Phenomenal characteristics associated with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: influence of valence and temporal distance

As humans, we frequently engage in mental time travel, reliving past experiences and imagining possible future events. This study examined whether similar factors affect the subjective experience associated with remembering the past and imagining the future. Participants mentally "re-experienced" or "pre-experienced" positive and negative events that differed in their temporal distance from the present (close versus distant), and then rated the phenomenal characteristics (i.e., sensorial, contextual, and emotional details) associated with their representations. For both past and future, representations of positive events were associated with a greater feeling of re-experiencing (or pre-experiencing) than representations of negative events. In addition, representations of temporally close events (both past and future) contained more sensorial and contextual details, and generated a stronger feeling of re-experiencing (or pre-experiencing) than representations of temporally distant events. It is suggested that the way we both remember our past and imagine our future is constrained by our current goals.     

Distorted body representations in healthy cognition

Delusions and misperceptions about the body are a conspicuous feature of numerous neurological and psychiatric conditions. In stark contrast to such pathological cases, the immediacy and familiarity of our ordinary experience of our body can make it seem as if our representation of our body is highly accurate, even infallible. Recent research has begun to demonstrate, however, that large and systematic distortions of body representation are a normal part of healthy cognition. Here, I describe this research, focusing on distortions of body representations underlying tactile distance perception and position sense. I also discuss evidence for distortions of higher-order body representations, such as the conscious body image. Finally, I will end with a discussion of the potential relations among different body representations and their distortions.     

Time in the mind: using space to think about time

How do we construct abstract ideas like justice, mathematics, or time-travel? In this paper we investigate whether mental representations that result from physical experience underlie people's more abstract mental representations, using the domains of space and time as a testbed. People often talk about time using spatial language (e.g., a long vacation, a short concert). Do people also think about time using spatial representations, even when they are not using language? Results of six psychophysical experiments revealed that people are unable to ignore irrelevant spatial information when making judgments about duration, but not the converse. This pattern, which is predicted by the asymmetry between space and time in linguistic metaphors, was demonstrated here in tasks that do not involve any linguistic stimuli or responses. These findings provide evidence that the metaphorical relationship between space and time observed in language also exists in our more basic representations of distance and duration. Results suggest that our mental representations of things we can never see or touch may be built, in part, out of representations of physical experiences in perception and motor action.     

The effect of external representations on numeric tasks

This article explores the effect of external representations on numeric tasks. Through several minor modifications on the previously reported two-digit number comparison task, we obtained different results. Rather than holistic comparison, we found parallel comparison. We argue that this difference was a reflection of different representational forms: The comparison was based on internal representations in previous studies but on external representations in our present study. This representational effect is discussed under a framework of distributed number representations. We propose that in numerical tasks involving external representations, numbers should be considered as distributed representations, and the behaviour in these tasks should be considered as the interactive processing of internal and external information through the interplay of perceptual and cognitive processes. We suggest that theories of number representations and process models of numerical cognition should consider external representations as an essential component.     

Abnormalities in the awareness of action

Optimal motor control relies on internal representations of the actual, desired and predicted states of our limbs and the external world. Only certain components of these internal representations are available to awareness. We suggest that impairments of the components of internal representations might underlie a broad variety of neuropsychiatric symptoms, including the anarchic hand sign, phantom limbs, utilization behaviour and delusions of control.     

The Proteus Effect: The Effect of Transformed Self‐Representation on Behavior

Virtual environments, such as online games and web‐based chat rooms, increasingly allow us to alter our digital self‐representations dramatically and easily. But as we change our self‐representations, do our self‐representations change our behavior in turn? In 2 experimental studies, we explore the hypothesis that an individual’s behavior conforms to their digital self‐representation independent of how others perceive them—a process we term the Proteus Effect. In the first study, participants assigned to more attractive avatars in immersive virtual environments were more intimate with confederates in a self‐disclosure and interpersonal distance task than participants assigned to less attractive avatars. In our second study, participants assigned taller avatars behaved more confidently in a negotiation task than participants assigned shorter avatars. We discuss the implications of the Proteus Effect with regards to social interactions in online environments.     

The development of numerical estimation: evidence against a representational shift

How do our mental representations of number change over development? The dominant view holds that children (and adults) possess multiple representations of number, and that age and experience lead to a shift from greater reliance upon logarithmically organized number representations to greater reliance upon more accurate, linear representations. Here we present a new theoretically motivated and empirically supported account of the development of numerical estimation, based on the idea that number‐line estimation tasks entail judgments of proportion. We extend existing models of perceptual proportion judgment to the case of abstract numerical magnitude. Two experiments provide support for these models; three likely sources of developmental change in children’s estimation performance are identified and discussed. This work demonstrates that proportion‐judgment models provide a unified account of estimation patterns that have previously been explained in terms of a developmental shift from logarithmic to linear representations of number.     

Seeing yourself helps you see others

It has been proposed that self-face representations are involved in interpreting facial emotions of others. We experimentally primed participants' self-face representations. In Study 1, we assessed eye tracking patterns and performance on a facial emotion discrimination task, and in Study 2, we assessed emotion ratings between self and nonself groups. Results show that experimental priming of self-face representations increases visual exploration of faces, facilitates the speed of facial expression processing, and increases the emotional distance between expressions. These findings suggest that the ability to interpret facial expressions of others is intimately associated with the representations we have of our own faces.     

