetheism to be the only plausible solution to the semantic paradoxes. The main contention of the paper is,
however, that their views should be rejected. Based on inspecting Priest’s and Beall’s dialetheist theories from a special
perspective, this paper contends that classical dialetheism has no natural and plausible way to assign truth values to various
truth-ineliminable sentences, i.e., sentences whose truth-conditions essentially involve the property of being true. Several examples of such truth-ineliminable sentences are given in the paper, and two classical dialetheist strategies for
assigning them truth values are inspected. This paper argues that none of these strategies is successful. 相似文献
12.
Benjamin McMyler 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(3):337-352
According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which
an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view
has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of
the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial
speaker rather than the audience, and so it isn’t clear that testimonial knowers are appropriately creditable for the truth of their
beliefs. I argue that the credit view of knowledge can be saved from Lackey’s objection by focusing on the way in which testimonial
knowledge is the result of an essentially social epistemic ability. While there is indeed a sense in which a testimonial knower
is only partially epistemically responsible for her testimonial belief, this is consistent with the truth of her belief being
creditable to her in another sense. The truth of her belief is most saliently explained by, and hence is fully creditable
to, an essentially social epistemic ability, an ability that is only partially seated in the knowing subject. 相似文献
13.
The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has
taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is
false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians
have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that
PAP is false, but that it is explanatorily irrelevant. Derk Pereboom and David Hunt’s buffer cases are tailor made to establish
this conclusion. In this paper I come to the aid of PAP, showing that buffer cases provide no reason for doubting either its
truth or relevance with respect to explaining an agent’s moral responsibility. 相似文献
14.
15.
Laurance J. Splitter 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(4):343-362
I take as my starting point recent concerns from within educational psychology about the need to treat the conceptual and
philosophical underpinnings of empirical research in the field more seriously, specifically in the context of work on the
self, mind and agency. Developing this theme, I find such conceptual support in the writings of P. F. Strawson and Donald
Davidson, two giants of analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. Drawing particularly on Davidson’s
later work, in which he seeks to integrate key claims about subjectivity, objectivity, belief, truth and knowledge, within
what he refers to as a triangular framework of two speakers and a common world, I find support for pedagogic and classroom
organizational structures based on collaborative thinking and dialogue. While Davidson did not write about education, I argue
that his framework has much to offer, most particularly in view of the priority it affords language and dialogue as the necessary
and sufficient conditions for reason, belief and thought—in short, for being a person in the world. 相似文献
16.
David E. Cooper 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(2-3):79-87
Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten
the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams,
as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth (a property of beliefs),
and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves
into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of teachers, which they have a special obligation to exercise
in the face of competing aims. This paper defends the idea of distinctive professional duties and considers two conceptions
of teaching which ascribe a central place to truthfulness. The first conceives of teaching as a personal relationship within
which trust, and hence, it is claimed, truthfulness, are paramount. This claim is challenged, and the paper concludes by sympathetically
considering a second conception of teaching, articulated by Oakeshott and Heidegger. In this conception, teaching is a ‘releasement’
from ‘the daily flux’ of pupils’ lives through a truthful initiation into the alternatives to this ‘daily flux’ found within
‘the civilized inheritance of mankind’. 相似文献
17.
Daniel Guevara 《Synthese》2008,164(1):45-60
Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from
an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples.
But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated
formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive
about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be. 相似文献
18.
James Beilby 《Sophia》2002,41(1):19-32
There has been much debate in both theological and philosophical circles over the matter of evidentialism—that is, whether
an individual must augment or supplement their belief in God with evidences supportive of that belief. However, what has been
(for the most part) lacking is a discussion which endeavors to integrate theological and philosophical desiderata. In this
paper I will suggest that the framework for such a discussion can be found in the work of St. Augustine—in particular, in
the way he holds together his belief in the sufficiency and necessity of faith and his ample use of evidences for belief in
God. 相似文献
19.
Information that initially is presumed to be correct, but that is later retracted or corrected, often continues to influence
memory and reasoning. This occurs even if the retraction itself is well remembered. The present study investigated whether
the continued influence of misinformation can be reduced by explicitly warning people at the outset that they may be misled.
A specific warning— giving detailed information about the continued influence effect (CIE)—succeeded in reducing the continued
reliance on outdated information but did not eliminate it. A more general warning—reminding people that facts are not always
properly checked before information is disseminated—was even less effective. In an additional experiment, a specific warning
was combined with the provision of a plausible alternative explanation for the retracted information. This combined manipulation
further reduced the CIE but still failed to eliminate it altogether. 相似文献
20.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献