Traces of Reduction: Marion and Heidegger on the Phenomenon of Religion

In his work, Being Given, Jean‐Luc Marion calls for a phenomenological investigation of the givenness (donation) of the phenomenon. As a phenomenologist of religion, Marion aims to give a philosophical account of the possibility of revelation, something which by definition is unconditionally given. In Being Given, he contends that his phenomenological reduction to unconditional givenness (in the figure of the saturated phenomenon) can account for religious phenomena in a way that respects the subject matter, all the while remaining philosophically neutral. In this paper I argue that Marion's aim to maintain strict philosophical neutrality interferes with his attempt to respect the subject matter of his own investigation, i.e., the givenness of revelation, since revelation is recognizably given, even as possibility, only in the non‐neutral context of an interpretive tradition. I establish the latter claim with recourse to Heidegger's early hermeneutic sketches of ‘primordial Christian religiosity.’ In turn, I call for a phenomenological Destruktion of Marion's work in order to release its potential as a non‐neutral investigation of a distinctively Catholic religiosity.     

Blurred vision: Marion on the ‘possibility’ of revelation

In this paper I challenge Merold Westphal’s claim that Jean-Luc Marion’s hermeneutical phenomenology is especially useful for theology. I argue that in spite of his explicit allegiance to Husserl’s “principle of all principles,” Marion fails to embody a commitment to phenomenological seeing in his analyses of revelation. In the sections of Being Given where he discusses revelation, Marion allows faith-based claims to bleed into his phenomenological analyses, resulting in what I call his ‘blurred vision’—the pretension that phenomenological seeing can be extended to theological matters. This pretension undermines Marion’s phenomenological aspirations, because it invests his analyses with a theological content that phenomenological intuition cannot account for or clarify. At the same time, this blurring of the line between theology and phenomenology also makes Marion’s work theologically ineffective. For it furnishes the theologian and believer with the false assurance that faith-based commitments can be grounded in phenomenological knowledge—a claim that he simply cannot make good on. In light of these problems, I propose an alternative Heideggerian approach that maintains the boundary between philosophical and theological discourse and thereby safeguards the integrity of both.     

Do You Have the Heart to Come to Faith? A Look at Anti‐Climacus' Reading of Matthew 11.6

In Practice in Christianity, Søren Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Anti‐Climacus enters into an extended engagement with Matthew 11.6, ‘Blessed is he who takes no offense at me’. In so doing, he comes to an understanding that ‘the possibility of offense’ characterises the ‘crossroad’ at which one either comes to faith in Christ's revelation or rejects it. Such a choice, as he is well aware, cannot be made from a neutral standpoint, and so he is led to propose that it is ‘the thoughts of the heart’ (i.e. a person's disposition) that constitute the pivotal factor in determining whether or not God will reconcile a person into the Christian faith. In this paper, I discuss Anti‐Climacus' interpretation of Mt. 11.6 and consider his reasons for interpreting a person's predisposition as being so decisive for faith.     

"They recognized him; and he became invisible to them"

Marion here provides a philosophical/exegetical reflection on the Emmaus episode (Luke 24:13–25) with a view to debunking (as both inane and blasphemous) a widely entertained understanding of faith as "a deficit of intuition"—something which has to be "added" to human powers "to compensate faulty intuition". Rather, Marion argues that faith is not so much required in order to recapture a lack in intuition but more a proper response in the face of an excess of intuition in relation to "a deficiency of statements and a dearth of concepts".     

A GIFT TO THEOLOGY? JEAN‐LUC MARION'S ‘SATURATED PHENOMENON’ IN CHRISTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Jean‐Luc Marion has recently established himself as one of the most important and theologically fertile thinkers within the phenomenological tradition. With his study of ‘the gift’ and ‘the saturated phenomenon’, Marion presents a challenge to theology to rethink revelation in its surprising givenness, as exceeding the boundaries often set up in advance by metaphysics and a priori anthropological foundations. This paper examines Marion's mature thought, particularly within the perspective of Christology. The paper argues that Marion's phenomenological style of reflection, as adapted to theology, is deeply contemplative and markedly Johannine in sensibility. As a strategy for theology, the phenomenological style gives to it important incentives and skills for reading off God's self‐revelation in Christ in its surprising and counter‐intuitive beauty. Marion's challenge/gift to theology is, however, in need of a balancing emphasis, one that appears too infrequently in his work: the ethical‐prophetic dimension of the Christ event. In view of keeping both the mystical and prophetic poles of theology closely linked, the paper argues that just as beauty is a key category for saturated phenomena, so too is the reality of suffering and evil. However, whereas beauty invites a humble receptivity to and contemplative enjoyment of the gift, the inscrutable reality of suffering and evil, which so often exceeds comprehension, touches off a critical and practical response. In broadening the study of saturated phenomena to include the refractory character of experience, especially that which threatens humanity, Marion's valuable contributions to theology require a complementary emphasis from those narrative‐practical Christologies that highlight the prophetic aspects of the tradition.     

DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECTIVE CRITERIA TO EVALUATE THE AUTHENTICITY OF REVELATION

Science has been dazzlingly successful in explaining nature. Scientific advances also have led to certain undesirable, though unintended, side effects, one of which is alienation from the spiritual. Revelation comes from the Divine. But what is the status of authenticity of a particular piece claimed to be revelation? What is its historical validity and current state of preservation? This essay proposes to develop a list of rational criteria, in consultation with all stakeholders, for addressing the subject. The aim is to bring objectivity into this discourse by placing it more on the turf of reason rather than basing it on considerations of faith and prior allegiance.     

A Critical Reading of Jean-Luc Marion's Interpretation of Anselm's Ontological Argument

In this essay, I qualify Jean-Luc Marion's anti-ontological interpretation of Anselm's argument. Marion claims that the argument is not ontological but in line with Dionysian apophatic theology. To substantiate his anti-ontological reading, Marion suggests that the main regulative idea of the Proslogion is bonum. The final regulative idea, however, is gaudium, since gaudium, not bonum, leads the argument to the beatific vision. If we reformulate the Proslogion focusing on gaudium, we find that Marion's analysis misses the evident ontological aspects of the argument, such as the tradition of prayer and hermeneutics. Since Anselm promulgated the argument within the Benedictine tradition of Bec, the practice of prayer or meditation is the legitimate context of the argument. However, because of his emphasis on the structure of call and response over the ontological and hermeneutical aspects of revelation, his analysis neglects the importance of the hermeneutic relation within which the Proslogion is born.     

In Search of the Self's Grounding Power: Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death as Dogmatics for Unbelievers

Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death can be read as an attempt to present the Christian message in a way that makes sense for unbelievers without violating the integrity of the Christian faith. This is done by exploring the psychological implications of the lack of faith in a way that is supposed to make sense even for those who take offence at the Christian message and do not accept the anthropological implications of the story of the incarnation as their basic point of orientation. It is argued that this attempt is successful, and that this can be demonstrated both by the consistency of the argument and the breadth of its Wirkungsgeschichte.     

PHENOMENOLOGY OF DIVINE REVELATION: THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY IN DIALOGUE

Although the relationship between theology and philosophy is a perennial issue in the history of thought, recent debates surrounding the so-called theological turn of continental phenomenology have created a new space in which it can be explored from a fresh perspective. In this vein, I propose three theses concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy of religion, with particular focus on the phenomenon of divine revelation. First, a philosophy of religion that ignores theology's claim about divine self-revelation will remain incomplete and unsatisfactory, at least from the perspective of a Christian theology which begins with the faith in God's self-revelation in one particular human person. Second, a theology that does not acknowledge the possibility of philosophical reflections on the human aspect of divine revelation will not be able to escape blind dogmatism, but rather will isolate itself from the academic community. Third, and finally, despite the concerns of both parties, a dialogue between theology and philosophy centred on the phenomena of revelation can develop into mutually critical and mutually constructive interactions.     

The Curious Case of Mr. Locke’s Miracles

Locke considers miracles to be crucial in establishing the credibility and reasonableness of Christian faith and revelation. The performance of miracles, he argues, is vital in establishing the “credit of the proposer” who makes any claim to providing a divine revelation. He accords reason a pivotal role in distinguishing spurious from genuine claims to divine revelation, including miracles. According to Locke, genuine miracles contain the hallmark of the divine such that pretend revelations become intuitively obvious. This paper argues that serious tensions exist in Locke’s position regarding miracles, which impact on the reasonableness of the assent to Christianity which he presumes they provide.     

REVEALING THE INVISIBLE: GREGORY OF NYSSA ON THE GIFT OF REVELATION

In this essay, Gregory of Nyssa is used as a foil against both John Milbank and Jean‐Luc Marion in order to take a fresh approach to the debate on the “gift” and the theological ramifications for the structure of giving. There is a complexity to Gregory's thought on gift which has not been adequately captured by either contemporary thinkers. With an understanding of giving which both enables and nullifies human generosity and calculation, and a construal of revelation as God's gift to creation by which one both receives and simultaneously endlessly seeks out a vision of the invisible, Gregory holds together in creative tension the very aspects which mark the difference between Milbank and Marion: economy and gratuitousness, participation and passive receptivity.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS FOR THE LIFE OF FAITH

This essay proceeds, first, with an analysis of the theme of overcoming metaphysics in Kant and Heidegger to see just what it is that needs overcoming and how this might be of service to the life of biblical, ecclesial faith. This is followed by an account of how Jean‐Luc Marion sees the right kind of phenomenology as performing this task and of John Milbank's counterclaim that “only theology overcomes metaphysics”. Marion's position is then defended as a genuine, if partial overcoming that needs theology for its completion. Finally, a brief account is offered of the authentically metaphysical dimension of theology.     

Belief, faith, and acceptance

Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term ‘belief’ is used where ‘faith’ or ‘acceptance’ would better express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something to have a property) and, more importantly, belief in (a trusting attitude that is illustrated by at least many paradigm cases of belief in God). Faith is shown to have a similar complexity, and even propositional faith divides into importantly different categories. Acceptance differs from both belief and faith in that at least one kind of acceptance is behavioral in a way neither of the other two elements is. Acceptance of a proposition, it is argued, does not entail believing it, nor does believing entail acceptance in any distinctive sense of the latter term. In characterizing these three notions (and related ones), the paper provides some basic materials important both for understanding a person’s religious position and for appraising its rationality. The nature of religious faith and some of the conditions for its rationality, including some deriving from elements of an ethics of belief, are explored in some detail.     

Fried and Freud on the Acropolis; on duality in the base of psychoanalytic thinking

Freud was conflicted in relation to his religious background. On the one hand, he was very clear on his adherence to a scientific Weltanschauung. On the other, he was fascinated by the Moses figure and one may see a Judaist structure in his way of thinking. The aim of this paper is to reflect on this conflict and the question of faith in psychoanalysis. After looking at object and method in religion and psychoanalysis, the authors go into the concept of ‘psychic reality’ and its change in the history of psychoanalysis. Through an analysis of Freud’s A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis and the function of literature, it is claimed that faith may be seen as a condition for the sense of experiential reality.     

Reason and revelation: Kant and the problem of authority

This paper explores the significance of authority for Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation. Beginning with the separation of the faculties of Theology and Philosophy in Conflict, it will be shown that Kant sees a clear distinction between the authority of reason and that of revelation. However, when one turns to Religion, it is also clear that Kant sees an important, perhaps necessary, relationship between the two. Drawing on a variety of texts, in particular those concerning the public and private use of reason, this paper then explores the relationship between the authority of reason and that of revelation. From this discussion, several conclusions will be drawn regarding Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation, namely that while distinct, the two are not necessarily in conflict and that, ultimately, the proper functioning of public reason must include some reference to revelation.     

Christ’s faith,doubt, and the cry of dereliction

According to accounts of the Passion, Christ cries out from the cross, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” The cry, I argue, manifests that Christ lacks a belief that God is with him. Given the standard view of faith—belief that p is required for faith that p—it would follow that Christ lost his faith that God is with him just before he died. In this paper, I challenge the standard view by looking at the cognitive requirement of faith. Although faith that p requires some positive cognitive orientation toward p, that orientation need not be belief. I show that reliance is an alternative stance that fulfills the cognitive requirement of faith. Reliance aims at providing sensible guidance for action that is in accord with one’s values/ends. Thinking of the cognitive component of Christ’s faith in terms of reliance makes sense of the doubt manifested in his cry.     

Islamic Positivism and Scientific Truth: Qur’an and Archeology in a Creationist Documentary Film

The ambition of “scientific creationism” is to prove that science actually confirms religion. This is especially true in the case of Muslim creationism, which adopts a reasoning of a syllogistic type: divine revelation is truth; good science confirms truth; divine revelation is henceforth scientifically proven. Harun Yahya is a prominent Muslim “creationist” whose website hosts many texts and documentary films, among which “Evidence of the true faith in historical sources”. This is a small audiovisual production which, starting from some archeological files, seeks to demonstrate that Qur’an truth precedes science but is equally proven by it. In this paper, we examine the organization of the scientific and religious argumentative repertoires and, in particular, what in each of them is taken as evidence and gets access to an authoritative status. It leads us to show how much this type of Muslim creationism constitutes a kind of scientism.     

The Problem of Ontotheology: Complicating the Divide Between Philosophy and Theology

This paper examines the problem of ontotheology as it was defined by Martin Heidegger, and how it has subsequently been approached by those philosophers and theologians who have followed in his wake. It argues that Heidegger's initial analysis of the onto-theological condition was mistaken by its presumption of a radical divide between philosophy and theology. Furthermore, many of the key thinkers who have followed after Heidegger have merely reinscribed this supposed divide between thought and faith, rather than genuinely questioning the terms Heidegger thought self-evident. The result, even among some of the most radical and influential contemporary thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, John Caputo, and Jean-Luc Marion, has been a contemporary philosophy deprived of questions of faith and a theology unaccountable to its place in the world. In response to this shortcoming of contemporary philosophical and theological thought, Jacques Derrida has approached the problem of ontotheology from the dual perspective of both thought and faith, and thereby, has provided a new path of thought beyond the problem of ontotheology and towards a renewed appreciation for the possibilities for a genuine philosophical theology.