The Embodied Nature of Implicit Theories: The Consistency of Ideas About the Nature of Matter

Recent research has revealed the existence of intuitive representations strongly rooted in diverse knowledge domains and the difficulties of modifying those representations through instruction by means of conceptual change processes (Carey, 1995; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Vosniadou, 1994). According to some interpretations, these representations are organized in the form of intuitive or implicit theories, among whose features would be representational consistency across different contexts or tasks. Other authors, however, have argued in favor of the partial or situated nature of these representations so that we cannot talk about authentic theories (Caravita & Hallden, 1994; diSessa, 1993, 1994). In this research, we analyzed the consistency of the representations on the nature of matter held by people with diverse levels of instruction from adolescents aged 12 to students with advanced studies in chemistry. Our objective was to analyze the consistency of these representations with respect to the core concepts of chemistry, the intrinsic movement of particles, and the discontinuous nature of matter, which would be constituted by particles separated by empty space. However, these two core concepts would be in contradiction to our embodied representation of matter based on its macroscopic or sensorial properties according to which matter is static and continuous. The results confirm a majority and consistent use of intuitive representations as against scientific ones, confirming that at least from the point of view of consistency, these representations constitute authentic implicit theories. Moreover, it is those representations that correspond to the macroscopic properties of matter that are used in the most consistent way, which also supports the hypothesis of the embodied nature of these theories. Although the corpuscular theory of matter, when used appropriately, provides more consistent representations, our data show a quite limited use of this theory, even among students with advanced studies in science, which once more shows the difficulties of achieving, through instruction, a change in these implicit, embodied theories. In the article, we discuss the implications of these data for science teaching.     

Iconic and non-iconic stages in number development: the role of language

Is language the key to number? This article argues that the human language faculty provides the cognitive equipment that enables humans to develop a systematic number concept. Importantly, the number concept is based on non-iconic representations that involve relations between relations: relations between numbers are linked with relations between objects. In contrast to this, language-independent numerosity concepts provide only iconic representations. The pattern of forming relations between relations lies at the heart of our language faculty, suggesting that it is language that enables humans to make the step from these iconic representations, which we share with other species, to a generalized concept of number.     

Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: an adverbial account of mental representations

This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger's views in his Being No One. Though perception does involve internal processing and representations, it is argued that perception is direct. We track real features of the world, but fallibly, in a certain way. Moreover, it is claimed that mental representations are quite different from internal neural representations. They are best construed in an adverbial way. What we perceive, the object of perception, is the real world. Internal neural representations are the means by which we perceive the world. And mental representations are the way in which we experience the world, the adverbial content of perception. Finally, what goes for the world goes for ourselves as well: in self-consciousness we track real features of ourselves, but fallibly, in a certain way.     

The time course of abstract visual representation

Studies in change blindness re-enforce the suggestion that veridical, pictorial representations that survive multiple relocations of gaze are unlikely to be generated in the visual system. However, more abstract information may well be extracted and represented by the visual system. In this paper we study the types of information that are retained and the time courses over which these representations are constructed when participants view complex natural scenes. We find that such information is retained and that the resultant abstract representations encode a range of information. Different types of information are extracted and represented over different time courses. After several seconds of viewing natural scenes, our visual system is able to construct a complex information-rich representation.     

Arguing about tobacco and its effects on social representations

This study analysed the influence of social debate (group discussion) on previously held antagonistic social representations about tobacco. In the first phase of our study, we contacted 130 subjects in order to know what type of social representations they held. Two representations were found: a ‘psychopathological’ representation and a ‘critical’ one. After obtaining these results, and in a second phase, we randomly divided 100 subjects into 10 discussion groups, whilst another 30 subjects were assigned to the control condition (non-discussion group). The group discussion (social debate) led to a convergence of previously held representations. Debate emerged as a mechanism which could reduce the distance between groups who hold previously opposing representations.     

Concepts as Semantic Pointers: A Framework and Computational Model

The reconciliation of theories of concepts based on prototypes, exemplars, and theory‐like structures is a longstanding problem in cognitive science. In response to this problem, researchers have recently tended to adopt either hybrid theories that combine various kinds of representational structure, or eliminative theories that replace concepts with a more finely grained taxonomy of mental representations. In this paper, we describe an alternative approach involving a single class of mental representations called “semantic pointers.” Semantic pointers are symbol‐like representations that result from the compression and recursive binding of perceptual, lexical, and motor representations, effectively integrating traditional connectionist and symbolic approaches. We present a computational model using semantic pointers that replicates experimental data from categorization studies involving each prior paradigm. We argue that a framework involving semantic pointers can provide a unified account of conceptual phenomena, and we compare our framework to existing alternatives in accounting for the scope, content, recursive combination, and neural implementation of concepts.     

Average size perception and the allure of a new mechanism

In this brief response to commentaries by Ariely (2008) and Chong, Joo, Emmanouil, and Treisman (2008) on our earlier article, we highlight the two key assumptions underlying earlier claims about statistical summary representations of object size and argue that existing studies have not met either of them. We note why statistical summary representations of size are different from such representations of motion or orientation, and we emphasize the need for simulations of performance to exclude focused attention explanations for judgments of average size.     

Representing time in language and memory: The role of similarity structure

Every day we read about or watch events in the world and can easily understand or remember how long they last. What aspects of an event are retained in memory? And how do we extract temporal information from our memory representations? These issues are central to human cognition, as they underlie a fundamental aspect of our mental life, namely our representation of time. This paper reviews previous language studies and reports a visual learning study indicating that properties of the events encoded in memory shape the representation of their duration. The evidence indicates that for a given event, the extent to which its associated properties or sub-components differ from one another modulates our representation of its duration. These properties include the similarity between sub-events and the similarity between the situational contexts in which an event occurs. We suggest that the diversity of representations that we associate with events in memory plays an important role in remembering and estimating the duration of experienced or described events.     

The Mental Representation of Human Action

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence.