Response latencies in naming objects

After some preliminary analysis of what is involved in naming objects, in which the possible role of classificatory systems in the memory store is discussed, it is shown experimentally that there are consistent differences between the times taken to respond to presented objects by uttering their names, variations between the performances of different individuals being outweighed by variations due to the different objects. Moreover, there is a high consistency between different individuals as to the ordering of objects in respect of their naming latencies. It is further shown that a high correlation exists between the time taken to name an object and the frequency with which its name occurs in the language as a whole, as estimated in the Thorndike-Lorge Word List. Some implications of these findings are discussed, especially with reference to possible mechanisms by which presented objects are visually identified, and the appropriate names retrieved from the “word-store.”     

Depth representation of moving 3-D objects in apparent-motion path

Apparent motion is perceived when two objects are presented alternately at different positions. The internal representations of apparently moving objects are formed in an apparent-motion path which lacks physical inputs. We investigated the depth information contained in the representation of 3-D moving objects in an apparent-motion path. We examined how probe objects-briefly placed in the motion path-affected the perceived smoothness of apparent motion. The probe objects comprised 3-D objects which were defined by being shaded or by disparity (convex/concave) or 2-D (flat) objects, while the moving objects were convex/concave objects. We found that flat probe objects induced a significantly smoother motion perception than concave probe objects only in the case of the convex moving objects. However, convex probe objects did not lead to smoother motion as the flat objects did, although the convex probe objects contained the same depth information for the moving objects. Moreover, the difference between probe objects was reduced when the moving objects were concave. These counterintuitive results were consistent in conditions when both depth cues were used. The results suggest that internal representations contain incomplete depth information that is intermediate between that of 2-D and 3-D objects.     

Framing pictures: the role of knowledge in automatized encoding and memory for gist

In general, frame theories are theories about the representation and use of knowledge for pattern recognition. In the present article, the general properties of frame theories are discussed with regard to their implications for psychological processes, and an experiment is presented which tests whether this approach yields viable predictions about the manner in which people comprehend and remember pictures of real-world scenes. Normative ratings were used to construct six target pictures, each of which contained both expected and unexpected objects. Eye movements were then recorded as subjects who anticipated a difficult recognition test viewed the targets for 30 sec each. Then, the subjects were asked to discriminate the target pictures from distractors in which either expected or unexpected objects had been changed. One consequence of the embeddedness of frame systems is that global frames may function as "semantic pattern detectors," so that the perceptual knowledge in them could be used for relatively automatic pattern recognition and comprehension. Thus, subjects might be able to identify expected objects by using automatized encoding procedures that operate on global physical features. In contrast, identification of unexpected objects (i.e., objects not represented in the currently active frame) should generally require more analysis of local visual details. These hypotheses were confirmed with the fixation duration data: First fixations to the unexpected objects were approximately twice as long as first fixations to the expected objects. On the recognition test, subjects generally noticed only the changes that had been made to the unexpected objects, despite the fact that the proportions of correct rejections were made conditional on whether the target objects had been fixated. These data are again consistent with the idea that local visual details of objects represented in the frame are not neccesary for identification and are thus not generally encoded. Further, since subjects usually did not notice when expected objects were deleted or replaced with different expected objects, it was concluded that if two events instantiate the same frame, they may often be indistinguishable, as long as any differences between them are represented as arguments in the frame. Thus, for the most part, the only information about an event that is episodically "tagged" is information which distinguishes that particular event from others of the same general class. The data reinforce the utility of a frame theory approach to perception and memory.     

Semantically incongruent objects attract eye gaze when viewing scenes for change

Past research has shown that change detection performance is often more efficient for target objects that are semantically incongruent with a surrounding scene context than for target objects that are semantically congruent with the scene context. One account of these findings is that attention is attracted to objects for which the identity of the object conflicts with the meaning of the scene, perhaps as a violation of expectancies created by earlier recruitment of scene gist information. An alternative account of the performance benefit for incongruent objects is that attention is more apt to linger on incongruent objects, as perhaps identifying these objects is more difficult due to conflicting information from the scene context. In the current experiment, we present natural scenes in a change detection task while monitoring eye movements. We find that eye gaze is attracted to these objects relatively early during scene processing.     

Logical structuralism and Benacerraf’s problem

There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called “Benacerraf’s Problem”, which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf’s problem.     

Unconfigured Tractarian Objects

According to the Tractatus , the world consists of atomic objects arranged in various configurations, and the ways the world might be are determined by the ways these objects can be configured. The question I address is whether these very objects can be unconfigured as well as configured. Much depends on a positive answer to this question, including, as I show, the internal coherence of the Tractatus itself. I argue that these objects can be unconfigured, and am critical of certain interpretive claims made by Fogelin which lead to the conclusion that they cannot be.     

What's in a shape? Children represent shape variability differently than adults when naming objects

Children and adults often generalize a word to objects of the same shape. However, the shape properties on which generalization is based are unknown. We investigated the degree to which two shape dimensions were represented categorically by children and adults when learning names for objects. Multidimensional scaling techniques were used to establish the perceptual similarity of two sets of objects in Experiment 1. In Experiments 2 and 3, children (from 2;8 to 4;5 years of age) and adults participated in two tasks in which they learned a novel name for an exemplar. We then examined how often the novel name was generalized to different objects and to line drawings of the objects. In one task, participants generalized the names from memory; in a second task the exemplar was in front of the participant during generalization. Adults accepted names more often to objects that fell "within" the proposed shape boundaries than to objects that fell "across" the boundaries. Children, however, were just as likely to generalize names to novel objects that fell within as to objects that crossed the boundaries.     

Is transcendental idealism coherent?

I argue that transcendental idealism can be understood as a coherent and plausible account of experience. I begin by proposing an interpretation of the claim that we know only appearances that does not imply that the objects of experience are anything other than independently real objects. As I understand it, the claim here is abouthow objects appear to us, and not aboutwhat objects appear to us. After this, I offer a version of a correspondence account of veridical experience, in virtue of which these independent entities can satisfy the contents of our experiences. Specifically, I claim that veridical experience can be construed as a kind of map of reality in itself, and that these independent entities satisfy the contents of our experiences when they are, given the proper method of projection, the objects mapped by those experiences.     

Smelling matter

While the objects of olfaction are intuitively individuated by reference to the ordinary objects from which they arise, this intuition does not accurately capture the complex nature of smells. Smells are neither ordinary three-dimensional objects, nor Platonic vapors, nor odors. Rather, smells are the molecular structures of chemical compounds within odor plumes. Molecular Structure Theory is offered as an account of smells, which can explain the nature of the external object of olfactory perception, what we experience as olfactory objects, and what determines the olfactory quality of smells by which we can demarcate the spatiotemporal boundaries of smells.     

An unforgettable apple: Memory and attention for forbidden objects

Are we humans drawn to the forbidden? From jumbo-sized soft drinks to illicit substances, the influence of prohibited ownership on subsequent demand has made this question a pressing one. We know that objects that we ourselves own have a heightened psychological saliency, relative to comparable objects that are owned by others, but do these kinds of effects extend from self-owned to “forbidden” objects? To address this question, we developed a modified version of the Turk shopping paradigm in which “purchased” items were assigned to various recipients. Participants sorted everyday objects labeled as “self-owned”, “other-owned,” and either “forbidden to oneself” (Experiment 1) or “forbidden to everyone” (Experiment 2). Subsequent surprise recognition memory tests revealed that forbidden objects with high (Experiment 1) but not with low (Experiment 2) self-relevance were recognized as well as were self-owned objects, and better than other-owned objects. In a third and final experiment, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine whether self-owned and self-forbidden objects, which showed a common memory advantage, are in fact treated the same at a neurocognitive–affective level. We found that both object types were associated with enhanced cognitive analysis, relative to other-owned objects, as measured by the P300 ERP component. However, we also found that self-forbidden objects uniquely triggered an enhanced response preceding the P300, in an ERP component (the N2) that is sensitive to more rapid, affect-related processing. Our findings thus suggest that, whereas self-forbidden objects share a common cognitive signature with self-owned objects, they are unique in being identified more quickly at a neurocognitive level.     

Categorizing objects in isolation and in scenes: what a superordinate is good for

Many studies have shown that subjects are faster at categorizing objects into "basic" concepts than into more general superordinate concepts. However, all of these studies have used a categorization task in which single, isolated objects are identified. There is good reason to believe that superordinate concepts are typically used to refer to collections of objects rather than to individual objects. For example, people more often use the term furniture to refer to a number of pieces of furniture rather than to name a single piece. This suggest that superordinate concepts include information about multiple objects and their common relations, particularly the typical scenes in which such objects appear. Four experiments examined this possibility by investigating whether the basic concept advantage will decrease or reverse itself when subjects are asked to categorize an object as part of a scene. The results showed that the basic-superordinate difference did decrease when subjects categorized objects in scenes. Furthermore, when an object was placed in an inappropriate scene, there was more interference for superordinate identifications. The results suggest qualitative differences in the representations of superordinate and basic concepts.     

Russell's Early Theory of Denoting

The ancient Greek method of analysis has a rational reconstruction in the form of the tableau method of logical proof. This reconstruction shows that the format of analysis was largely determined by the requirement that proofs could be formulated by reference to geometrical figures. In problematic analysis, it has to be assumed not only that the theorem to be proved is true, but also that it is known. This means using epistemic logic, where instantiations of variables are typically allowed only with respect to known objects. This requirement explains the preoccupation of Greek geometers with questions as to which geometrical objects are ‘given’, that is, known or ‘data’, as in the title of Euclid's eponymous book. In problematic analysis, constructions had to rely on objects that are known only hypothetically. This seems strange unless one relies on a robust idea of ‘unknown’ objects in the same sense as the unknowns of algebra. The Greeks did not have such a concept, which made their grasp of the analytic method shaky.     

Motor affordance and its role for visual working memory: evidence from fMRI studies

We examined the role of motor affordances of objects for working memory retention processes. Three experiments are reported in which participants passively viewed pictures of real world objects or had to retain the objects in working memory for a comparison with an S2 stimulus. Brain activation was recorded by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Retaining information about objects for which hand actions could easily be retrieved (manipulable objects) in working memory activated the hand region of the ventral premotor cortex (PMC) contralateral to the dominant hand. Conversely, nonmanipulable objects activated the left inferior frontal gyrus. This suggests that working memory for objects with motor affordance is based on motor programs associated with their use. An additional study revealed that motor program activation can be modulated by task demands: Holding manipulable objects in working memory for an upcoming motor comparison task was associated with left ventral PMC activation. However, retaining the same objects for a subsequent size comparison task led to activation in posterior brain regions. This suggests that the activation of hand motor programs are under top down control. By this they can flexibly be adapted to various task demands. It is argued that hand motor programs may serve a similar working memory function as speech motor programs for verbalizable working memory contents, and that the premotor system mediates the temporal integration of motor representations with other task-relevant representations in support of goal oriented behavior.     

Visual search asymmetry for viewing direction

In visual search experiments, we examined the existence of a search asymmetry for the direction with which three-dimensional objects are viewed. It was found that an upward-tilted target object among downward-tilted distracting objects was detected faster than when the orientation of target and distractors was reversed. This indicates that the early visual process regards objects tilted downward with respect to the observer as the situation that is more likely to be encountered. That is, the system is set up to expect to see the tops of these objects. We also found a visual field anisotropy, in that the asymmetry was more pronounced in the lower visual field. These findings are consistent with the idea that the tops of objects are usually situated in the lower visual field and less often in the upper field. Examination of the conditions under which the asymmetry and the anisotropy occur demonstrated the importance of the three-dimensional nature of the stimulus objects. Early visual processing thus makes use of heuristics that take into account specific relationships between the relative locations in space of the observer and 3-D objects.     

Self as a second-order object: Reinterpreting the Jamesian “Me”

Existing definitions of the self can be lumped into three groups: self as self-reflectivity, self as self-concept, and self as the individual. This article traces current disagreements over the definition of the self to a crucial ambiguity in William James's original delineation of the “Me.” Implicit in James's delineation was a distinction between first-order objects and second-order objects: while first-order objects are things as they are, independent of the perception of a knowing subject, second-order objects are things as perceived by a knowing subject. This article makes this distinction explicit and argues that the self is a second-order object associated with the first-person or “emic” perspective. Defined as the empirical existence of the individual (first order) perceived by the individual as “me” or “mine” (second order), the self is distinguished from the “I” which is the mental capacity for self-reflection; the self-concept which is the mental representation of the individual's existence; and the individual which is the empirical referent of the self-concept. As a second-order object, the “Me,” i.e., the self, is the unity of the existence and perception of the individual.     

Epistemic Objects as Interactive Loci

Contemporary process metaphysics has achieved a number of important results, most significantly in accounting for emergence, a problem on which substance metaphysics has foundered since Plato. It also faces trenchant problems of its own, among them the related problems of boundaries and individuation. Historically, the quest for ontology may thus have been largely responsible for the persistence of substance metaphysics. But as Plato was well aware, an ontology of substantial things raises serious, perhaps insurmountable problems for any account of our epistemic access to such things. Physical things are subject to change, and as such, they are poor objects of knowledge—if knowledge is to be more reliable than mere opinion. There is a reading of Plato’s Theaetetus on which knowledge may be understood as a relation between an epistemic subject and a logos, where logoi are intrinsically dialectical, and where dialectic is a kind of intersubjective activity. Insofar as this epistemology may be attributed to Plato, the project of this paper is Platonic in spirit. It is also, in a sense, Kantian, in that it divorces ontology from the search for things-in-themselves, redirecting our attention from things to objects: epistemic objects. Such objects can be understood, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty proposed, as shared by multiple subjects by virtue of their participation in an intersubjective world, constituted by what Shaun Gallagher calls “participatory sense-making.” On an epistemology constructed in this way, the fact that both epistemic objects and their subject are mutable is no obstacle to knowledge. Far-from-equilibrium systems are forever mutable; at thermodynamic equilibrium, there would be neither subject, nor object. Epistemic objects, on this picture, are metastable loci of interactive potential.     

Material Objects,Constitution, and Mysterianism

It is sometimes claimed that ordinary objects, such as mountains and chairs, are not material in their own right, but only in virtue of the fact that they are constituted by matter. As Fine puts it, they are “only derivatively material” (2003, 211). In this paper I argue that invoking “constitution” to account for the materiality of things that are not material in their own right explains nothing and renders the admission that these objects are indeed material completely mysterious. Although there may be metaphysical contexts in which mysterianism can be accepted with equanimity, I further argue, the question of the materiality of quotidian objects is not one of them.     

Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world

The universality, invariance, and elegance of principles governing the universe may be reflected in principles of the minds that have evolved in that universe--provided that the mental principles are formulated with respect to the abstract spaces appropriate for the representation of biologically significant objects and their properties. (1) Positions and motions of objects conserve their shapes in the geometrically fullest and simplest way when represented as points and connecting geodesic paths in the six-dimensional manifold jointly determined by the Euclidean group of three-dimensional space and the symmetry group of each object. (2) Colors of objects attain constancy when represented as points in a three-dimensional vector space in which each variation in natural illumination is canceled by application of its inverse from the three-dimensional linear group of terrestrial transformations of the invariant solar source. (3) Kinds of objects support optimal generalization and categorization when represented, in an evolutionarily-shaped space of possible objects, as connected regions with associated weights determined by Bayesian revision of maximum-entropy priors.     

The experience of force: the role of haptic experience of forces in visual perception of object motion and interactions, mental simulation, and motion-related judgments

Forces are experienced in actions on objects. The mechanoreceptor system is stimulated by proximal forces in interactions with objects, and experiences of force occur in a context of information yielded by other sensory modalities, principally vision. These experiences are registered and stored as episodic traces in the brain. These stored representations are involved in generating visual impressions of forces and causality in object motion and interactions. Kinematic information provided by vision is matched to kinematic features of stored representations, and the information about forces and causality in those representations then forms part of the perceptual interpretation. I apply this account to the perception of interactions between objects and to motions of objects that do not have perceived external causes, in which motion tends to be perceptually interpreted as biological or internally caused. I also apply it to internal simulations of events involving mental imagery, such as mental rotation, trajectory extrapolation and judgment, visual memory for the location of moving objects, and the learning of perceptual judgments and motor skills. Simulations support more accurate judgments when they represent the underlying dynamics of the event simulated. Mechanoreception gives us whatever limited ability we have to perceive interactions and object motions in terms of forces and resistances; it supports our practical interventions on objects by enabling us to generate simulations that are guided by inferences about forces and resistances, and it helps us learn novel, visually based judgments about object behavior.